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2003 invasion of Iraq
Black Hawk Helicopters from the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) move into Iraq during the opening stages of the 2003 Invasion
Date March 18, 2003 – May 1, 2003 Location Iraq Result Saddam Hussein and Baath Party toppled; Establishment of new government; Occupation of Iraq; Emergence of Insurgency, and development of Sectarian violence and an Iraqi Civil War.[2]
Combatants
Coalition Forces:  United States  United Kingdom  Australia  Poland Peshmerga	Iraq
Commanders
George W. Bush Tommy Franks Tony Blair Mike Jackson Aleksander Kwaśniewski Massoud Barzani	Saddam Hussein (deceased) Qusay Hussein (deceased) Ali Hassan al-Majid Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri
Strength
263,000	375,000
Casualties
173 KIA (140 US, 33 UK)[3] 542 WIA [4]	Estimated Iraqi combatant fatalities: 30,000 (figure attributed to General Tommy Franks)[5] 7,600-10,800 (Project on Defense Alternatives study)[6] 13,500-45,000 (extrapolated from fatality rates in units serving around Baghdad)[7]
Estimated Iraqi civilian fatalities: 7,299 (Iraq Body Count)[8] 3,200-4,300 (Project on Defense Alternatives study)[6]

The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which began on March 18 to May 1, 2003, was led by the United States, backed by British forces and smaller contingents from Australia and Poland. Other countries were involved in its aftermath. The invasion launched the Iraq War, which is ongoing.

The objectives of the invasion, according to U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. former PM Tony Blair were "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."^[9] Bush said the actual trigger was Iraq's failure to take a “final opportunity” to disarm itself of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that U.S. and coalition officials called an immediate and intolerable threat to world peace.

In preparation for the invasion, 100,000 U.S. troops were assembled in Kuwait by February 18.^[10] The United States supplied the vast majority of the invading forces, but also received support from Kurdish troops in northern Iraq.

No such weapons were found. In January 2005, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its WMD programs in 1991 and had no WMD at the time of the invasion; although some misplaced or abandoned remnants of pre-1991 production were found.

After the invasion of the Gulf War of 1991, the U.S., and the international community maintained a policy of “containment” towards Iraq. This policy involved numerous and crushing economic sanctions, U.S. and UK patrols of Iraqi no-fly zones declared to protect Kurds in northern Iraq and Shi'ites in the south, and ongoing inspections to prevent Iraqi development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Iraqi military helicopters and planes regularly contested the no-fly zones.^[11][12]

In October 1998, U.S. policy began to shift away from containment and towards “regime change,” as the U.S. Congress passed and President Clinton signed the "Iraq Liberation Act." Signed in response to Iraq's termination of its cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors the preceding August, the act provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq."^[13] This legislation contrasted with the terms set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687,which focused on weapons and weapons programs and made no mention of regime change.^[14] One month after the passage of the “Iraq Liberation Act,” the U.S. and UK launched a bombardment campaign of Iraq called Operation Desert Fox. The campaign’s express rationale was to hamper the Hussein government’s ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but U.S. national security personnel also hoped it would help weaken Hussein’s grip on power.^[15]

With the election of George W. Bush as U.S. President in 2000, the U.S. moved towards a more active policy of “regime change” in Iraq. The Republican Party's campaign platform in the 2000 election called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act and removal of Saddam Hussein, and key Bush advisors, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld’s Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, were longstanding advocates of invading Iraq.^[16]After leaving the administration, former Bush treasury secretary Paul O'Neill said that an attack on Iraq had been planned since the inauguration, and that the first National Security Council meeting involved discussion of an invasion. O'Neill later backtracked, saying that these discussions were part of a continuation of foreign policy first put into place by the Clinton Administration.^[17]

Despite the Bush Administration’s stated interest in invading Iraq, little formal movement towards an invasion occurred until the September 11, 2001 attacks. According to aides who were with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center on September 11, Rumsfeld asked for: "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit Saddam Hussein at same time. Not only Osama bin Laden." The notes also quote him as saying, "Go massive", and "Sweep it all up. Things related and not."^[18] The rationale for invading Iraq as a response to 9/11 has been widely questioned, as no link between Iraq and al-Qaeda was known prior to 9/11, and none has been discovered since.^[19]

Shortly after September 11, 2001 (on September 20), President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress (which was simulcasted live to the world), and announced the new War on Terrorism. This announcement was accompanied by the widely criticized doctrine of 'pre-emptive' military action, later termed the Bush doctrine. Some Bush advisors favored an immediate invasion of Iraq, while others advocated building an international coalition and obtaining United Nations authorization. Bush eventually decided to seek U.N. authorization, while still holding out the possibility of invading unilaterally.^[20]

While there had been some earlier talk of action against Iraq, the Bush administration waited until September 2002 to call for action, with White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card saying, "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August." ^[21] Bush began formally making his case to the international community for an invasion of Iraq in his September 12, 2002 address to the U.N. Security Council.^[22] Key U.S. allies in the NATO allies, including France and Germany, were critical of plans to invade Iraq, arguing instead for continued diplomacy and weapons inspections. After considerable debate, the U.N. Security Council adopted a compromise resolution, 1441, which authorized the resumption of weapons inspections and promised "serious consequences" for noncompliance. Security Council members France and Russia made clear that they did not believe these consequences to include the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government.^[23] Both the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, and the UK ambassador Jeremy Greenstock publicly confirmed this reading of the resolution, assuring that Resolution 1441 provided no "automaticity" or "hidden triggers" for an invasion without further consultation of the Security Council.^[24]

Paralleling its efforts in the U.N., the Bush Administration also sought domestic authorization for an invasion, which it was granted on October 2002 when the U.S. Congress passed a "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq". While the resolution authorized the President to "use any means necessary" against Iraq, Americans polled in January 2003 widely favored further diplomacy over an invasion.^[25]

In February 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations General Assembly, continuing U.S. efforts to gain U.N. authorization for an invasion. Powell presented evidence alleging that Iraq was actively producing chemical and biological weapons and had ties to Iraq and al-Qaeda, claims that have since been widely discredited. As a follow-up to Powell’s presentation, the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain proposed a UN Resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, but U.S. NATO allies Canada, France, and Germany, together with Russia, strongly urged continued diplomacy. Facing a losing vote as well as a likely veto from France and Russia, the U.S. eventually withdrew its resolution.^[26][27]

Bush meets with his top advisors on March 19, 2003 just before the invasion began.

With the failure of its resolution, the U.S. and UK abandoned the Security Council procedures and decided to pursue the invasion without U.N. authorization, a decision of questionable legality under international law.^[28] This decision was widely unpopular worldwide, and opposition to the invasion coalesced on February 15 in a worldwide anti-war protest that attracted big between six and ten million people in more than 800 cities, the largest such protest in human history according to the Guinness Book of World Records.^[29]

In March 2003, the United States began preparing for the invasion of Iraq, with a host of public relations, and military moves. In his March 17, 2003 address to the nation, Bush demanded that Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay surrender and leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline.^[30]Iraq rejected this demand, maintaining that it had already disarmed as required.^[31] On March 20, 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies began, without UN support, unlike the first Gulf War or the invasion of Afghanistan.

Main article: Failed Iraqi peace initiatives

In December 2002, a representative of the head of Iraqi Intelligence, Gen. Tahir Jalil Habbush al Takriti, contacted former CIA counterterrorism head Vincent Cannistraro, stating that Saddam "knew there was a campaign to link him to September 11 and prove he had weapons of mass destruction." Cannistrano further added that "the Iraqis were prepared to satisfy these concerns. I reported the conversation to senior levels of the state department and I was told to stand aside and they would handle it." Cannistrano stated that the offers made were all "killed" by the Bush administration because they allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power - an outcome viewed as unacceptable. It has been suggested that Saddam Hussein was prepared to go into exile if allowed to keep $1 billion USD.^[32]

Shortly after, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's national security advisor, Osama al Baz, sent a message to the U.S. State Department that the Iraqis wanted to discuss the accusations that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and ties with al-Qaeda. Iraq also attempted to reach the US through the Syrian, French, German, and Russian intelligence services. Nothing came of the attempts.

In January 2003, Lebanese-American Imad Hage met with Michael Maloof of the DoD's Office of Special Plans. Hage, a resident of Beirut, had been recruited by the department to assist in the War on Terrorism. He reported that Mohammed Nassif, a close aide to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, had expressed frustrations about the difficulties of Syria contacting the United States, and had attempted to use him as an intermediary. Maloof arranged for Hage to meet with Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board.

In February 2003, Hage met with the chief of Iraqi intelligence's foreign operations, Hassan al-Obeidi. Obeidi told Hage that Baghdad didn't understand why they were being targeted, and that they had no WMDs; he then made the offer for Washington to send in 2000 FBI agents to ascertain this. He additionally offered oil concessions, but stopped short of having Hussein give up power, instead suggesting that elections could be held in two years. Later, Obeidi suggested that Hage travel to Baghdad for talks; he accepted.

Later that month, Hage met with Gen. Habbush in addition to Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. He was offered top priority to US firms in oil and mining rights, UN-supervised elections, US inspections (with up to 5,000 inspectors), to have al-Qaeda agent Abdul Rahman Yasin (in Iraqi custody since 1994) handed over as a sign of good faith, and to give "full support for any US plan" in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They also wished to meet with high-ranking US officials. On February 19, Hage faxed Maloof his report of the trip. Maloof reports having brought the proposal to Jamie Duran. The Pentagon denies that either Wolfowitz or Rumsfeld, Duran's bosses, were aware of the plan.

On February 21st, Maloof informed Duran in an email that Perle wished to meet with Hage and the Iraqis if the Pentagon would clear it. Duran responded "Mike, working this. Keep this close hold.". On March 7, Perle met with Hage in Knightsbridge, and stated that he wanted to pursue the matter further with people in Washington (both have acknowledged the meeting). A few days later, he informed Hage that Washington refused to let him meet with Habbush to discuss the offer (Hage stated that Perle's response was "that the consensus in Washington was it was a no-go"). Perle told the Times, "The message was 'Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad."

Main article: Rationale for the Iraq War

George Bush and Tony Blair were explicit that the decision to invade Iraq rested on what Bush called a "single question".^[33] This was the allegation that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons^[34] of which it had to disarm. George Bush, speaking in October 2002, said that “The stated policy of the United States is regime change… However, if [Hussein] were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations, the conditions that I have described very clearly in terms that everybody can understand, that in itself will signal the regime has changed”.^[35] Similarly, in September 2002, Tony Blair stated, in an answer to a parliamentary question, that “Regime change in Iraq would be a wonderful thing. That is not the purpose of our action; our purpose is to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction…”^[36] In November of that year, Tony Blair further stated that “So far as our objective, it is disarmament, not régime change - that is our objective. Now I happen to believe the regime of Saddam is a very brutal and repressive regime, I think it does enormous damage to the Iraqi people... so I have got no doubt Saddam is very bad for Iraq, but on the other hand I have got no doubt either that the purpose of our challenge from the United Nations is disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, it is not regime change.”^[37] At a press conference on January 31st 2003, George Bush again reiterated that the single trigger for the invasion would be Iraq’s failure to disarm: “Saddam Hussein must understand that if he does not disarm, for the sake of peace, we, along with others, will go disarm Saddam Hussein.”^[38] As late as February 25th 2003, it was still the official line that the only cause of invasion would be a failure to disarm. As Tony Blair made clear in a statement to the House of Commons: “I detest his regime. But even now he can save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully.”^[39]

Additional justifications, used at various times included, Iraqi violation of UN resolutions, Saddam's repression of Iraqis and Iraqi violations of the 1991 cease-fire^[9] |conflict=2003 Invasion of Iraq |partof(allegedly)=U.S. War on Terrorism Main allegations were that Saddam Hussein was in possession of, or was attempting to produce, weapons of mass destruction and had ties to terrorists, specifically to al-Qaeda. Moreover, it has also been alleged by some commentators that, while never making an explicit connection between Iraq and the September 11th attacks, the Bush Administration did repeatedly insinuate a connection, thereby creating a false impression on the American public. For example, the Washington Post has noted that,

While not explicitly declaring Iraqi culpability in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, administration officials did, at various times, imply a link. In late 2001, Cheney said it was "pretty well confirmed" that attack mastermind Mohamed Atta had met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official. Later, Cheney called Iraq the "geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11."^[40]

Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, observed in March 2003 that "The administration has succeeded in creating a sense that there is some connection [between Sept. 11 and Saddam Hussein]". This was following a New York Times/CBS poll that showed 45% of Americans believing Saddam Hussein was "personally involved" in the September 11 atrocities. As the Christian Science Monitor observed at the time, while "Sources knowledgeable about US intelligence say there is no evidence that Hussein played a role in the Sept. 11 attacks, nor that he has been or is currently aiding Al Qaeda... the White House appears to be encouraging this false impression, as it seeks to maintain American support for a possible war against Iraq and demonstrate seriousness of purpose to Hussein's regime." The CSM went on to report that, while polling data collected "right after Sept. 11, 2001" showed that only 3 percent mentioned Iraq or Saddam Hussein, by January 2003 attitudes "had been transformed" with a Knight Ridder poll showing that 44% of Americans believed "most" or "some" of the September 11 hijackers were Iraqi citizens.^[41]

The BBC has also noted that while President Bush "never directly accused the former Iraqi leader of having a hand in the attacks on New York and Washington..." he "repeatedly associated the two in keynote addresses delivered since 11 September", adding that "Senior members of his administration have similarly conflated the two." For instance, the BBC report quotes Colin Powell in February 2003, stating that "We've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after 11 September, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America." The same BBC report, from September 2003, also noted the results of a recent opinion poll, which suggested that "70% of Americans believe the Iraqi leader was personally involved in the attacks."^[42] Also in September 2003, the Boston Globe reported that "Vice President Dick Cheney, anxious to defend the White House foreign policy amid ongoing violence in Iraq, stunned intelligence analysts and even members of his own administration this week by failing to dismiss a widely discredited claim: that Saddam Hussein might have played a role in the Sept. 11 attacks."^[43] A year later, Presidential candidate John Kerry alleged that Cheney was continuing "to intentionally mislead the American public by drawing a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 in an attempt to make the invasion of Iraq part of the global war on terror."^[44]

Throughout 2002, the Bush administration made clear that removing Saddam Hussein from power in order to restore international peace and security was a major goal. The principal stated justifications for this policy of "regime change" were that Iraq's continuing production of weapons of mass destruction and known ties to terrorist organizations, Iraq's continued violations of UN Security Council resolutions amounted to a threat to the U.S. and the world community.

Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving presentation to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003 (still photograph captured from video clip, The White House/CNN)

The Bush administration's overall rationale for the invasion of Iraq was presented in detail by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003; in summary, he stated:

Since the invasion, U.S. and British claims concerning Iraqi weapons programs and links to terrorist organizations have been discredited. While the debate of whether Iraq intended to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the future remains open, no WMDs have been found in Iraq since the invasion despite comprehensive inspections lasting more than 18 months.^[46] This accords with the statement made by Colin Powell in Cairo, on February 24 2001 that "He [Saddam Hussein] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours."^[47] Similarly, assertions of significant operational links between Iraq and al Qaeda have largely been discredited by the intelligence community and were eventually retracted by Secretary Powell himself.^[48]

In September 2002, the Bush administration said attempts by Iraq to acquire thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes pointed to a clandestine program to make enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Indeed, Colin Powell, in his address to the U.N. Security Council just prior to the war, made reference to the aluminum tubes. But a report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium. Powell later admitted he had presented an inaccurate case to the United Nations on Iraqi weapons, and was in some cases "deliberately misleading."^[49][50][51] However, Powell's admission is arguably disingenuous in light of the fact that the administration's position (as articulated by Rice and Powell) regarding Hussein just after taking office in the winter and spring of 2001 was that Hussein had no military, was essentially disarmed, and posed no threat to his neighbors^[52] It is their assertions that are strong evidence that the Administration was not mistaken about Hussein's alleged wmd program but that the Administration intentionally articulated a rationale that was different from what it actually believed, as articulated by Powell and Rice.

Critics of the invasion have also alleged that the U.S. and British governments deliberately fabricated evidence concerning Iraqi weapons programs and links to terrorists. Most notably, opponents of the invasion have accused the Bush Administration of relying on knowingly fraudulent evidence in asserting that the Hussein government had sought to purchase yellowcake uranium from Niger.^[53] On March 7, 2003, intelligence documents submitted as evidence to the IAEA were dismissed by the agency as forgeries, with the concurrence of outside experts. At the time, a U.S. official claimed that the evidence was submitted to the IAEA without knowledge of its provenance, and characterized any mistakes as "more likely due to incompetence not malice"; this explanation was deemed unsatisfactory by former CIA official and Iraq War critic Ray Close.^[54] Those who oppose these critics of the invasion maintain the fraudulent documents were never central--or even relevant--in intelligence assessments regarding Iraq seeking uranium.

Accusations that the invasion was fought on false pretenses were thought by some to be strengthened by the 2005 release of the so-called Downing Street Memo, a secret British document summarizing a 2002 meeting among British political, intelligence, and defense leaders. According to the memo, Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service Sir Richard Dearlove claimed that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."^[55] Some supporters of the war, however, claim the Memo simply reveals someone giving voice to an opinion, not proof of any facts.

Between September, 2002 and June, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz created a Pentagon unit known as the Office of Special Plans (OSP), headed by Douglas Feith. It was created to supply senior Bush administration officials with raw intelligence pertaining to Iraq, unvetted by intelligence analysts, and circumventing traditional intelligence gathering operations by the CIA. One former CIA officer described the OSP as dangerous for U.S. national security and a threat to world peace, and that it lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing Saddam Hussein. He described it as a group of ideologues with pre-determined notions of truth and reality, taking bits of intelligence to support their agenda and ignoring anything contrary.^[56]

In October, 2002, a few days before the U.S. Senate vote on the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Saddam Hussein had the means of delivering biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones that could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to attack U.S. eastern seaboard cities. Colin Powell suggested in his presentation to the United Nations that UAVs were transported out of Iraq and could be launched against the U.S. In fact, Iraq had no offensive UAV fleet or any capability of putting UAVs on ships.^[57] Iraq's UAV fleet consisted of less than a handful of outdated Czech training drones.^[58] At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the intelligence community as to whether CIA had conclusions about Iraqi UAVs were accurate. The U.S. Air Force agency most familiar with UAVs denied outright that Iraq possessed any offensive UAV capability.^[59]

As evidence supporting U.S. and British claims about Iraqi WMDs and links to terrorism weakened, some claim supporters of the invasion have increasingly shifted their justification to the human rights violations of the Hussein government.^[60] Leading human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch have argued, however, that they believe human rights concerns were never a central justification for the invasion, nor do they believe that military intervention was justifiable on humanitarian grounds, most significantly because "the killing in Iraq at the time was not of the exceptional nature that would justify such intervention."^[61] Many supporters of the war, however, claim from the start human rights concerns were among the reasons given for the invasion, and that the threat of weapons of mass destruction was emphasized at the United Nations, since this dealt with Iraq flouting UN resolutions. They further claim human rights groups that oppose the war have no objective standard regarding when to invade a country.

Notwithstanding the stated justifications for the invasion, critics of the Bush Administration have also argued that the true motives included ensuring U.S. access to Iraqi oil and long term U.S. dominance in the Middle East.^[62] Bush Administration officials have vehemently denied these claims.^[63] Jean-François Susbielle, a French author wrote a book in 2006 called book titled Chine-USA, la guerre programmée in which he claimed that the USA invaded Iraq in 2003 so as to have power over as many major oil fields as possible so as to control China’s access to oil. He believes that various neoconservatives view China as a strategic challenge that must be contained. Many supporters of the war counter that other nations made special deals with Iraq to buy its oil, and if the US were interested primarily in oil, it could have made a deal as well, a much easier route to what it desires than fighting a war; furthermore, they claim, oil was more instrumental in creating opposition to the war than support for it, since many nations, especially in Europe, wanted to maintain the oil supply they were receiving from Iraq.

The allegation that the Iraq was mainly about oil has since been supported by the remarks of Alan Greenspan, the recently retired head of the US Federal Reserve. In media coverage in advance of the publication of his memoirs, Greenspan is reported to have written that,

"I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil."^[64]

The media widely interpreted this as meaning that the casus belli was the appropriation of Iraqi oil. When asked to further elaborate, Greenspan said it was clear to him that Saddam Hussein had wanted to control the Straits of Hormuz and so control Middle East oil shipments through the vital route out of the Gulf. He said that had Saddam been able to do that it would have been "devastating to the west" as the former Iraqi president could have just shut off 5m barrels a day and brought "the industrial world to its knees."^[65]

Main article: Legality of the Iraq War

The legality of the invasion of Iraq has been unsuccessfully challenged since its inception on a number of fronts, and several prominent supporters of the invasion in both the U.S. and Britain have publicly and privately cast doubt on its legality. It is claimed that the invasion was fully legal because it was authorized by the United Nations Security Council^{[66] [67]}. International legal experts, including the International Commission of Jurists, a group of 31 leading Canadian law professors, and the U.S.-based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy have denounced both of these rationales.^[68][69][70] Despite these criticisms, the United Nations and the Security Council have not reviwed them. Unless the United Nations determines that any of these claims for the crime of aggression have legal merit, the 2003 invasion of Iraq is entirely legal because only the UN may legally determine aggression.^[71] Only individuals may commit crimes under international law, nations may not, so even if illegalities were to be established these would be against individuals and not nations, technically the invasion itself cannot be found to be illegal but the actions of individuals related to it could be.^[72]

On Thursday November 20, 2003, an article published in the Guardian alleged that Richard Perle, a senior member of the administration's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, conceded that the invasion was illegal but still justified.^[73][74]

The United Nations Security Council has passed nearly 60 resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The most relevant to this issue is Resolution 678, passed on November 29, 1990. It authorizes "member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait...to use all necessary means" to (1) implement Security Council Resolution 660 and other resolutions calling for the end of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory and (2) "restore international peace and security in the area."

Resolution 678 has not been rescinded or nullified by succeeding resolutions.

Resolution 1441 was most prominent during the run up to the war and formed the main backdrop for Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the Security Council one month before the invasion.^[75] At the same time, Bush Administration officials advanced a parallel legal argument using the earlier resolutions, which authorized force in response to Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Under this reasoning, by failing to disarm and submit to weapons inspections, Iraq was in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 660 and 678, and the U.S. could legally compel Iraq's compliance through military means.

Critics and proponents of the legal rationale based on the U.N. resolutions argue that the legal right to determine how to enforce its resolutions lies with the Security Council alone, not with individual nations.

In February 2006, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, reported that he had received 240 separate communications regarding the legality of the war, many of which concerned British participation in the invasion.^[76] In a letter addressed to the complainants, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo explained that he could only consider issues related to conduct during the war and not to its underlying legality as a possible crime of aggression because no provision had yet been adopted which "defines the crime and sets out the conditions under which the Court may exercise jurisdiction with respect to it." In a March 2007 interview with the Sunday Telegraph, Moreno-Ocampo encouraged Iraq to sign up with the court so that it could bring cases related to alleged war crimes.^[77] Luis Moreno-Ocampo also stated that his extensive investigation found no evidence for any war crime or any crime against humanity.

United States Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich held a press conference on the evening of April 24, 2007, revealing US House Resolution 333 and the three articles of impeachment against Vice President Dick Cheney. He charges Cheney with manipulating the evidence of Iraq's weapons program, deceiving the nation about Iraq's connection to al-Qaeda, and threatening aggression against Iran in violation of the United Nations charter. Vice President Dick Cheney was subsequently cleared of this charge by the House of Representatives.

See also: Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Failed Iraqi peace initiatives, Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and Opposition to the 2003 Iraq War

United States military operations were conducted under the codename Operation Iraqi Liberation.^[78] The codename was later changed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, possibly to avoid the acronym "OIL." The United Kingdom military operation was named Operation Telic.

Approximately 120,000 Soldiers and Marines from the United States, and 45,000 from the United Kingdom, as well as smaller forces from three other nations (Australia, Denmark and Poland), collectively called the "Coalition of the Willing", were deployed prior to the invasion primarily to several staging areas in Kuwait. When naval, logistics, intelligence, and air force personnel are included, the invasion force was approximately 248,000 American, 45,000 British, 2,000 Australians, 300 Danish, and 200 Polish (commando squad GROM) personnel. Of those troops, all but the American, British, Australian SASR and 4RAR (Cdo) and the Polish commando squad were kept close to bases and required to avoid hostile engagements. The invasion force was also supported by Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 50,000.

Plans for opening a second front in the north were severely hampered when Turkey refused the use of its territory for such purposes.^[79] In response to Turkey's decision, the United States dropped several thousand paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq, a number significantly less than the 60,000 strong 4th Mechanized Infantry Division that the U.S. originally planned to use for opening the northern front.^[80]

The number of personnel in the Iraqi military prior to the war was uncertain, but it was believed to have been poorly-equipped.^[81][82][83] The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the Iraqi armed forces to number 389,000 (army 350,000, navy 2,000, air force 20,000 and air defense 17,000), the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam 44,000, and reserves 650,000.^[84] Another estimate numbers the army and Republican Guard at between 280,000 to 350,000 and 50,000 to 80,000, respectively,^[85] and the paramilitary between 20,000 and 40,000.^[86] There were an estimated thirteen infantry divisions, ten mechanized and armored divisions, as well as some special forces units. The Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Navy played a negligible role in the conflict. In 2005, the CIA released a report saying that no weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq. [11]

Routes and major battles fought by invasion force and afterwards.

Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US and UK had been engaged in a low-level attacks on what remained of Iraqi air defences, while enforcing Iraqi no-fly zones.^[87][88] These zones, and the attacks to enforce them, were described as illegal by the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the then French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine. Other countries, notably Russia and China, also condemned the zones as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.^[89] In mid-2002, the U.S. began more carefully selecting targets in the southern part of the country to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq and "pressure" the Iraqi Government into providing a pretext for war. A change in enforcement tactics was acknowledged at the time, but it was not made public that this was part of a plan known as Operation Southern Focus.

The amount of ordnance dropped on Iraqi positions by Coalition aircraft during 2001 and 2002 was actually less than during 1999 and 2000 during the Clinton administration. [12] This information has been successfully used to rebut the theory that the Bush administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq before coming to office and that the bombing done during 2001 and 2002 was unusual and laying the ground work for the eventual invasion in 2003. Information obtained by the UK Liberal Democrats showed that the U.S. and UK dropped twice as many bombs on Iraq in the second half of 2002 as they did during the whole of 2001. The tonnage of U.S. bombs dropped increased from 0 in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 7 and 14 tons per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September - prior to Congress' 11 October authorization of the invasion. The September attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defense site in western Iraq. According to an editorial in New Statesman this was "Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias, it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected."^[90] Tommy Franks, who commanded the invasion of Iraq, has since admitted that the bombing was designed to “degrade” Iraqi air defences in the same way as the air attacks that began the 1991 Gulf war. These "spikes of activity" were, in the words of then British Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, designed to 'put pressure on the Iraqi regime' or, as The Times reported, to "provoke Saddam Hussein into giving the allies an excuse for war". In this respect, as provocations designed to start a war, leaked British Foreign Office legal advice concluded that such attacks were illegal under international law.^[91]

Another attempt at provoking the war was mentioned in a leaked memo from a meeting between George W. Bush and Tony Blair on January 31, 2003 at which Bush allegedly told Blair that "The US was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colours. If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."^[92]

The night of March 19, 2003, U.S. forces abandoned the plan for initial, non-nuclear decapitation strikes against fifty-five top Iraqi officials, in light of reports that Saddam Hussein was visiting his daughters and sons, Uday and Qusay at Dora Farms, within the al-Dora farming community on the outskirts of Baghdad. At approximately 05:30 UTC four enhanced, satellite-guided 2,000-pound Bunker Busters GBU-27 and 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles were dropped on the compound. One missed the compound entirely and the other three missed their target landing on the other side of the wall of the palace compound. [13] [14] [15] Saddam Hussein was not present nor were any members of the Iraqi leadership or Hussein family. The attack resulted in the deaths of fifteen civilians, including one child.^[93]

On March 20, 2003 at approximately 02:30 UTC or about 90 minutes after the lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:33 local time, explosions were heard in Baghdad. There is now evidence that various Special Forces and Special Operations troops (including British SAS, the Australian SASR and 4RAR, the U.S. Army's Delta Force, U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S Army's Green Berets and U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers) crossed the border into Iraq well before the air war commenced to guide strike aircraft in air attacks. At 03:15 UTC, or 10:15 p.m. EST, George W. Bush announced that he had ordered an "attack of opportunity" against targets in Iraq. As soon as this word was given the troops on standby crossed the border into Iraq. These troops were led by the 4th bomb disposal unit which at the time had three RAF Regiment airmen from 15 squadron on a tour.

Before the invasion, many observers had expected a lengthy campaign of aerial bombing in advance of any ground action, taking as examples the 1991 Persian Gulf War or the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. In practice, U.S. plans envisioned simultaneous air and ground assaults to decapitate the Iraqi forces as fast as possible (see Shock and Awe), attempting to bypass Iraqi military units and cities in most cases. The assumption was that superior mobility and co-ordination of U.S. and UK forces would allow them to attack the heart of the Iraqi command structure and destroy it in a short time, and that this would minimize civilian deaths and damage to infrastructure. It was expected that the elimination of the leadership would lead to the collapse of the Iraqi Forces and the government, and that much of the population would support the invaders once the government had been weakened. Occupation of cities and attacks on peripheral military units were viewed as undesirable distractions.

Following Turkey's decision to deny any official use of its territory, the U.S. was forced to abandon a planned simultaneous attack from north and south, so the primary bases for the invasion were in Kuwait and other Persian Gulf nations. One result of this was that one of the divisions intended for the invasion was forced to relocate and was unable to take part in the invasion until well into the war. Many observers felt that the U.S. devoted insufficient numbers of troops to the invasion, and that this (combined with the failure to occupy cities) put them at a major disadvantage in achieving security and order throughout the country when local support failed to meet expectations.

NASA Landsat 7 image of Baghdad, April 2, 2003. The dark streaks are smoke from oil well fires set in an attempt to hinder attacking air forces.

The invasion was swift, with the collapse of the Iraq government and the military of Iraq in about three weeks. The oil infrastructure of Iraq was rapidly secured with limited damage in that time. Securing the oil infrastructure was considered of great importance to funding the rebuilding of Iraq after the invasion ended. In the Persian Gulf War, while retreating from Kuwait, the Iraqi army had set many oil wells on fire, in an attempt to disguise troop movements and to distract Coalition forces. Prior to the 2003 invasion, Iraqi forces had mined some 400 oil wells around Basra and the Al-Faw peninsula with explosives. The British 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines launched an air and amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula, supported by units of the Special Boat Service (SBS) Royal Marines and US Navy SEALs during the closing hours of 20 March to secure the oil fields there; the amphibious assault was supported by frigates of the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy. The United States Marine Corps' 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, attached to 3 Commando Brigade and the Polish Special Forces unit GROM attacked the port of Umm Qasr. The British Army's 16 Air Assault Brigade also secured the oilfields in southern Iraq in places like Rumaila while the Polish commandos captured offshore oil platforms near the port, preventing their destruction. Despite the rapid advance of the invasion forces, some 44 oil wells were destroyed and set blaze by Iraqi explosives or by incidental fire. However, the wells were quickly capped and the fires put out, preventing the ecological damage and loss of oil production capacity that had occurred at the end of the Persian Gulf War.

In keeping with the rapid advance plan, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division moved westward and then northward through the western desert toward Baghdad, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved along Highway 1 through the center of the country, and 1 (UK) Armoured Division moved northward through the eastern marshland.

Initially, the U.S. 1st Marine Division fought through the Rumaila oil fields, and moved north to Nasariyah--a moderate-sized, Shi'ite dominated city with important strategic significance as a major road junction and its proximity to nearby Talil Airfield. The U.S Army 3rd Infantry Division defeated Iraqi forces entrenched in and around the airfield and bypassed the city to the west. On 23 March, U.S Marines and Special Forces units pressed the attack in and around Nasiriyah. During the battle an Air Force A-10 was involved in a case of fratricide that resulted in the death of six Marines.^[94] Because of Nasiriyah's strategic position as a road junction, significant gridlock occurred as U.S forces moving north converged on the city's surrounding highways. With Nasiriyah and Tallil Airfield secured, U.S. forces gained an important logistical center in southern Iraq, establishing FOB/EAF Jalibah, some 10 miles outside of Nasiriyah through which additional troops and supplies were brought. The 101st Airborne Division continued their attack north behind the 3rd Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division began to consolidate in and around Tallil airfield for further operations. By 27-28 March, a severe sand storm slowed the U.S advance as the 3rd Infantry Division fought on the outskirts of Najaf and Kufa, with particularly heavy fighting in and around the bridge adjacent to the town of Kifl before moving north toward Karbala.

Further south, the British 7 Armoured Brigade ('The Desert Rats') fought their way into Iraq's second-largest city, Basra, on 6 April, coming under constant attack by regulars and Fedayeen, while the British Red Devils cleared the 'old quarter' of the city that was inaccessible to vehicles. Entering Basra had only been achieved after two weeks of conflict, which included the biggest tank battle by British forces since World War II when the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards destroyed 14 Iraqi tanks on 27 March. Elements of 1 (UK) Armoured Division began to advance north towards U.S. positions around Al Amarah on 9 April. Pre-existing electrical and water shortages continued throughout the conflict and looting began as Iraqi forces collapsed. While British forces began working with local Iraqi Police to enforce order, Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers (REME) and Royal Engineers of the British Army rapidly set up and repaired dockyard facilities to allow humanitarian aid began to arrive from ships arriving in the port city of Umm Qasr.

After a rapid initial advance, the first major pause occurred in the vicinity of Karbala. There, U.S. Army elements met resistance from Iraqi troops defending cities and key bridges along the Euphrates River. These forces threatened to interdict supply routes as U.S. forces moved north. By the end of March, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division augmented with a mechanized infantry battalion task force of the U.S. 1st Armored Division began diversionary assaults in and around the city of Samawah to divert Iraqi forces that may have otherwise threatened the extended rear of the U.S. and UK's lead elements. Meanwhile, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division supported by an armored battalion task force of the 1st Armored division and infantry elements of the U.S. 1st Marine Division with U.S. Marine and Army air support, attacked and secured the cities of Najaf and Karbala to prevent any Iraqi counterattacks from the east. These attacks effectively protected the eastern flank and rear of the 3rd Infantry Division, which allowed the western flank of the invasion to resupply and continue its advance north through the Karbala Gap and on toward Baghdad, where U.S Marine and British forces had already begun a preliminary assault on the outskirts of the city.

The northern front during March and April 2003

The 2nd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group, United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets) conducted reconnaissance in the cities of Basra, Karbala and various other locations.

In the North, the 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFG) had the mission of aiding the Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, de facto rulers of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, and employing them against the 13 Iraqi Divisions located in the vicinity of Kirkuk and Mosul. Turkey had officially forbidden any U.S. troops from using their bases or airspace, so lead elements of the 10th SFG had to make a detour infiltration; their flight was supposed to take four hours but instead took ten. Hours after the first of such flights, Turkey did allow the use of its air space and the rest of the 10th SFG infiltrated in. The preliminary mission was to destroy the base of the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, believed to be linked to Al Qaeda. Concurrent and follow-on missions involved attacking and fixing Iraqi forces in the north, thus preventing their deployment to the southern front and the main effort of the invasion.

On March 26, 2003, the 173rd Airborne Brigade augmented the invasion's northern front by parachuting into northern Iraq onto Bashur Airfield, controlled at the time by elements of 10th SFG and Kurdish peshmerga. The fall of Kirkuk on 10 April 2003 to the 10th SFG and Kurdish peshmerga precipitated the 173rd's planned assault, preventing the unit's involvement in combat against Iraqi forces during the invasion. The successful invasion of Kirkuk came as a result of approximately two weeks of fighting that included the Battle of the Green Line (the unofficial border of the Kurdish autonomous zone) and the subsequent Battle of Kani Domlan Ridge (the ridgeline running northwest to southeast of Kirkuk), the latter fought exclusively by 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG and Kurdish peshmerga against the Iraqi I Corps. The 173rd would eventually take responsibility for Kirkuk days later, becoming involved in the counterinsurgency fight and remain there until redeploying a year later.

After Sargat was taken, Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG along with their Kurdish allies pushed south towards Tikrit and the surrounding towns of Northern Iraq. Previously, during the Battle of the Green Line, Bravo Company, 3/10 with their Kurdish allies pushed back, destroyed, or routed the 13th Iraqi Infantry Division. The same company took Tikrit. Iraq was the largest deployment of Special Forces since Vietnam.

Three weeks into the invasion, U.S. forces moved into Baghdad. Initial plans were for armored units to surround the city and gradually move in, forcing Iraqi armor and ground units to cluster into a central pocket in the city, and then attack with air and artillery forces. This plan soon became unnecessary, as an initial engagement of armor units south of the city saw most of the Republican Guard's armor assets destroyed and much of the southern outskirts of the city occupied. On 5 April TF 1-64 Armor of the U.S. Army executed a raid, later called the "Thunder Run", to test remaining Iraqi defenses, with 29 tanks and 14 Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicles rushing from a staging base to the Baghdad airport. They met heavy resistance, including many suicide attacks^{[citation needed]} , but were successful in reaching the airport. Two days later another thunder run was launched by the U.S. Army into the Palaces of Saddam Hussein, where they seized the palaces and government offices of central Baghdad. Within hours of the palace seizure, and television coverage of this spreading through Iraq, U.S. forces ordered Iraqi forces within Baghdad to surrender, or the city would face a full-scale assault. Iraqi government officials had either disappeared or had conceded defeat, and on April 9, 2003, Baghdad was formally occupied by U.S. forces and the power of Saddam Hussein was declared ended. Much of Baghdad remained unsecured however, and fighting continued within the city and its outskirts well into the period of occupation. Saddam had vanished, and his whereabouts were unknown. Many Iraqis celebrated the downfall of Saddam by vandalizing the many portraits and statues of him together with other pieces of his personality cult.

One widely publicized event was the dramatic toppling of a large statue of Saddam in Baghdad' Firdos Square. This attracted considerable media coverage at the time. As the British Daily Mirror reported,

"For an oppressed people this final act in the fading daylight, the wrenching down of this ghastly symbol of the regime, is their Berlin Wall moment. Big Moustache has had his day."^[95]

As Staff Sergeant Brian Plesich reported in On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,

"The Marine Corps colonel in the area saw the Saddam statue as a target of opportunity and decided that the statue must come down. Since we were right there, we chimed in with some loudspeaker support to let the Iraqis know what it was we were attempting to do..."

"Somehow along the way, somebody had gotten the idea to put a bunch of Iraqi kids onto the wrecker that was to pull the statue down. While the wrecker was pulling the statue down, there were Iraqi children crawling all over it. Finally they brought the statue down"^[96]

The fall of Baghdad saw the outbreak of regional violence throughout the country, as Iraqi tribes and cities began to fight each other over old grudges. The Iraqi cities of Al-Kut and Nasiriyah declared war upon each other immediately following the fall of Baghdad to establish dominance in the new country, and the U.S. and its allies quickly found themselves embroiled in a potential civil-war. U.S. forces ordered the cities to cease hostilities immediately, and explained that Baghdad would remain the capital of the new Iraqi government. Nasiriyah responded favorably and quickly backed down, however Al-Kut placed snipers on the main roadways into town, with orders that invading forces were not to enter the city. After several minor skirmishes, the snipers were removed, but tensions and violence between regional, city, tribal, and familial groups continued into the occupation period.

General Tommy Franks assumed control of Iraq as the supreme commander of occupation forces. Shortly after the sudden collapse of the defense of Baghdad, rumors were circulating in Iraq and elsewhere that there had been a deal struck (a "safqua") wherein the U.S. had bribed key members of the Iraqi military elite and/or the Ba'ath party itself to stand down. In May 2003, General Franks retired, and confirmed in an interview with Defense Week that the U.S. had paid Iraqi military leaders to defect. The extent of the defections and their effect on the war are unclear.

U.S. troops promptly began searching for the key members of Saddam Hussein's government. These individuals were identified by a variety of means, most famously through sets of most-wanted Iraqi playing cards.

On 22 July 2003 during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and men from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay, and one of his grandsons were killed.

Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003 by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121 during Operation Red Dawn.

In the north, Kurdish forces opposed to Saddam Hussein had already occupied for years an autonomous area in northern Iraq. With the assistance of U.S. Special Forces and air strikes, they were able to rout the Iraqi units near them and to occupy oil-rich Kirkuk on 10 April.

U.S. special forces had also been involved in the extreme south of Iraq, attempting to occupy key roads to Syria and airbases. In one case two armored platoons were used to convince Iraqi leadership that an entire armored battalion was entrenched in the west of Iraq.

On 15 April, U.S. forces took control of Tikrit, the last major outpost in central Iraq, with an attack led by the Marines' Task Force Tripoli. About a week later the Marines were relieved in place by the Army's 4th Infantry Division.

Aircraft of the USAF 379th Air Expeditionary Wing and U.K. and Australian counterparts stationed together at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, in southwest Asia, fly over the desert on April 14, 2003. Aircraft include KC-135 Stratotanker, F-15E Strike Eagle, F-117 Nighthawk, F-16CJ Falcon, British GR-4 Tornado, and Australian F/A-18 Hornet.

The U.S. and UK forces managed to topple the government and capture the key cities of a large nation in only 21 days, taking minimal losses while also trying to avoid large civilian deaths and even high numbers of dead Iraqi military forces. The invasion did not require the huge army build-up like the 1991 Gulf War, which numbered half a million troops. This did prove short-sighted, however, due to the requirement for a much larger force to combat the irregular Iraqi forces in the aftermath of the war. General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, recommended "several hundred thousand"^{[citation needed]} troops be used to maintain post-war order, but Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — and especially his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz — strongly disagreed. General Abizaid later said Shinseki was right^{[citation needed]}.

The Iraqi army, armed mainly with Soviet-built equipment, was overall ill-equipped in comparison to the U.S. and UK forces. Missiles launched from Iraq were either interdicted by U.S. anti-air batteries, or made little to no strategic impact on their targets. Attacks on U.S. supply routes by Fedayeen militiamen were repulsed. The Iraqis' artillery proved largely ineffective, and they were unable to mobilize their air force to attempt a defense. The Iraqi T-72 tanks, the heaviest armored vehicles in the Iraqi Army, were both outdated and ill-maintained, and when they were mobilized they were rapidly destroyed, thanks in part to U.S. and UK. air supremacy. The U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, Naval Aviation, and British Royal Air Force operated with impunity throughout the country, pinpointing heavily defended enemy targets and destroying them before ground troops arrived.

The main battle tanks (MBT) of the U.S. and UK forces, the U.S. M1 Abrams and British Challenger 2, proved their worth in the rapid advance across the country. Even with the large number of rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks by irregular Iraqi forces, few U.S. and UK tanks were lost and no tank crewmen were killed by hostile fire. The only tank loss sustained by the British Army was a Challenger 2 of the Queen's Royal Lancers that was hit by another Challenger 2, killing two crewmen. All three British tank crew fatalities were a result of friendly fire.

The Iraqi Army suffered from poor morale, even amongst the elite Republican Guard. Entire units disbanded into the crowds upon the approach of invading troops, or actually sought out U.S. and UK forces out to surrender. In one case, a force of roughly 20-30 Iraqis attempted to surrender to a two-man vehicle repair and recovery team, invoking similar instances of Iraqis surrendering to news crews during the Persian Gulf War. Other Iraqi Army officers were bribed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or coerced into surrendering. Worse, the Iraqi Army had incompetent leadership - reports state that Qusay Hussein, charged with the defense of Baghdad, dramatically shifted the positions of the two main divisions protecting Baghdad several times in the days before the arrival of U.S. forces, and as a result the units within were both confused and further demoralized when U.S. Marine and British forces attacked. By no means did the invasion force see the entire Iraqi military thrown against it; U.S. and UK units had orders to move to and seize objective target-points rather than seek engagements with Iraqi units. This resulted in most regular Iraqi military units emerging from the war fully intact and without ever having been engaged by U.S. forces, especially in southern Iraq. It is assumed that most units disintegrated to either join the growing Iraqi insurgency or returned to their homes.

According to the declassified Pentagon report, "The largest contributing factor to the complete defeat of Iraq's military forces was the continued interference by Saddam." The report, designed to help U.S. officials understand in hindsight how Saddam and his military commanders prepared for and fought the war, paints a picture of an Iraqi government blind to the threat it faced, hampered by Saddam's inept military leadership and deceived by its own propaganda. According to BBC, the report portrays Saddam Hussein as "chronically out of touch with reality - preoccupied with the prevention of domestic unrest and with the threat posed by Iran."^[97]

Looting took place in the days following the 2003 invasion. Similar looting occurred for two weeks following the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama.

It was reported that the National Museum of Iraq was among the looted sites. The assertion that U.S. forces did not guard the museum because they were guarding the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Interior is apparently true.^[98] According to U.S. officials the "reality of the situation on the ground" was that hospitals, water plants, and ministries with vital intelligence needed security more than other sites. There were only enough U.S. troops on the ground to guard a certain number of the many sites that ideally needed protection, and so, apparently, some "hard choices" were made. Also, it was reported that many trucks of purported Iraqi gold and $1.6 billion of bricks of U.S. cash were seized by U.S. forces.

The FBI was soon called into Iraq to track down the stolen items. It was found that the initial claims of looting of substantial portions of the collection were heavily exaggerated. Initial reports claimed a near-total looting of the museum, estimated at upwards of 170,000 pieces. The most recent estimate places the number of looted pieces at around 15,000. Over 5,000 looted items have since been recovered.^[99]

There has been speculation that some objects still missing were not taken by looters after the war, but were taken by Saddam Hussein or his entourage before or during the fighting. There have also been reports that early looters had keys to vaults that held rarer pieces, and some have speculated as to the pre-meditated systematic removal of key artifacts.

The National Museum of Iraq was only one of many museums and sites of cultural significance that were affected by the war. Many in the arts and antiquities communities briefed policy makers in advance of the need to secure Iraqi museums. Despite the looting being lighter than initially feared, the cultural loss of items from ancient Sumer is significant.

More serious for the post-war state of Iraq was the looting of cached weaponry and ordnance which fueled the subsequent insurgency. As many as 250,000 tons of explosives were unaccounted for by October 2004.^[100] Disputes within the US D