Alberto Fujimori

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Alberto Fujimori
Alberto Fujimori

In office
July 28, 1990 – November 22, 2000
Vice President(s) Máximo San Román (1990)
Roque Márquez (1995)
Francisco Tudela (2000)
Preceded by Alan García
Succeeded by Valentín Paniagua Corazao

Born July 28, 1938 (1938-07-28) (age 69)
Lima, Peru
Political party Cambio 90 (1990-1999)
Peru 2000 (2000)
Si Cumple (2006)
People's New Party (2007)
Spouse Susana Higuchi (divorced)
Satomi Kataoka
Religion Roman Catholic

Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori (born in Lima, Peru on July 28, 1938) is a Peruvian politician who served as president from July 28, 1990 to November 17, 2000. A controversial figure,[1] Fujimori has been credited with uprooting terrorism in Peru and restoring its macroeconomic stability, though his methods have drawn charges of authoritarianism.[2] He is alleged to be accountable for a number of human rights abuses[3] during his presidency, for which he is currently facing trial.[4]

In late 2000, in the face of mounting scandals, widespread corruption, and growing instability, he fled to Japan, where he resigned. His resignation was initially transmitted by fax and later officially via the Peruvian Embassy in Tokyo. The Congress of the Republic rejected his resignation, and removed him from office. It then barred him from holding any elective office for 10 years.

Wanted in Peru to face charges of corruption and human rights abuse, Fujimori remained in exile abroad. After travelling to Chile in November 2005, he was detained by Chilean authorities,[5] and ultimated extradited to face criminal charges in Peru, in September 2007.[6]

On December 11, 2007, in a court case separate from the pending human rights charges, Fujimori was convicted of ordering an illegal search and seizure of documents and videotapes in the possession of the wife of his former spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. He was sentenced to six years in prison.[7] The trial was at one point interrupted by an outburst by Fujimori in which he declared, "I received a country almost in collapse, exhausted by hyperinflation, international financial isolation and widespread terrorism... My government rescued the human rights of 25 million Peruvians with no exceptions... I reject the charges totally."[4]

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According to government records, Fujimori was born on July 28, 1938 in Miraflores, a district of Lima. His parents, Naoichi Fujimori and Mutsue Inomoto de Fujimori, were natives of Kumamoto, Japan who immigrated to Peru in 1934. He holds dual Peruvian and Japanese citizenship, his parents having secured the latter through the Japanese Consulate.

In recent years, many of Fujimori's political opponents, especially news reporter Cecilia "Chichi" Valenzuela-Hume,[citation needed] charged that he had actually been born in Japan. Because Peru's constitution requires the president to have been born in Peru, this would have made Fujimori ineligible to be president.[8] In July 1997, the political magazine Caretas reported that his birth and baptismal certificates may have been altered, suggesting that Fujimori's original birthplace had been erased and replaced with "Miraflores, Lima" in different handwriting. Caretas also alleged that when Fujimori's mother entered Peru in 1934, she declared having two children; Fujimori is the second of four children.[9]

Fujimori obtained his early education at the Colegio Nuestra Señora de la Merced, and La Rectora, and graduated high school from La gran unidad escolar Alfonso Ugarte in Lima. He went on to undergraduate studies at the Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina in 1957, graduating in 1961 first in his class as an agricultural engineer.

There he lectured on mathematics the following year. In 1964 he went on to study physics at the University of Strasbourg in France. On a Ford scholarship, Fujimori also attended the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee[10] in the United States, where he obtained his master's degree in mathematics in 1969. In 1974, he married Susana Higuchi, also of Japanese descent.

In recognition of his academic achievements, the sciences faculty of the Universidad Nacional Agraria offered Fujimori the deanship and in 1984 appointed him to the rectorship of the university, which he held until 1989.

In 1987, Fujimori also became president of the National Commission of Peruvian University Rectors (Asamblea Nacional de Rectores), a position which he has held twice. He also hosted a TV show called "Concertando" from 1987 to 1989, on Peru's state-owned network, Channel 7.

A dark horse candidate, Fujimori won the 1990 presidential election under the banner of the new party Cambio 90 ("cambio" meaning "change"), beating the world-renowned writer Mario Vargas Llosa in a surprising upset. He capitalized on profound disenchantment with previous president Alan García and his American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party. He exploited popular distrust of Vargas Llosa's identification with the existing Peruvian political establishment, and uncertainty about Vargas Llosa's plans for neoliberal economic reforms. Fujimori won much support from the poor, who had been frightened by Vargas Llosa's austerity proposals.

During the campaign, Fujimori was nicknamed El Chino, which translates literally to "The Chinaman". Although he is of Japanese heritage, Fujimori has suggested that he was always gladdened by the term, which he perceived as a term of affection.

During his first term in office, Fujimori enacted wide-ranging neoliberal reforms, known as Fujishock. This program bore little resemblance to Fujimori's campaign platform, and was in fact far more drastic than anything Vargas Llosa had proposed. Peru re-entered the global economy, from which it had become estranged during the García administration.

Spurred on by the IMF, Fujimori began an extensive process of privatization, selling off hundreds of state-owned enterprises. Fujishock restored macroeconomic stability to the economy and generated a brief economic upturn in the mid-1990s. His administration made sweeping changes to national laws to encourage foreign investment in the extractive oil, gas, and mining sectors. To accommodate foreign investors, the legislation gave new powers to "the competent sectoral authority," or agencies that oversee mining and oil projects, to determine on a case-by-case basis emissions limits, toxic waste disposal procedures and other concerns, which had previously been set by specific guidelines under environmental law.

During Fujimori's first term in office, APRA and Vargas Llosa's party, FREDEMO, remained in control of both chambers of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and Senate), hampering his ability to enact his programs. Fujimori also found it difficult to combat the threat posed by the Maoist guerrilla organization Shining Path (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso).

In response to the political deadlock, Fujimori, with the support of the military, carried out a so-called self-coup (Spanish: autogolpe; called Fuji-coup, or fujigolpe in Peru) — that is, a coup d'état against his own government, on April 5, 1992. He shut the Congress, suspended the constitution, and purged the judiciary.[11] Some have claimed that there was little initial domestic resistance to the auto-coup; in fact, it was welcomed with approximately 80% approval at the polls.[12]

Fujimori claimed that the presidential coup was necessary to break with the deeply-entrenched interests that were hindering him from rescuing Peru from the chaotic state in which García had left it.[13] Barry Levitt has noted that, “Fujimori was able to dictate the solution to a crisis of democracy that his own autogolpe had spawned, partly because the coup was broadly supported by domestic public opinion.”[14]

International reaction to Fujimori's coup was swift:

  • The next day, the Organization of American States' secretary general called for a meeting of the Permanent Council, at which point "the coup was denounced and, invoking Resolution 1080, the council called for an ad hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs." This meeting was convened on April 13, the foreign ministers reiterating their condemnation of Fujimori’s autogolpe.[14] Following negotiations involving the OAS, the government, and opposition groups, Alberto Fujimori's initial response, which the OAS rejected, was to hold a referendum to ratify the auto-coup. Fujimori then proposed scheduling elections for a Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD), which would be charged with drafting a new constitution, to be ratified by a national referendum. Despite the lack of consensus among political forces in Peru regarding this proposal, the ad hoc OAS meeting of ministers nevertheless approved Fujimori’s offer in mid-May, and elections for the CCD were held on November 22, 1992.[14]
  • International financial organizations delayed planned or projected loans, and the United States government suspended all aid to Peru other than humanitarian assistance, as did Germany and Spain.
  • Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations, and Argentina withdrew its ambassador.
  • Chile joined Argentina in requesting that Peru be suspended from the Organization of American States.

The coup appeared to threaten the economic recovery strategy of reinsertion, and complicated the process of clearing arrears with the IMF.

Even before the coup, relations with the United States had been strained because of Fujimori's reluctance to sign an accord that would have increased U.S. and Peruvian military efforts in eradicating coca fields. Nevertheless, Fujimori eventually signed the accord in May 1991, in order to get desperately needed aid and military assistance for the struggle against the insurgents. Two weeks after the self-coup, the George H.W. Bush administration changed its position and officially recognized Fujimori as the legitimate leader of Peru.

Using this opportunity (since FREDEMO was dissolved and APRA's leader, Alan García, had been exiled to Colombia), Fujimori proceeded to legitimize his position. He called elections for a Democratic Constitutional Congress that would serve as a legislature and a constituent assembly. While the APRA and Popular Action attempted to boycott this, the Popular Christian Party and many left-leaning parties participated in this election. His supporters won a majority in this body, and drafted a new constitution in 1993. A referendum was scheduled, and the coup and the Constitution of 1993 were approved by a narrow margin of between four and five percent.

Later in the year, on November 13, there was a failed military coup. Fujimori, alerted by then relatively-unknown Captain Vladimiro Montesinos, sought temporary refuge in the Japanese embassy.

In 1994, Fujimori separated from his wife Susana Higuchi in a noisy, public divorce. He formally stripped her of the title First Lady in August 1994, appointing their elder daughter First Lady in her stead.

Higuchi publicly denounced Fujimori as a "tyrant" and claimed that his administration was corrupt. They formally divorced in 1995.

The 1993 Constitution allowed Fujimori to run for a second term, and in April 1995, at the height of his popularity, Fujimori easily won reelection with almost two-thirds of the vote. His major opponent, former Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, won only 22 percent of the vote. His supporters won control of the legislature. One of the first acts of the new congress was to declare an amnesty for all members of the Peruvian military or police accused or convicted of human rights abuses between 1980 and 1995. As Steve Ellner wrote in his commentary on the contrasting forms of the populism of Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimori, Fujimori adopted a common strategy among dictators in Latin America: he “extolled ambitious national projects…and stressed the role of technology and private investments.”.[15]

During his second term, Fujimori signed a peace agreement with Ecuador over a border dispute that had simmered for more than a century. The treaty allowed the two countries to obtain international funds for developing the border region. Fujimori also settled unresolved issues with Chile, Peru's southern neighbor, still outstanding since the Treaty of Lima of 1929.

The 1995 election was the turning point in Fujimori's career. Peruvians now began to be more concerned about freedom of speech and the press. However, before he was sworn in for a second term, Fujimori stripped two universities of their autonomy and reshuffled the national electoral board. According to a poll by the Peruvian Research and Marketing Company conducted in 1997, 40.6% of Lima residents considered President Fujimori an authoritarian.[16][17][18]

In addition to the nature of democracy under Fujimori, people increasingly started paying closer attention to the growing number of allegations involving Fujimori and his chief of the National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos, which finally led to his resignation in 2000. According to a 2004 World Bank Publication[19] there was, “well-documented abuse of power by Montesinos, Fujimori's close associate- [which] led to a steady and systematic undermining of the rule of law…”

The 1993 constitution limits presidents to two terms. However, Fujimori began efforts to circumvent the two-term limit almost as soon as he won reelection in 1995. Not long after he took office for a second term, Fujimori's supporters in Congress passed a law of "authentic interpretation" which effectively allowed him to run for another term in 2000. A 1998 effort to repeal this law by "referendum" failed.[20] In late 1999, Fujimori announced that he would run for a third term. The Peruvian electoral bodies, stacked with Fujimori supporters, accepted his argument that the two-term restriction didn't apply to him since it was enacted while he was already in office.[21]

Exit polls showed Fujimori well short of the 50% required to avoid an electoral runoff. However, the first official results showed him with 49.6% of the vote, just short of outright victory. Eventually, Fujimori was credited with 49.89%--20,000 votes short of avoiding a runoff. There were reports of numerous irregularities, however, the international observers recognized an adjusted victory of Fujumori.

His primary opponent, Alejandro Toledo, called for his supporters to spoil their ballots in the runoff by writing "No to fraud!" on them (voting is mandatory in Peru). International observers pulled out of the country after Fujimori refused to delay the runoff.

In the runoff, Fujimori won with just over 51% of the vote. While votes for Toledo declined from 40.24% of the valid votes cast in the first round to 25.67% of the valid votes in the second round, invalid votes jumped from 2.25% of the total votes cast in the first round to 29.93% of total votes in the second round. That such a large percentage of votes were thrown out as invalid shows that many Peruvians took Toledo's advice and deliberately spoiled their ballots.

Even though Fujimori had won with only a bare majority, rumor of irregularities led to daily protests in front of the presidential palace. As a conciliatory measure, he nominated former opposition candidate Federico Salas as the new prime minister. However, the opposition parties in parliament failed to support this measure and continued with their protests. Toledo campaigned vigorously to have the election annulled, but the corruption scandal then emerging around Vladimiro Montesinos, who was the director of Peru's National Intelligence Service (SIN), did his work for him.

Fujimori meeting with OAS Secretary General César Gaviria on September 28 2000, seven weeks before the end of his presidency.
Fujimori meeting with OAS Secretary General César Gaviria on September 28 2000, seven weeks before the end of his presidency.

The scandal exploded into full force when on the evening of September 14, 2000; the cable TV station Canal N broadcast a video of Montesinos in which he appeared to give a bribe of US$15,000 to opposition congressman Alberto Kouri for his defection to Fujimori's Perú 2000 party. This video was presented by Fernando Olivera, leader of the FIM (Independent Moralizing Front), who purchased it from one of Montesinos's closest allies (nicknamed by the Peruvian press as El Patriota).

Fujimori's support virtually collapsed, and on November 10, Fujimori won approval from Congress to hold elections on April 8, 2001--in which he would not be a candidate. On November 13, Fujimori left Peru for a visit to Brunei to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. On November 16, Valentín Paniagua took over as president of Congress after the pro-Fujimori leadership lost a vote of confidence. On November 17, Fujimori travelled from Brunei to Tokyo, where he submitted his resignation as president via fax. Congress refused to accept his resignation, instead voting 62-9 to remove Fujimori from office on the grounds that he was "morally disabled."

On November 19, government ministers presented their resignations en bloc. Since Fujimori's first vice president, Francisco Tudela, had broken with Fujimori and resigned a few days earlier, Second Vice President Ricardo Márquez then claimed the presidency, but Congress refused to recognize him since he was an ardent Fujimori loyalist. Márquez resigned two days later. Paniagua was next in line, and became interim president to oversee the April elections.

In 2002, a report commissioned by Health Minister Fernando Carbone suggested that Fujimori had played a role in pressuring 200,000 indigenous people in rural areas into being sterilized from 1996 to 2000.[3] Carbone further asserted that "the state should not promote birth control practices, nor impede them".[22]

When Fujimori came to power, much of Peru was dominated by the Maoist insurgent group Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path"), and the Marxist-Leninist group Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). In 1989, 25% of Peru's district and provincial councils opted not to hold elections, owing to a persistent campaign of assassination, over the course of which over 100 officials had been killed by Shining Path in that year alone.[23] That same year, over one-third of Peru's positions for justices of the peace stood vacant, owing to Shining Path intimidation.[23] Union leaders and military officials had also been assassinated throughout the 1980s.[23]

Areas where Shining Path was active in Peru.
Areas where Shining Path was active in Peru.

By the early 1990s, some parts of the country were under the control of the insurgents, in territories known as "zonas liberadas" ("liberated zones"), where inhabitants lived under the rule of these groups and paid them taxes.[24] When Shining Path arrived in Lima, it organized so-called "paros armados" ("work stoppages"), which were enforced by killings and other forms of violence. The leadership of Shining Path was largely comprised of university students and teachers.[25] Two previous governments, those of Fernando Belaúnde Terry and Alan García, at first neglected the threat posed by Shining Path, then launched an unsuccessful military campaign to eradicate it, undermining public faith in the state and precipitating an exodus of elites.[26]

By 1992, Shining Path guerrilla attacks had claimed an estimated 20,000 lives over the course of 12 years. The July 16, 1992 Tarata Bombing, in which several car bombs exploded in Lima's wealthiest district, killed over 40 people; the bombings were characterized by some commentators as an "offensive to challenge President Alberto Fujimori."[27] The bombing at Tarata was followed up with a "weeklong wave of car bombings... Bombs hit banks, hotels, schools, restaurants, police stations and shops... [G]uerrillas bombed two rail bridges from the Andes, cutting off some of Peru's largest copper mines from coastal ports."[28]

Fujimori has been credited by some Peruvians with ending the fifteen-year reign of terror of Shining Path. As part of his anti-insurgency efforts, Fujimori granted the military broad powers to arrest suspected insurgents and try them in secret military courts with few legal rights. This measure has often been criticized for having compromised the fundamental democratic and human right of an open trial wherein the accused faces the accuser. Fujimori contended that these measures were justified, that this compromise of open trials was necessary because the judiciary was too afraid to charge alleged insurgents, and that judges and prosecutors had legitimate fears of insurgent reprisals against them or their families.[29] At the same time, Fujimori's government armed rural Peruvians, organizing them into groups known as "rondas campesinas" ("peasant patrols").

Insurgent activity was in decline by the end of 1992,[30] and Fujimori took credit for this development, claiming that his campaign had largely eliminated the insurgent threat. After the auto-coup, the intelligence work of the DINCOTE (National Counter-Terrorism Directorate) led to the capture of the leaders from Shining Path and MRTA, including notorious Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán. Guzmán's capture was a political coup for Fujimori, who used it to great effect in the press; in an interview with documentarian Ellen Perry, Fujimori even notes that he specially ordered Guzmán's prison jumpsuit to be white with black stripes, to enhance the image of his capture in the media.[31]

Critics charge that to achieve the defeat of Shining Path, the Peruvian military engaged in widespread human rights abuses, and that the majority of the victims were poor highland campesinos caught in the crossfire between the military and insurgents. The final report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, published on 28 August 2003, revealed that while the majority of the atrocities committed between 1980 and 1995 were the work of Shining Path, the Peruvian armed forces were also guilty of having destroyed villages and murdered campesinos whom they suspected of supporting insurgents.

The Japanese embassy hostage crisis began on December 17, 1996, when fourteen MRTA militants seized the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima during a party, taking hostage some four hundred diplomats, government officials, and other dignitaries; the action was partly in protest of prison conditions in Peru. During the four-month standoff, the Emerretistas gradually freed all but 72 of their hostages. The government rejected the militants' demand to release imprisoned MRTA members and secretly prepared an elaborate plan to storm the residence, while stalling by negotiating with the hostage-takers.[32]

On April 22, 1997, a team of military commandos, codenamed "Chavín de Huantar", raided the building. One hostage, two military commandos, and all 14 MRTA insurgents were killed in the operation.[33] Images of President Fujimori at the ambassador's residence during and after the military operation, surrounded by soldiers and liberated dignitaries, and walking among the corpses of the insurgents, were widely televised. The conclusion of the four-month long standoff was used by Fujimori and his supporters to bolster his image as "tough on terrorism".[citation needed] In an interview with the Japan Times, Fujimori said he had acted under the impression that he had obtained Japan's "endorsement" to use lethal force in the hostage crisis at the Japanese ambassador's residence.[34]

Several organizations criticized Fujimori's methods in the struggle against Shining Path and the MRTA. According to Amnesty International, "the widespread and systematic nature of human rights violations committed during the government of former head of state Alberto Fujimori (1990 - 2000) in Peru constitute crimes against humanity under international law."[35] Fujimori's alleged association with death squads is currently being studied by the Interamerican Court of Human Rights, after the court accepted the case of "Cantuta vs Perú".

The 1991 Barrios Altos massacre by members of the death squad Grupo Colina, made up of members of the Peruvian Armed Forces, was one of the crimes cited in the request for his extradition submitted by the Peruvian government to Japan in 2003.

The success of the operation in the Japanese embassy hostage crisis was tainted by subsequent allegations that at least three and possibly eight of the insurgents had been summarily executed by the commandos after surrendering. In 2002, the case was taken up by public prosecutors, but the Peruvian Supreme Court ruled that the military tribunals had jurisdiction. A military court later absolved them of guilt, and the "Chavín de Huantar" soldiers led the 2004 military parade. In response, in 2003 MRTA family members lodged a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights accusing the Peruvian state of human rights violations, namely that the MRTA insurgents had been denied the "right to life, the right to judicial guarantees and the right to judicial protection". The IACHR accepted the case and is currently studying it.[36] The current Peruvian Minister of Justice, Maria Zavala, has recently stated that the latest verdict by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights(IACHR) supports the Peruvian government's efforts to extradite Fujimori from Chile. Though the IACHR verdict does not directly implicate Fujimori, it does fault the Peruvian government for its complicity in the 1992 murders of nine students and one faculty member from Cantuta University.[37] The current Peruvian government and the majority of the population have rejected both rulings of the IACHR.[citation needed]

Fujimori submitted his resignation by fax, but his resignation was rejected by the Congress, which preferred to oust him by vote to articulate formally its disapproval. Fujimori was also banned from Peruvian politics for a term of ten years. He remained in self-imposed exile in Japan.[38] Several senior Japanese politicians have supported Fujimori,[39] partly because of what they consider his decisive action in ending the 1997 Japanese embassy hostage crisis.

Former President Alejandro Toledo headed the case against Fujimori. He arranged meetings with the Supreme Court, tax authorities, and other powers in Peru in order to "coordinate the joint efforts to bring the criminal Fujimori from Japan." His vehemence in this matter had crossed the border of the Peruvian law: forcing the judiciary and legislative system to keep guilty sentences without hearing Fujimori's defense (see "Political Peruvian Constitution" 1993); not providing Fujimori with a lawyer in absence of representation; and expelling pro-Fujimori congressmen from the parliament without proof of the accusations against them. This last was later reversed by the judiciary.[40]

Some examples of the attempts by the former Toledo administration were:

  • On April 3, 2002, a diverse group of concerned scholars and professionals issued “A Letter to Takushoku University and the Government and People of Japan.”[41] This letter was also publicly distributed to the international news media. The letter, which was signed by leading academics and specialists of Peruvian society expressed profound concern following the news that Fujimori had obtained a visiting professorship at Takushoku University and was “using the goodwill and generosity of the Japanese people to evade responsibility for official misconduct and possible crimes committed while he served as president of Peru.” When the petition was drafted three specifics charges against former President Fujimori were under investigation. While being charged with abandonment of office, invariably the most serious charges include Fujimori’s role in the massacre of 26 civilians in two separate instances ("La Cantuta" and “Barrios Altos massacre"). At that time, Fujimori was also under investigation for illegally funneling $15 million to Vladimiro Montesinos. Victim's families, civil society and human rights organizations continue to voice demands for Alberto Fujimori to assume responsibility for his purported involvement in human rights abuses.
  • At the beginning of March 2003, at the behest of the Peruvian Government, Interpol issued an international arrest order for Fujimori on charges that include murder, kidnapping, and crimes against humanity. In addition, the former Toledo administration lodged an extradition request with the Japanese government in September 2003. Attorney General Nelly Calderón also travelled to Tokyo to argue Peru's request for Fujimori's extradition before Japan's judicial authorities. She detailed the charges against Fujimori to the Japanese authorities, and pointed out irregularities in the former president's dual Peruvian-Japanese nationality.
  • In September 2003, congresswoman Dora Núñez Dávila (FIM) denounced Fujimori and several of his ministers for crimes against humanity because of forced sterilizations carried out during his regime. According to Núñez, the Fujimori administration initiated a family planning programme with extensive forced sterilisations in which health workers were given monthly quotas of procedures to perform. Former Prime Minister Luis Solari also supported this accusation, as Minister of Health, during these investigations.
  • On November 14 2003, Congress approved more charges against Fujimori. It voted 63–0 with two abstentions to approve charges, and to investigate how much he had been involved in the air-drop of nearly 10,000 Kalashnikov rifles into the Colombian jungle in 1999 and 2000 for guerrillas belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Fujimori maintains he had no knowledge of the arms-smuggling, and blames Montesinos. By approving the charges, Congress has lifted the immunity granted to Fujimori as a former president, and if he returns from Japan he can be criminally charged and prosecuted. An ex-advisor of SIN, Francisco Loayza, said documents exist which link Fujimori to the arms deal and claimed this information can be used to extradite Fujimori since Japan has signed international conventions prohibiting arms trafficking by civilian aircraft. According to Loayza, eighty such operations took place during Fujimori's term in office.
  • Congress also voted 65–0 with one abstention, to support charges against Fujimori for his responsibility in the detention and disappearance of sixty-seven students from Peru's central Andean city of Huancayo, and the disappearance of several residents from the northern coastal town of Chimbote during the 1990s. It also approved charges that Fujimori mismanaged millions of dollars from Japanese charities to build schools, with an unexplained USD $2.3 million shortfall in funds received, among other irregularities.
  • In March 2005, it appeared that Peru all but abandoned its efforts to persuade the Japanese government to extradite Fujimori. Denise Ledgard, legal attaché of the Peruvian embassy in Tokyo and the person in charge of Peru's extradition request, returned to Lima and there were no immediate plans to replace her. Luis Macchiavello, Peru's ambassador to Japan, said, however, that his government would continue to push for Fujimori's extradition, possibly through multilateral organisations. In a report in the Financial Times, one official admitted privately that the process had stalled and that Lima had nearly abandoned hope of persuading Tokyo to relent. It also cited accusations of deliberate foot-dragging on the part of the Japanese in order to avoid international embarrassment at rejecting the petition outright.
  • In October of 2005, Fujimori publicly announced he would run in the up-coming Peruvian national election.

At the same time, the Strategic Finance and International Co-operation Unit (UFEC) of the office of the Special Prosecutor for Corruption Offenses (Procuraduría Ad Hoc Anticorrupción, established in the early days of the Toledo administration to examine irregularities under the previous regime) released a report in which it alleged that the illicit gains of the Fujimori administration amounted to USD $2 billion. UFEC claims that this money was removed from the country illegally. Walter Hoflich, head of the UFEC unit, said that $174 million had already been recovered, but that this sum represents less than a tenth of those illegal earnings. Most of this money is related to Vladimiro Montesinos' web of corruption. The Office of the Prosecutor reports that it has located an additional $59 million deposited in banks in the United States, Switzerland, and Grand Cayman, which it has failed to repatriate. Despite this effective action against corruption, there is no direct evidence compromising Fujimori. A specialized US company (Kroll), hired by the Peruvian government has failed to prove the accusation against Fujimori, after years of investigations.[citation needed] The UFEC's figure of two billion dollars is considerably higher than that arrived at by Transparency International, an NGO that studies corruption. In its "Global Corruption Report 2004", Transparency International listed Fujimori as leading the seventh most corrupt government of the past two decades, estimating that the corruption may have embezzled USD $600 million in funds.[42][43]

Undaunted by the accusations and the judicial proceedings underway against him, which, citing Toledo's involvement, he dismissed as "politically motivated," Fujimori, working from Japan, has established a new political party in Peru, Sí Cumple to participate in the 2006 presidential elections. However, in February 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the possibility of Fujimori participating in those elections, noting that the ex-president was barred by Congress from holding office for ten years. The decision was regarded as unconstitutional by Fujimori supporters such as ex-congress members Luz Salgado, Marta Chávez, and Fernán Altuve, who argued it was a "political" maneuver, and that the only body with authority to determine the matter is the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE). Magdalena Chu, head of the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE), has also declared that the JNE is the only authority which can decide on the admissibility of Fujimori's candidacy.[citation needed] Others however, such as Heriberto Benítez of Frente Independiente Moralizador (FIM) say the decision is "complementary" to the Congress's ten-year prohibition. In the opinion of ex-president Valentín Paniagua, the Constitutional Court finding is binding and "no further debate is possible".[44][45]

Fujimori's new political party Sí Cumple, created at the beginning of 2003, has been receiving more than 10% in many country-level polls,,[citation needed] contending with APRA for the second place slot, far behind Unidad Nacional. The general secretary is Carlos Orellana, Fujimori's former press advisor during his presidency.[citation needed] In addition, there are several other parties under the Fujimorismo umbrella such as Cambio 90, Nueva Mayoría, and Fuerza Perú. All of them have been certified to participate in the 2006 elections.[citation needed] However, Fujimori has declared that the only "official" Fujimorismo party that will participate in the next presidential elections is Sí Cumple.[citation needed]

Fujimori is credited by many Peruvians for bringing stability to the country after the violence and hyperinflation of the García years. While it is generally agreed that the "Fujishock" brought short/middle-term macroeconomic stability, the long-term social impact of Fujimori's free market economic policies is still hotly debated.

High growth during Fujimori's first term petered out during his second term. "El Niño" phenomena had a tremendous impact on the Peruvian economy during the late 1990s.[46] Nevertheless, total GDP growth between 1992 and 2001, inclusive, was 44.60%, that is, 3.76% per annum; total GDP per capita growth between 1991 and 2001, inclusive, was 30.78%, that is, 2.47% per annum. Also, studies by INEI, the national statistics bureau[47] show that the number of Peruvians living in poverty increased dramatically (from 41.6% to 55%) during Alan García's term, but they actually decreased somewhat (from 55% to 54%) during Fujimori's term. Furthermore, FAO reported Peru reduced undernourishment by about 29% from 1990-92 to 1997-99.[48]

Peru was reintegrated into the global economic system, and began to attract foreign investment. The sell-off of state-owned enterprises led to improvements in some service industries, notably local telephony, mobile telephony and Internet. For example, before privatization, a consumer or business would need to wait up to 10 years to get a local telephone line installed from the monopolistic state-run telephone company, at a cost of $607 for a residential line.[49][50] A couple of years after privatization, the wait was reduced to just a few days. Peru's Physical land based telephone network had a dramatic increase in telephone penetration from 2.9% in 1993 to 5.9% in 1996 and 6.2% in 2000,[51] and a dramatic decrease in the wait for a telephone line. Average wait went from 70 months in 1993 (before privatization) to 2 months in 1996 (after privatization).[52] Privatization also generated foreign investment in export-oriented activities such as mining and energy extraction, notably the Camisea gas project, as well as investment in tourism and agroexport activities.[citation needed]

By the end of the decade, Peru's international currency reserves were built up from nearly zero at the end of García's term to almost USD $10 billion. Fujimori also left a smaller state bureaucracy and reduced government expenses (in contrast to the historical pattern of bureaucratic expansion), independent and technical-minded administration of public entities like SUNAT, a large number of new schools (not only in Lima but in Peru's small towns), more roads and highways, and new and upgraded communications infrastructure.[citation needed] These improvement led to the revival of tourism, agroexport, industries and fisheries.[53][54]

Detractors have observed that Fujimori was able to encourage large-scale mining projects with foreign corporations and push through mining-friendly legislation laws because the post auto-coup political picture greatly facilitated the process.

Some analysts state that some of the GDP growth during the Fujimori years reflects a greater rate of extraction of non-renewable resources by transnational companies; these companies were attracted by Fujimori by means of near-zero royalties, and, by the same fact, little of the extracted wealth has stayed in the country.[55][56][57][58] Peru's mining legislation, they claim, has served as a role model for other countries that wish to become more mining-friendly.[59]

Fujimori's privatization program also remains shrouded in controversy. A congressional investigation in 2002, led by radical socialist opposition congressman Javier Diez Canseco, stated that of the USD $9 billion raised through the privatizations of hundreds of state-owned enterprises, only a small fraction of this income ever benefited the Peruvian people.

Some scholars claim that Fujimori's government became a "dictatorship" after the auto-coup,[60] permeated by a network of corruption organized by his associate Montesinos, who now faces dozens of charges that range from embezzlement to drug trafficking to murder (Montesinos is currently on trial in Lima).[61][62][63] Fujimori's style of government has also been described as "populist authoritarianism". Numerous governments[64] and human rights organizations, such as APRODEH and Amnesty International, have called for the extradition of Fujimori to face charges of corruption and crimes against humanity.[citation needed]

Fujimori still enjoys a measure of support within Peru: a poll conducted in Lima in February 2005 gave him a 17% popularity rating (former President Toledo, at the same time, was averaging an approval rating of around 8%).[65] A poll conducted in March 2005 by the Instituto de Desarrollo e Investigación de Ciencias Económicas (IDICE) indicated that 12.1% of the respondents intended to vote for Fujimori in the 2006 presidential election.[66] A poll conducted on November 25, 2005 by the Universidad de Lima indicated a high approval (45.6%) rating of the Fujimori period between 1990-2000, attributed to his counter-insurgency efforts (53%).[67]

According to a more recent Universidad de Lima survey, Fujimori still retains public support, ranking fifth in personal popularity among other political figures. Popular approval for his decade-long presidency (1990-2000) has reportedly grown (from 31.5% in 2002 to 49.5% in May 2007). Despite accusations of corruption and human rights violations, nearly half of the individuals interviewed in the survey approved of Fujimori’s presidential regime. In the same poll, a large majority of people in the nation’s capital feel that Fujimori should face criminal charges in Peru: 82.6% of respondents in Lima and the port of Callao agreed that the former president should be extradited from Chile to stand trial in Peru.[68]

The Lima-based newspaper Perú 21 ran an editorial noting that even though the Universidad de Lima poll results indicate that 4 out of every 5 interviewees believe that Fujimori is guilty of some of the charges against him, he still enjoys at least 30% of popular support and enough approval to restart a political career.

  1. ^ Fujimori's controversial career, BBC News, 18 September 2000. Accessed online 4 November 2006.
  2. ^ Jo-Marie Burt. 2006 "Quien habla es terrorista": the political use of fear in Fujimori's Peru. Latin American Research Review 41(3):32-61
  3. ^ a b "Mass sterilisation scandal shocks Peru", BBC News, July 24, 2002. 
  4. ^ a b Peru’s Ex-President Gets 6 Years for Illicit Search, New York Times, 12 December 2007. Accessed online 12 December 2007.
  5. ^ Conditional release for Fujimori, BBC News, 18 May 2006. Accessed online 26 September 2006.
  6. ^ Extradited Fujimori back in Peru 22 September 2007
  7. ^ Fujimori jailed for abusing power, BBC News, 12 December 2007. Accessed online 12 December 2007.
  8. ^ Encyclopædia Britannica reports these challenges, but seems to dismiss them, saying that his family emigrated from Japan in 1934. Fujimori, Alberto / Year in Review 1998, Encyclopædia Britannica online, accessed 19 June 2006
  9. ^ Expressindia.com - Information about Fujimori's birthplace
  10. ^ Famous people major in Mathematics, University of Rochester website. Retrieved on March 30, 2007
  11. ^ Levitsky, Steven "Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru", Journal of Democracy. 10(3):78
  12. ^ Smith, Peter H. Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis. 1995, page 236.
  13. ^ (Spanish) Mensaje a la nación del presidente del Perú, ingeniero Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, el 5 de abril de 1992 (PDF). On the site of the Peruvian National Congress. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  14. ^ a b c Barry S. Levitt. 2006 “A desultory defense of democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. (Organization of American States).” Latin American Politics and Society 48(3):93-123.
  15. ^ Steve Ellner “The contrasting variants of the populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori” Journal of Latin American Studies 35(1) 2003
  16. ^ Cathleen Caron, Judiciary Firmly Under Control in Fujimori's Peru, Human Rights Brief, Volume 6 Issue 1 (1999). p.9 et. seq.
  17. ^ Roger Atwood, 'Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Pertu from Leguia to Fujimori,' SAIS Review, vol. 21, no. 2 (2001), p. 167
  18. ^ Kurt Weyland, 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,' Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 31, no. 3 (1996)
  19. ^ “State Society Interactions as Sources of Persistence and Change in Inequality” in Inequality in Latin America: Breaking With History? (World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Viewpoints). David De Ferranti, et al. World Bank Publications. 2004, p. 139
  20. ^ David R. Mares 2001 Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 161.
  21. ^ Clifford Krauss, Peru's Chief to Seek 3rd Term, Capping a Long Legal Battle, 'New York Times, December 28, 1999. Accessed online 26 September 2006.
  22. ^ [1]
  23. ^ a b c Freeman, Michael. Freedom Or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers. 2003, page 150.
  24. ^ Freeman, Michael. Freedom Or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers. 2003, page 148.
  25. ^ Freeman, Michael. Freedom Or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers. 2003, page 159.
  26. ^ "By the time Fujimori was elected you had a population in the cities, and particularly in Lima, that was living in fear." The Fall of Fujimori: Peru's war on terror July 6, 2006
  27. ^ Car-Bomb Blasts in Peru Kill 18 And Hurt 140 in Wealthy Sector July 18, 1992
  28. ^ Peruvian Guerrillas Test Government With Bombs July 23, 1992
  29. ^ Fujimori advances this argument in Ellen Perry's documentary film, The Fall of Fujimori.
  30. ^ Stern, Steve J. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. 1998, page 307.
  31. ^ Ellen Perry's The Fall of Fujimori.
  32. ^ Brewer, Paul. The Lima Embassy Siege and Latin American Terrorism. 2006, page 12.
  33. ^ Japanese embassy hostage crisis in Peru started 10 years ago 18 December, 2006, Accessed 26 December 2006.
  34. ^ Fujimori says Japan consented to forcefully end hostage crisis in 1997 20 December, 2006, Accessed 26 December 2006.
  35. ^ Bring Former President Fujimori to Justice, Amnesty International. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  36. ^ Report Nº 13/04, Petition 136/03, Admissibility, Eduardo Nicolas Cruz Sanchez et al., Peru, February 27, 2004, on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights IACHR site. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  37. ^ Verdict made by IACHR favors extradition of Peru's Fujimori 21 December, 2006, Accessed 26 December 2006.
  38. ^ Fate of indemnity clauses: Let the public decide April 12, 2006
  39. ^ David Pilling, Peru tiring of bid to secure Fujimori return, Financial Times, 31 March 2005. Accessed online 26 September 2006.
  40. ^ (Spanish) Valle Riestra: Pedido de extradición de Fujimori será rechazado por Chile RPP Noticias, 16 November 2005. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  41. ^ Scholars for Presidential Accountability in Peru, April 3, 2002,, reproduced on Peruvian Graffiti website.
  42. ^ Highlights from the Global Corruption Report 2004, Transparency International, 25 March 2004. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  43. ^ Suharto Tops World Corruption League, 25 March 2004, Laksamana.Net, Jakarta. Archived 17 July 2004 on the Internet Archive.
  44. ^ (Spanish) No hay nada más que discutir sobre candidatura de Fujimori, Noticias on terra.com.peru, 27 February 2006, credited to Andina. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  45. ^ (Spanish) Salgado: JNE debe ser quien defina postulación de Fujimori, Noticias on terra.com.peru, 21 February 2005, credited to Expreso. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  46. ^ Gastón Antonio Zapata Velasco, Kenneth Broad, et.al., Peru Country Case Study: Impacts and Responses to the 1997-98 El Niño Event, Peru Country Case Study supported by the International Research Institute for climate prediction (IRI) and NOAA's Office of Global Programs as a contribution to the UNEP/NCAR/WMO/UNU/ISDR study for the UN Foundation. Accessed 27 September 2006.
  47. ^ El Entorno, Atlas Internet Perú - Red Científica Peruana, 2003. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  48. ^ Undernourishment around the world: Reductions in undernourishment over the past decade, part of The state of food insecurity in the world 2001, FAO Corporate Document Repository. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  49. ^ (Spanish) Las Privatizaciones y la Pobreza en el Perú: Resultados y Desafios (PowerPoint presentation), unsigned, undated, on the site of El Área de Economía de la Regulación, Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico (CIUP). Accessed 27 September 2006.
  50. ^ Peru after Privatization: Are Telephone Consumers Better Off?. Máximo Torero, Enrique Schroth, and Alberto Pascó-Font. Accessed 04 October 2006.
  51. ^ Líneas en servicio y densidad en la telefonía fija y móvil: 1993 - 2006 (Excel spreadsheet, on the site of Peru's Ministry of Transport and Communications. Accessed 28 September 2006.
  52. ^ The Information Revolution in Latin America: The Case of Peru (PDF), December 6, 1999. Student group paper from Stanford University. Accessed 28 September 2006.
  53. ^ (Spanish) Primer reporte-resumen… Actividades en el Congreso, El Heraldo, 27 October 2004, reprinted on the site of the Peruvian Congress. Accessed 28 September 2006.
  54. ^ (Spanish) Noti-Aprodeh, 8 April 2003, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH). Accessed 28 September 2006.
  55. ^ "Chile, Peru - How much do mining companies contribute? The debate on royalties is not over yet", Latinamerica Press, Special Edition - The Impact of Mining Latinamerica Press, Vol. 37, No. 2, January 26, 2005. ISSN 0254-203X. Accessible online as a Microsoft Word document. Accessed 26 September 2006. There appears to be a separate HTML copy of the article on the site of Carrefour Amérique Latine (CAL). Accessed 27 September 2006.
  56. ^ "Peru: Public consultation says NO to mining in Tambogrande", p.14–15 in WRM Bulletin # 59, June 2002 (World Rainforest Movement, English edition). Accessible online as Rich Text Format (RTF) document. Accessed 26 September 2006.
  57. ^ Jeffrey Bury, "Livelihoods in transition: transnational gold mining operations and local change in Cajamarca, Peru" The Geographical Journal (Royal Geographic Society), Vol. 170 Issue 1 March 2004, p. 78. Link leads to a pay site allowing access to this paper.
  58. ^ "Investing in Destruction: The Impacts of a WTO Investment Agreement on Extractive Industries in Developing Countries", Oxfam America Briefing Paper, June 2003. Accessed 27 September 2006.
  59. ^ “A Backwards, Upside-Down Kind of Development”: Global Actors, Mining and Community-Based Resistance in Honduras and Guatemala, Rights Action, February 2005. Accessed 27 September 2006.
  60. ^ Charles D. Kenney, 2004 Fujimori's Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy in Latin America (Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies) University of Notre Dame Press ISBN 0-268-03172-X
  61. ^ Julio F. Carrion (ed.) 2006 The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru. Pennsylvania State University Press ISBN 0-271-02748-7
  62. ^ Catherine M. Conaghan 2005 Fujimori's Peru: Deception In The Public Sphere (Pitt Latin American Series) University of Pittsburgh Press ISBN 0-8229-4259-3
  63. ^ (Spanish) Esteban Cuya, La dictadura de Fujimori: marionetismo, corrupción y violaciones de los derechos humanos, Centro de Derechos Humanos de Nuremberg, July 1999. Accessed 22 October 2006.
  64. ^ Resolución del Parlamento Europeo apoyando la extradición de Fujimori, Strasbourg, 19 January 2006
  65. ^ Fujimori anuncia su retorno en el 2006, Vida Latina / Associated Press, unsigned, undated. Accessed 27 September 2006.
  66. ^ García, Fujimori Top Candidates In Peru, Angus Reid Global Monitor (Angus Reid Consultants), March 30, 2005. Accessed 27 September 2006.
  67. ^ (Spanish) Estudio 293 - Barómetro - Lima Metropolitana y Callao - Sábado 19 y Domingo 20 de Noviembre de 2005, Grupo de Opinión Pública de la Universidad de Lima. Accessed 27 September 2006.
  68. ^ Peruvians Call for Fujimori's Extradition Angus Reid Global Monitor (Angus Reid Consultants), May 12, 2007, Accessed 19 May 2007.

Preceded by
Alan García
President of Peru
July 1990 – April 1992
Succeeded by
Valentín Paniagua
President of the Emergency
and National Reconstruction Government

April 1992 – July 1995
President of Peru
July 1995 – November 2000
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