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In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire planned to construct a Baghdad Railway under German control. The Baghdad Railway consisted of the already constructed Orient Express line and the newer Constantinople-Baghdad line through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Through this ralway, Germany sought methods to modernize the Turkish economy, army and transport. To build factories and get further loans, to expand farm output and quickly get the farm produce to market and export, railways would be needed. The railway became a source of international tensions in the years leading up to World War I but they were resolved in 1914 before the war began, although it has been argued that it played some role in the origins of the First World War (Jastrow, see literature below).

Contents 1 Overview 2 The Baghdad Concession 3 Route 4 British view of the railway 4.1 initial support 4.2 Steamer price war and settlement 4.3 1911 - Britain blocks further development - questions in the house 4.4 Settlement 5 Role in origins of World War I 6 During the War 7 After the War 8 Bibliography 9 References 10 See also 11 External links

If it had been completed the Berlin-Baghdad (and, ultimately, Basra) railway linkages would have enabled transport and trade from Germany through a port on the Persian Gulf, from which trade goods and supplies could be directly exchanged with the farthest of the German colonies, and the world. The run home to Germany would give German industry direct supply of oil. This access to resources, with trade unfettered from British control of shipping would have been beneficial to German economic interests.^[1]

The railway also presented a threat to Russia, since it was accepted as axiomatic that political influence followed economic, and the railway was expected to extend Germany's economic role towards the Caucasian frontier and into north Persia where Russia had a dominant share of the market.^[2]

By the late 19th Century the Ottoman Empire was the "Sick Man" of Europe, cheap imports from industrialised Europe and the effects of a disastrous war had left Turkeys finances under the control of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, composed of and answerable to the Great Powers.^[3] The Europeans saw great potential to eploit the resources of the crumbling empire, irrigation could transform agriculture, there were chrome, antimony lead and zinc mines and some coal. Not least there was potentially vast amounts of oil. As early as 1871 a commission of experts studied the geology of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and reported plentiful oil of good quality, but commented that poor transportation made it doubtful these fields could compete with Russian and American ones. In 1901 a German report announced the region had a veritable "lake of petrolium" of almost inexhaustible supply.^[4]

In 1872 German railway engineer William von Pressel was retained by the Ottoman government to develop plans for railways in Turkey. However private enterprise would not build the railway without subsidies, so the Ottoman Government had to set aside part of its revinues from empire to subsidise its construction, thus increasing its debt to the European powers.^[5]

The initial steps towards construction of a rail line from İstanbul to Baghdad were taken in 1888 when a German arms dealer, Dr. Alfred von Kaulla and Dr George von Siemans, Managing director of Deutsche Bank, put together a syndicate and obtained a concession from Turkish leaders to extend the Haydarpaşa - İzmit Railway to Ankara. Thus came into existence the Anatolian Railway company (SCFOA).^[6]

After the line to Angora was completed in 1893, railway workshops were built in Eskişehir and permission was obtained to construct a railway line from Angora to Konya, and that line was completed in 1896. The two lines were the first two sections of the Baghdad Railway. Another railroad built at the same time by German engineers was the Hejaz railway, commissioned by Sultan Hamid II.

The Ottoman chose to place the line outside the range of the British Navy guns. Therefore, the coastal way from Iskenderun to Alep was avoided. The line had to cross the Anamus mountains inland at the cost of expensive engineering including an 8 km tunnel between Ayran and Fevzipaşa.^[7]

During 1898 and 1899 the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works received many applications for permission to construct a railway to Baghdad, it was not because of lack of competition that the Deutsche Bank was finally awarded the concession. A Russian plan was rejected for fear of it extending Russian influence in Constantinople. A well financed British plan collapsed due to the outbreak of the Boer War. A well financed French proposal became financers of the winning Deutsche Bank plan.^[8]

Other nations of Europe paid little attention to the building of the railway lines until 1903 when the Ottoman Government gave permission to an Ottoman corporation to build the railway line from Konia to Baghdad. This Baghdad Railway Company was controlled by a few German banks.

There was concern in Russia, France, and Britain after 1903 as the implications of the German scheme to construct a great Berlin-Baghdad railway became apparent. A railway that would link Berlin to the Persian Gulf would provide Germany with a connection to her colonies in Africa, i.e. with German East Africa and German South-West Africa (present-day Tanzania and Namibia). The railroad might eventually strengthen the Ottoman Empire and its ties to Germany and might shift the balance of power in the region..

Despite obstructions at the diplomatic level, work was slowly begun on the railway. Both geographical and political obstacles prevented the completion of the Baghdad Railway before World War I commenced in 1914.

The railway passed through the following towns and places, in the order given, north to south:

• Konia
• Anatolian table lands
• Karaman
• Eregli
• The foothills of Taurus
• Cilician Gates
• Cilician plain
• Adana
  • Mersina
• Amanus range
• Aleppo
• Nisibin
• Mosul
• Bahgdad
• Basra

The initial reaction of Great Britain was one of strong support. A long article outlining the possitive benefits of the enterprise appeared in the Times newspaper. It was argued that Germany was a major trading partner of Britain, and that though the competition for trade would affect Britain the fact that it was a good trading partner that was winning the trade instead would make up for the loss.

The railway would obviously compete with British trade in Mesopotamia, but this would not happen for many years. However in 1906 the Hambur-American Stemship line announced its intention to run regular stemships between Europe and the Persian Gulf. After a futile price war the British lines, which had lost their monopoly, came to agreement in 1913 with their competitors, ending a rivalry which had caused considerable political concern.^[9]

In 1911 the railway company looked to build a branch line to Alexandretta from Aleppo to pick up on the valuable trade of Northern Syria and the Northern Messopotamian valley. However the Young Turk government could not offer further railway concessions without raising custonms duties from 11 to 14 percent. Such a raise required the agreement of all the powers, but was vetoed by Great Britain after Sir Edward Grey spoke in the House of Commons - ... if the money is to be used to promote railways which may be a source of doubtful advantage to British trade ... I say it will be impossible for us to agree to that increase ..."^[10].

The main British commercial interest that the British Government insisted was protected was that of the Right Honorable James Lyle Mackay, Baron Inchcape of Strathnaver. As well as being the formost shipping magnate of the British Empire Lord Inchcape was a director of the Anglo Persian Oil Company and of the D'Arcy Exploration Company. On February 23 a contract was signed in London between Lord Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway Company.^[11] In March 1914 the German government was obliged to recognize southern Mesopotamia, as well as central and southern Persia, as the exclusive field of operations of the Anglo-Persian Company.^[12]

Discussion of the railway's role as a contributing factor to the outbreak of war is complicated by two issues. Firstly historians and political analysts who wrote about this issue directly after the war were arguably not in possession of all the facts. Full government diplomatic documents of the German government were released between 1922 and 1927, British documents between 1926 and 1938. Only some Russian documents were released, and Italian documents only came out after the Second World War.^[13] Secondly historians have tended to give an interpretation of the facts that is clouded by their own political orientation. While socialist historians might emphasise imperial rivalries and monopolies as the driving force for the war, especially as revealed in the Russian diplomatic documents, other historians have argued that intractable nationality issues in the denial of self-determination to minority groups were the dominant cause.^[14] They argue that although the railway issue was heated before 1914, conservative historians agree that it was not a cause of World War I,^[15] because the main controversies (over financing) had been resolved before the war started. Thus, "Some of the optimism should be attributed to the willingness of the German government to compose long-standing differences. ...and in June 1914 a settlement was achieved over the Baghdad railway."^[16] "Many economic and colonial issues which had been causing friction between French, German and British governments before 1914, such as the financing of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies, had been resolved by the summer of 1914."^[17]

By 1915 the railway ended some 50 miles east of Diarbakr (now called Diyarbakır). Another spur, heading east from Aleppo, ended at Nasibin (now called Nusaybin). Additionally some rail was laid starting in Baghdad reaching north to Tikrit and south to Kut. This left a gap of some 300 miles between the railroad lines. Additionally, there were three mountains which the railroad was going to go through, but the tunnels through these three mountains were not complete. So the railroad was, in actual fact, broken into four different sections at the start of the war. The total time to get from Istanbul to Baghdad during the war was 22 days (Esposito, Vincent (ed.) (1959). The West Point Atlas of American Wars - Vol. 2; map 53. Frederick Praeger Press). The total distance was 1,255 miles (2019 km).

The breaks in the railroad meant that the Ottoman government had significant difficulties in sending supplies and reinforcements to the Mesopotamian Front.

Main article: Mesopotamia Campaign

The fighting in Mesopotamia remained somewhat isolated from the rest of the war.

During the conflict, Turkish and German workers labored to complete the railway for military purposes but with limited manpower and so many more important things to spend money on, only two of the gaps were closed.

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles cancelled all German rights to the Baghdad Railway. However, the Deutsche Bank transferred its holdings to a Swiss bank.

People in Turkey, Italy, France, and Britain reached several agreements which created various arrangements that gave a certain degree of control over the Baghdad Railway to various indistinct interests in those nations. Investors, speculators, and financiers were involved by 1923 in secretive and clandestine ways.

The British Army had completed the southeastern section from Baghdad to Basra, so that part was under British control. The French held negotiations to obtain some degree of control over the central portion of the railway, and Turkish interests controlled the oldest sections that had been constructed inside of Turkey but talks continued to be held after 1923. The American involvement in the Near East began in 1923 when Turkey approved the Chester concession, which aroused disapprovals from France and the UK.

• H. S. W. Corrigan, "German-Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914: A Re-Assessment." Past and Present, No. 36 (April, 1967), pp. 144-152, shows the Railway issue was driving Germany and Turkey further apart.
• R. J. W. Evans (British) and Hartmut Pogge Von Strandman (German), The Coming of the First World War - Oxford UP 1990.
• E. M. Earle Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway (1923) Russel and Russel (1966 reprint)
• Morris Jastrow, Jr., The War and the Bagdad Railroad (1917) ISBN 1402167865
• William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order ISBN 0-7453-2310-3
• Ruth Henig, The Origins of the First World War. Routledge. 2002.
• Ruth Henig, The Origins of the First World War. Routledge. 1989.
• Jonathan S. McMurray. Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (2001) rejects old theory that RR tied Turkey to Germany
• John B. Wolf. The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad (1973)

1. ^ William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order ISBN 0-7453-2310-3
2. ^ Evans (1990) Page 83.
3. ^ Earle (1923) page 10
4. ^ Earle (1923) page 14
5. ^ Earle (1923) page 19
6. ^ Earle (1923) page 31
7. ^ Chemin de Fer Impérial Ottoman de Baghdad. Trains of Turkey. Retrieved on March 24, 2007.
8. ^ Earle (1923) page 58
9. ^ Earle (1923) page 109
10. ^ Earle (1923) page 111
11. ^ Earle page 259
12. ^ Earle page 261
13. ^ Henig (1989) page 34
14. ^ Henig (1989) page 39
15. ^ Henig (2002) Page 39.
16. ^ Evans (1990) Page 166.
17. ^ Henig (2002) Page 39.

• Mesopotamian Campaign

• Baghdad Railway