From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Ebro River
Part of the Second Punic War
Date Spring, 217 BC Location Mouth of Ebro River, Spain Result Decisive Roman victory
Combatants
Carthage	Roman Republic
Commanders
Himilco	Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus
Strength
40 Quinqueremes	55 Quinqueremes and Triremes
Casualties
4 sunk, 25 captured	Unknown

Second Punic War

Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene – Ebro River – Ager Falernus – Geronium – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus – 3rd Nola – Beneventum – 1st Tarentum – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Cartagena – Numistro – Asculum – Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Bagbrades – Cirta – Po Valley – Great Plains – Zama

Punic Wars
First – Mercenary – Second – Third

Battle of Ebro River was a naval battle fought between a Carthaginian fleet of approximately 40 quinqueremes under Himilco and a Roman fleet of 55 ships under Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus near the mouth of Ebro river in the spring of 217 BC. Hasdrubal Barca, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, had launched a joint expedition to destroy the Roman base north of the Ebro. The Carthaginian naval contingent were totally defeated after a surprise attack by the Roman ships, losing 29 ships and the control of seas around Spain after this defeat. The reputation of the Romans were further enhanced in Spain after this victory, causing rebellion among some of the Spanish tribes under Carthaginian control.

Contents 1 Prelude 2 The Battle 3 Aftermath and Importance 4 References 5 Sources 6 Further Reading

After the defeat of Hanno in the Battle of Cissa, Gnaeus Scipio had spent his time consolidating his hold on Northern Spain and raiding the Spanish territory of Carthage south of the Ebro from his base at Tarraco. He had received no major reinforcements from Rome to augment his forces. Hasdrubal Barca, the Carthaginian commander, in the meantime, had raised a number of Iberian levies to expand his army substantially. The Punic naval contingent in Spain contained 32 Quinqueremes and 5 triremes in 218 BC when Hannibal had departed from Spain. During the winter of 218 BC, Hasdrubal added a further 10 Quinqueremes to this fleet and trained additional crews to man them. In the Spring of 217 BC, Hasdrubal mounted a joint expedition towards the Roman territory north of the Ebro. Hasdrubal commanded the army, the exact number is unknown ^[1], and his deputy Himilco led the fleet^[2]. The expedition followed the coastline, with the ships beaching beside the army at night.

Gnaeus, fearing that the Carthaginian army outnumbered his own, resolved to fight a naval battle. Although could only man 35 Quinqueremes^[3] (25 ships were sent back to Italy after a Carthaginian raid had caused severe casualties among the crews, and some sailors may have been posted in garrisons), the allied Greek city of Massilia had provided 20 ships for his fleet^[4] .

Having reached the Ebro river, the Carthaginian fleet had anchored near the estuary, the sailors and crew leaving their ships for foraging. Although Hasdrubal had posted scouts to detect the activities of the Romans, Himilco had no ships out scouting for Roman ships. The a pair of Massilian ships had located the Punic fleet as it lay at anchor, and had slipped away undetected to warn Gneaus of the Carthaginian presence. The Roman fleet had sailed from Tarraco and was positioned only 10 miles to the north when the warnings reached Gnaeus Scipio. Gneaus had manned his ships with picked legionaries, and now sailed down to attack the Punic fleet.

Hasdrubal's army scouts detected the approaching Roman fleet before the navy and warned their fleet of the coming danger through fire signals. Most of the crews had been foraging, and as they hastily had to man their ships and sail out in a disorderly manner. There was little coordination and some ships were undermanned because of the surprise achieved by the Romans. Hasdrubal drew up his army on the shore to give encouragement to his fleet.

Not only did the Romans have the advantage of total surprise and numbers (40 against 55 ships), but the combat (in)effectiveness of the Carthaginians is not reflected in the number of ships as 1/4 of their fleet was newly trained^[5]. The Romans formed 2 lines with the 35 Roman ships in front and the 20 Massaliot ships behind them, with the formation and the naval skill of the Massalians nullifying the superior manuverabiliy of the Carthaginian fleet^[6]. The Romans engaged the Carthaginian ships as they came out of the river, ramming and sinking 4 ships and boarding and capturing 2 more. The Carthaginian crews then lost heart, beached their ships and sought safety among the army. The Romans grappled and hauled away 23 of the beached ships.

The defeat was decisive. Hasdrubal was obliged to march back to Cartagena, fearing sea bourne attacks. Carthaginian prestige suffered severely and there were rebellions among tribes under Carthaginian control, keeping Hasdrubal from attacking the Romans in force until 215 BC. Although the main Carthaginian fleet had captured a supply fleet headed for Spain in 217 BC off Cosa in Italy, Publius Cornelius Scipio arrived in Spain with 8,000 soldiers in the fall of that year, with a mandate from the Roman Senate to prevent any help from reaching Hannibal in Italy from Spain. This is the only reinforcement the Roman Republic would send to Spain before 211 BC. The Scipio brothers would raid Carthiginian Spain^[7], and meet Hasdrubal at the Battle of Dertosa in 215 BC.

With the Spanish contingent of the Carthaginian navy shattered, Hasdrubal was forced to either call Carthage for reinforcements or build new ships. He did neither. The performance of Spanish crews had been poor in the battle, and their dismissal would spark a rebillion in the Trudetani tribe^[8], forcing Carthage to send 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal would spend all of 216 BC subduing the rebels. Scipio had ensured that Roman seaborne supplies would not be intercepted by Carthaginian ships from Spain, and their fleet can raid the Carthaginian domain at will. The only major naval expedition against the Romans from Spain will be that of Mago Barca to Italy in 204 BC.

• Bagnall, Nigel (1990). The Punic Wars. ISBN 0-312-34214-4. 
• Cottrell, Leonard (1992). Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80498-0. 
• Lazanby, John Francis (1978). Hannibal's War. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 0-85668-080-X. 
• Goldsworthy, Adrians (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel Military Paperbacks. ISBN 0-304-36642-0. 
• Peddie, John (2005). Hannibal's War. Sutton Publishing Limited. ISBN 0-7509-3797-1. 
• Baker, G. P. (1999). Hannibal. Cooper Square Press. ISBN 0-8154-1005-0. 

• Lancel, Serge (1997). Carthage A History. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 1-57718-103-4. 
• Warry, John (1993). Warfare in The Classical World. Salamander Books Ltd.. ISBN 1-56619-463-6. 
• Casson, Lionel (1981). The Ancient Mariners 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01477-9.