Sources
Help build the largest human-edited directory on the web.
Submit a site - Become an editor
Wikipedia. Licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.
Are you an expert in this subject? Join the discussion and share your knowledge at Wikipedia.org.
Battle of Leyte Gulf
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article or section is missing citations or needs footnotes. Using inline citations helps guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies.(December 2007) |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The 'Battle of Leyte Gulf', also known as the the 'Battle for Leyte Gulf' and formerly as the 'Second Battle of the Philippine Sea', was the largest naval battle of World War II and, by some criteria, the largest sea battle in history.
It was fought in waters near to the Philippine island of Leyte from 23 October to 26 October 1944, between air and naval forces of the Allies and of the Empire of Japan. On October 20, United States troops invaded Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in South East Asia, and in particular depriving its forces and industry of crucial oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to repel the Allied invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets (which at the time included several Royal Australian Navy warships). The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never again sailed to battle in comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, were to remain inactive in their bases for the remainder of the Pacific War.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four interrelated major battles — the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar — and other actions including the "Fight in Palawan Passage".
The first use of kamikaze aircraft took place following the Leyte landings. A kamikaze hit the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia on 21 October. Organized suicide attacks by the "Special Attack Force" began on 25 October.
The campaigns of August 1942 to early 1944 had driven Japanese forces from many of their island bases in the south and central Pacific — while isolating many of their other bases (most notably the bastion of Rabaul) — and in June 1944 a series of Allied amphibious landings supported by the US Fifth Fleet's Fast Carrier Task Force captured the Northern Mariana Islands breaching Japan's inner strategic ring of defences and giving the Allies a base from which long range B-29 Superfortress bombers could operate against the Japanese home islands. The Japanese counterattacked in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in which the US Navy destroyed three Japanese aircraft carriers and approximately 600 Japanese aircraft, leaving the IJN with virtually no carrier-borne airpower.
For subsequent operations, Admiral Ernest J. King and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored blockading Japanese forces in the Philippines and attacking Formosa to give the Allies control of the sea routes between Japan and southern Asia. General Douglas MacArthur favoured an invasion of the Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Leaving the Philippines in Japanese hands would be a blow to American prestige and a personal affront to General MacArthur, who in 1942 had famously pronounced 'I shall return'. Also, the considerable air power the Japanese had amassed in the Philippines was thought too dangerous to bypass by many high-ranking officers outside the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Admiral Chester Nimitz. However, Nimitz and MacArthur initially had opposing plans, with Nimitz's plan initially centered on an invasion of Formosa, since that could also cut the supply lines to Southeast Asia. Formosa could also serve as a base for an invasion of mainland China, which MacArthur felt unnecessary. A meeting between MacArthur, Nimitz, and President Franklin Roosevelt helped confirm the Philippines as a strategic target, but had less to do with the final decision to invade the Philippines than sometimes claimed. Nimitz eventually changed his mind and agreed to MacArthur's plan.[1]
Perhaps the most decisive consideration against the Formosa-China plan, as envisaged by Admiral King and others, was that the invasion of Formosa was expected to require much larger ground forces than were available in the Pacific in late 1944, and would not have been feasible until the defeat of Germany had released the necessary additional Allied divisions for service in the east (See Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II - Volume XII 'Leyte').
It was eventually decided that Macarthur's forces would invade the island of Leyte in the central Philippines. The amphibious forces and close naval support would be provided by the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral Kinkaid. The Third Fleet, commanded by Admiral William F. Halsey, with Task Force 38 - the Fast Carrier Task Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher - as its main component, would provide more distant cover and support for the invasion against Japanese counterattacks.
 |
A serious and fundamental defect in this plan was that there would be no overall allied naval commander for the coming operation. This lack of a unified command, along with failures in communication, was to produce a crisis, and very nearly a strategic disaster, for the Allied forces.
The Allied options were equally apparent to the Imperial Japanese Navy. Combined Fleet Chief Toyoda Soemu prepared four "victory" plans: Shō-Gō 1 (捷１号作戦 Shō ichigō sakusen) was a major naval operation in the Philippines, while Shō-Gō 2, Shō-Gō 3 and Shō-Gō 4 were responses to attacks on Formosa, the Ryukyu and Kurile Islands respectively. The plans were for complex, aggressive operations committing nearly all available forces to a decisive battle, and therefore of necessity substantially depleting Japan's slender reserves of oil fuel.
Thus, when on 12 October 1944, Nimitz launched a series of carrier raids against Formosa and the Ryuku Islands to make sure aircraft based there could not intervene in the Leyte landings, the Japanese put Shō-Gō 2 into action, launching waves of attacks against the carriers, losing 600 planes in three days, almost their entire air strength in the region. Following the American invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese Navy transitioned to Shō-Gō 1.
Shō-Gō 1 called for Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's ships, known as Northern Force, to lure the main American covering forces away from Leyte. The Northern force would be built around several aircraft carriers, but these would be carrying very few aircraft or trained aircrew. The carriers would serve as the main bait. As the US covering forces were decoyed away by the Northern force two surface forces would advance on Leyte from the west. The Southern force under Admirals Nishimura and Shima would penetrate to the landing area via Surigao Strait. The Center Force under Admiral Kurita, by far the most powerful of the attacking forces, would pass through San Bernadino Strait into the Philippine Sea, turn southwards, and then also attack the landing area. [Morison 1963]
This plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the attacking forces, but Toyoda later explained this to his American interrogators as follows:
- Should we lose in the Philippines operations, even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the loss of the Philippines. [Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) - 'Interrogations of Japanese Officials' - see external link below]
As it sortied from its base in Brunei Kurita's powerful 'Center Force' consisted of five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna), ten heavy cruisers (Atago, Maya, Takao, Chōkai, Myōkō, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone and Chikuma), two light cruisers (Noshiro and Yahagi) and fifteen destroyers.
As Center Force passed Palawan Island shortly after midnight on 23 October, it was sighted by the submarine USS Darter. Although Darter's contact report was picked up by a radio operator on Yamato, Kurita failed to take appropriate anti-submarine precautions. Shortly afterwards Darter sank Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago, with four torpedo hits, and seriously damaged her sister ship Takao. Darter's companion submarine USS Dace then torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser Maya. Kurita transferred his flag to the battleship Yamato. Takao turned back to Brunei escorted by two destroyers and followed by the two submarines. On 24 October, as the submarines continued to shadow the damaged cruiser, Darter grounded on the Bombay Shoal. All efforts to get her off failed, and she was abandoned. Her entire crew was, however, rescued by Dace.
At about 08:00 on 24 October, the Center Force was spotted entering the narrow Sibuyan Sea by planes from USS Intrepid of Halsey's Third Fleet. Despite its great strength that fleet was much less well-placed to deal with the threat than it could (and should) have been. On 22 October Halsey had detached two of his carrier groups to the fleet base at Ulithi to provision and rearm. When the Darter's contact report came in Halsey recalled Davison's group but allowed McCain, with the strongest of Task Force 38's carrier groups, to continue towards Ulithi. Halsey finally recalled McCain on 24 October - but the delay meant that the most powerful American carrier group played little part in the coming battle, and that Third Fleet was therefore effectively deprived of nearly 40% of its air strength for most of the battle. On the morning of 24 October only three groups were available to strike Kurita's force, and the one best positioned to do so - Bogan's Task Group 38.2 - was by mischance the weakest of the groups, containing only one large carrier - Intrepid - and two light carriers. (The failure to promptly recall McCain on 23 October was also to deprive the Third Fleet, throughout the battle, of 4 of its 6 heavy cruisers ).
Planes from carriers Intrepid and Cabot of Bogan's group attacked at about 10:30, making hits on the battleships Nagato, Yamato, Musashi and severely damaging the heavy cruiser Myōkō. A second wave from USS Intrepid, Essex and Lexington later attacked, with SB2C Helldivers and F6F Hellcats from USS Essex Air Group 15, scoring another 10 hits on Musashi. As she withdrew, listing to port, a third wave from Enterprise and Franklin hit her with eleven bombs and eight torpedoes.
Kurita turned his fleet around to get out of range of the planes, passing the crippled Musashi as his force retreated. He waited until 17:15 before turning around again to head for the San Bernardino Strait. Musashi rolled over and sank at about 19:30.
In all Third Fleet flew 259 sorties against Center Force on 24 October, and most of these were by Grumman F6F fighter-bombers. This weight of attack was nowhere near sufficient to neutralize the threat from Kurita. It contrasts with the 527 sorties flown by Third Fleet against Ozawa's much weaker Northern Force on the following day. Moreover a large proportion of the Sibuyan Sea attack was directed against one ship, the Musashi. This great battleship was eliminated, and the cruiser Myoko crippled, but every other ship in Kurita's force remained battleworthy and able to advance.
Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Onishi Takijiro had directed his First Air Fleet of 80 planes based on Luzon against the carriers USS Essex, USS Lexington, USS Princeton and USS Langley of Rear Admiral Sherman's Task Group 38.3 (whose planes were also being used to attack airfields in Luzon to prevent Japanese land based aircraft attacks on the Allied ships in the Leyte Gulf). Princeton was hit by an armor-piercing bomb dropped by a Yokosuka D4Y 'Judy', and burst into flames. At 15:30, the aft magazine exploded, killing 200 sailors on Princeton and 80 on the cruiser USS Birmingham which was alongside assisting with the firefighting. Birmingham was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire, and other nearby vessels were damaged as well. All efforts to save Princeton failed, and she was finally scuttled (torpedoed by the light cruiser Reno) at 17:50.
Kurita was able to proceed through San Bernardino Strait during the night, to make a dramatic and unexpected appearance off the coast of Samar the following morning.
After the Japanese Southern and Center forces had been located but before Ozawa's carriers had been detected, Halsey and the staff of Third Fleet, aboard the battleship New Jersey, prepared a contingency plan to meet the threat from kurita's Center Force. The intention was to cover San Bernadino Strait with a powerful force of fast battleships supported by two of the Third Fleet's fast carrier groups. The battleship force was to be designated Task Force 34 and to consist of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee. Admiral Frederick Sherman was to be in overall command of the supporting carrier groups.
At 1512 on 24 October Halsey sent a radio message to his subordinate task group commanders, giving details of this contingency plan :
"BATDIV 7 MIAMI, VINCENNES, BILOXI, DESRON 52 LESS STEVEN POTTER, FROM TG 38.2 AND WASHINGTON, ALABAMA, WICHITA, NEW ORLEANS, DESDIV 100, PATTERSON, BAGLEY FROM TG 38.4 'WILL BE FORMED AS TASK FORCE 34 UNDER VICE ADMIRAL LEE, COMMANDER BATTLE LINE. TG 34 TO ENGAGE DECISIVELY AT LONG RANGES. CTG 38.4 CONDUCT CARRIERS OF TG 38.2 AND TG 38.4 CLEAR OF SURFACE FIGHTING. INSTRUCTIONS FOR TG 38.3 AND TG 38.1 LATER. HALSEY, OTC IN NEW JERSEY." [Morison 1963. Emphasis added by contributor]
This message was also picked up by Seventh Fleet and by Pacific Fleet headquarters. Task Force 34 was not formed off San Bernadino Strait as envisaged. This message was to lead to colossal misunderstanding, and to have a profound influence on the course of the battle.
Third Fleet's aircraft failed to locate Ozawa's Northern (decoy) force until 16:40 on 24 October. This was largely because Third Fleet had been preoccupied with attacking Kurita and defending itself against the Japanese air strikes from Luzon. On the evening of 24 October Ozawa intercepted a (mistaken) American communication describing Kurita's withdrawal, and he therefore began to withdraw too. However, at 20:00 Toyoda Soemu ordered all his forces to attack 'counting on divine assistance'. Ozawa reversed course again and headed southwards towards Leyte.
Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force constituted the main Japanese threat, and he was determined to seize what he saw as a golden opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Center Force had been neutralized by Third Fleet's air strikes earlier in the day in the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring, Halsey radioed (to Nimitz and Kinkaid):
"CENTRAL FORCE HEAVILY DAMAGED ACCORDING TO STRIKE REPORTS.
AM PROCEEDING NORTH WITH THREE GROUPS TO ATTACK CARRIER FORCES
AT DAWN" [Morison 1963 - Emphasis added by contributor]
The words 'with three groups' were to prove dangerously misleading. In the light of the intercepted 1512 24 October ' . . will be formed as Task Force 34' message from Halsey, Admiral Kinkaid and his staff assumed, as did Admiral Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters, that Task Force 34, commanded by Lee, had now been formed. They supposed that Halsey was leaving this powerful battleship force guarding San Bernadino Strait (and covering Seventh Fleet's northern flank) while he took his three available carrier groups northwards in pursuit of the Japanese carriers. But Task Force 34 had not yet been formed, and Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the Third Fleet's carriers. Halsey had consciously and deliberately left San Bernadino Strait absolutely unguarded. As Woodward wrote 'Everything was pulled out from San Bernadino Strait. Not so much as a picket destroyer was left'. [C. Vann Woodward, 1957]
Halsey and his staff officers resolutely ignored information from a night reconnaisance aircraft operating from the light carrier USS Independence that Kurita's powerful surface force had turned back towards San Bernardo Strait, and that after a long blackout the navigation lights in the Strait had been turned on. When Rear Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, commanding TG 38.2, radioed this information to Halsey's flagship, he was rebuffed by a staff officer, who tersely replied "Yes, yes, we have that information." Vice Admiral Lee, who had correctly deduced that Ozawa's force was on a decoy mission and indicated this in a blinker message to Halsey's flagship, was similarly rebuffed. Commodore Arleigh Burke and Commander James Flatley of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's staff had come to the same conclusion. They were sufficiently worried about the situation to wake Mitscher, who asked 'Does Admiral Halsey have that report?' On being told that Halsey did, Mitscher, knowing too well Halsey's temperament, commented 'If he wants my advice he'll ask for it' and went back to sleep.
The entire available strength of Third Fleet - some 65 ships and the most powerful naval force on the planet - continued to steam northwards, away from San Bernadino Strait.
Nishimura's 'Southern Force' consisted of the battleships Yamashiro and Fusō, the heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. They were attacked by bombers on 24 October but sustained only minor damage.
Because of the strict radio silence imposed on the Center and Southern Forces, Nishimura was unable to synchronise his movements with Shima and Kurita. When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at about 02:00 Shima was 25 miles (40 km) behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte.
As the Southern Force approached Surigao Strait, it ran into a deadly trap set by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had six battleships (West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, all but the Mississippi having been sunk or damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor), eight cruisers (heavy cruisers USS Louisville (Flagship), Portland, Minneapolis and HMAS Shropshire, light cruisers USS Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise), 28 destroyers and 39 motor torpedo boats (Patrol/Torpedo (PT) boats. To pass through the narrows and reach the invasion shipping, Nishimura would have to run the gauntlet of torpedoes from the PT boats followed by the large force of destroyers, and then advance under the concentrated fire of the six battleships and their eight flanking cruisers disposed across the far mouth of the Strait.
At 2236 one of the motor torpedo-boats, PT-131, made the first contact on the approaching Japanese ships. Over more than three-and-a-half hours the torpedo-boats made repeated attacks on Nishimura's force, but without making any torpedo hits. However, they made contact reports which were of use to Oldendorf and his force.
As Nishimura's ships entered Surigao Strait they received devastating torpedo attacks from the American destroyers disposed on both sides of their line of advance. At about 0300 both Japanese battleships were hit by torpedoes. The Yamashiro was able to steam on, but the Fuso exploded and broke in two. Three of Nishimura's four destroyers were also hit, and two of these sank. The third, Asagumo, was able to retire.
At 03:16, USS West Virginia’s radar picked up the surviving ships of Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yards (38 km) and had achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yards (27 km). West Virginia tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:53, she unleashed the eight 16 inch (406 mm) guns of her main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (21 km), striking the Yamashiro with her first salvo. She went on to fire a total of 93 of her heavy shells. At 03:55 California and Tennessee joined in, firing respectively a total of 69 and 63 14-inch. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese could not reply because of their inferior fire control systems.
The other three US battleships, equipped with less advanced gunnery radar, had difficulty arriving at a firing solution. Maryland eventually succeeded in visually ranging on the splashes of the other battleships' shells, and then fired a total of 48 16-inch projectiles. Pennsylvania was unable to find a target and her guns remained silent.
Mississippi only obtained a solution at the end of the battle-line action, and then fired just one (full) salvo of twelve 14-inch shells. This was the last salvo to be fired by the American battleships in this engagement, and the last salvo ever to be fired by a battleship against another heavy ship. Thus this was to be the end of an era in naval history.
Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 16-inch (406 mm) and 14-inch (356 mm) armor-piercing shells, as well as the fire of Oldendorf's flanking cruisers. Shigure turned and fled but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at about 04:20, with Nishimura on board. Mogami and Shigure retreated southwestwards down the Strait.
The rear of the Southern Force, the "Second Striking Force" commanded by Vice Admiral Shima, had approached Surigao Strait about 40 miles astern of Nishimura. It too came under attack from the PT boats, and one of these hit the light cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo which crippled her and caused her to fall out of formation. Shima's two heavy cruisers (Nachi and Ashigara) and eight destroyers next encountered remnants of Nishimura's force. Seeing what he thought were the wrecks of both Nishimura's battleships (actually the two halves of Fusō), Shima ordered a retreat. His flagship, Nachi, collided with Mogami, flooding the latter's steering-room. Mogami fell behind in the retreat and was sunk by aircraft the next morning. The bow half of Fusō was destroyed by Louisville, and the stern half sank off Kanihaan Island. Of Nishimura's seven ships, only Shigure survived.
The Battle of Surigao Strait was the last battle-line action in history - Yamashiro and her American opponents were the last battleships to engage another battleship in combat. If Yamashiro was sunk by battleship fire alone (which is unlikely), then she was one of only two during the Second World War for which this may be claimed (the other being the Kongō-class battleship Kirishima - in the Battle of Guadalcanal. However, Yamashiro had been hit by as many as four torpedoes from American destroyers, and Kirishima was scuttled because the US battleship Washington's gunfire had wrecked her steering and left her in a hopeless position. It is in fact doubtful whether during that war any battleship was sunk by gunfire alone (although the battlecruiser Hood was destroyed by gunfire in the Battle of the Denmark Strait)).
Surigao Strait was also the last battle in which one force (the Americans, in this case) was able to 'cross the T' of its opponent. However, by the time the battleship action was joined the Japanese 'line' was very ragged and consisted of only one battleship (Yamashiro), one heavy cruiser and one destroyer. Thus the 'crossing of the T' which took place on this occasion was scarcely more than notional - a purely academic 'crossing of the T' - and it had little or no effect on the outcome of the battle.
The destroyers which carried out massed torpedo attacks with such devastating effect in the Battle of Surigao Strait were ships of the very successful Fletcher Class.
This was the most numerous class of destroyers ever built for the US Navy - or indeed for any other navy - consisting of 175 ships in all. The overwhelming majority of destroyers in the US Third and Seventh Fleets during the Battle for Leyte Gulf were of this class - including 26 of the 28 destroyers with Oldendorf's force in Surigao Strait on the moring of 25 October 1944.
Three Fletcher Class ships - Hoel, Heermann and Johnston - of 'Taffy 3' were to play an heroic and central role in the Battle off Samar later on the same day.
Halsey's decision to take all the available strength of Third Fleet northwards to attack the Japanese carriers left San Bernadino Strait completely unguarded. As C. Vann Woodward remarks, 'not so much as a picket destroyer was left.'
It was generally assumed by senior officers in Seventh Fleet (including Kinkaid) that Halsey was taking his three available carrier groups northwards (McCain's group, the strongest in Third Fleet, was still returning from the direction of Ulithi) but leaving the battleships of Task Force 34 covering San Bernadino Strait against the Japanese Center Force. In fact Halsey had not yet formed Task Force 34, and all six of Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the carriers.
Kurita's Center Force was therefore able to emerge unopposed from San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on 25 October and steam southwards along the coast of Samar, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and led most of his fleet away - a hope that proved to have been amply fulfilled. At this stage, despite the losses in the Palawan Passage and Sibuyan Sea actions Center Force was still very powerful, consisting of 4 battleships including the giant Yamato, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and a dozen destroyers.
In their path were the three escort carrier groups of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet. These contained a total of sixteen small escort carriers, with their escorting lightly armed (and entirely unarmoured) destroyers and smaller 'destroyer escorts'. Admiral Thomas Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.1 ("Taffy 1") consisted of the escort carriers Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee, and Petrof Bay. (The remaining two escort carriers from Taffy 1, Chenango and Saginaw Bay, had departed for Morotai, Indonesia on October 24, carrying "dud" aircraft from other carriers for transfer ashore. They returned with replacement aircraft after the battle.) Admiral Felix Stump's Task Unit 77.4.2 ("Taffy 2") consisted of Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island, and Ommaney Bay.
Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of Fanshaw Bay, St Lo, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay, and Gambier Bay.
Each escort carrier carried typically about 28 planes. The sixteen carriers of the three groups had available some 450 aircraft in all. The overwhelming majority of these were Wildcat fighters or Avenger torpedo-bombers. The ordnance carried by the escort carriers for these aircraft was primarily for anti-submarine protection or for operations in support of the ground forces on Leyte. The carriers' magazines were therefore dominated by depth charges and small general-purpose fragmentation bombs. There were however some torpedoes.
The escort carriers were very slow and lightly armored and stood little chance in an encounter with a battleship. They were, however, "screened" by destroyers and destroyer escorts (affectionately known as "tin cans").
The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, taking the Americans completely by surprise. Kurita, not seeing the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, mistook the escort carriers for light fleet carriers of the Independence Class, and thought that he had the whole of the American Third Fleet under guns of his battleships including the 18.1-inch (460 mm) guns of the Yamato.
When Taffy 3 discovered they were coming under attack, Clifton Sprague (no relation to Thomas Sprague) directed his Taffy 3 carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and flee towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and ordered the destroyers to make smoke to mask the retreating carriers, which drew fire from the Japanese ships. The History Channel's 2006 Dogfights called it the naval mismatch of the century, wherein David would send Goliath fleeing for home. Yamato was the largest and most powerful battleship to ever see combat; it alone displaced as much as all of Taffy 3 put together.
Concerned about the splashes of incoming fire, Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans, skipper of the destroyer USS Johnston, which was the closest to the attackers, suddenly took the initiative to order his ship to "flank speed, full left rudder," ordering Johnston to directly attack the greatly superior oncoming Japanese ships on his own in what would appear to be a suicidal mission.
The Johnston was a 2100-ton destroyer of the Fletcher Class, armed with five 5-inch (127 mm) guns, 40mm and 20mm light anti-aircraft guns, and ten 21-inch Mark-15 torpedoes. Only the torpedoes gave her any chance of inflicting serious damage on an enemy battleship.
Weaving to avoid shells, and steering towards splashes, the Johnston approached the Japanese heavy cruiser Kumano for a torpedo run. When Johnston was 10 miles (17 km) from Kumano, her 5-inch (127 mm) guns rained shells on Kumano’s bridge and deck (where they could do some damage — whereas the shells would simply bounce off the enemy ship's armored hull). Johnston closed to within torpedo range and fired a salvo, which blew the bow off the cruiser squadron flagship Kumano and also took the cruiser Suzuya out of the fight as she stopped to assist.
From seven miles (11 km) away, the battleship Kongo sent a 14 inch shell through the Johnston’s deck and engine room. Johnston’s speed was cut in half to only 14 knots (26 km/h), while the aft gun turrets lost all electrical power. Then three 6-inch shells, possibly from Yamato's secondary batteries, struck Johnston’s bridge, killing many and wounding Comdr. Evans. The bridge was abandoned, and Evans steered the ship from the aft steering column. Evans nursed his ship back towards the fleet, when he saw the other destroyers attacking as well. Emboldened by the Johnston's attack, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's destroyers on the assault. Even in her heavily damaged state, damage-control teams restored power to 2 of the 3 aft turrets, and Evans turned the Johnston around and re-entered the fight.
The other destroyers attacked the Japanese line with suicidal determination, drawing fire and scattering the Japanese formations as ships turned to avoid torpedoes. The powerful Yamato found herself between two spreads of torpedoes fired from the destroyer USS Heermann which were on parallel courses, and for ten minutes, she headed away from the action, unable to turn back for fear of being hit. Heermann, meanwhile, closed with the other Japanese battleships, advancing so close to her huge targets that they could not fire for either inability to depress their main guns enough or fear of hitting their own men and ships.
At 07:35, the even smaller destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts turned and headed toward the battle. On the way, the Roberts passed by the mangled Johnston and saw an inspirational sight in the person of Comdr. Evans standing on the Johnston’s stern, his left hand wrapped in a bandage, saluting the captain of the Roberts. With only two 5-inch (127 mm) guns, one fore and aft, and just 3 Mark-15 torpedoes, her crew lacked the weapons and training in tactics to take on the much larger attackers. Still, she charged in to attack the heavy cruiser Chokai. With smoke as cover, the Roberts steamed to within two and a half miles (4 km) of Chokai, coming under fire of her two forward 8-inch turrets. But Roberts was so close that the shells passed overhead. Once in torpedo range, Roberts' 3-torpedo salvo struck the cruiser. Following this Roberts fought with the Japanese ships for an hour, firing over 600 5-inch shells and raking the upper works with 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns while maneuvering at close range. At 08:51, the Japanese finally landed two hits, the second of which destroyed the aft gun turret. With her remaining 5-inch (127 mm) gun, she set the bridge of the cruiser Chikuma afire and destroyed the number 3 gun turret, before being pierced again by three 14 inch shells from the Kongo. With a 40-foot (12 m) hole in her side, the Roberts took on water, and at 09:35, the order was given to abandon ship, sinking 30 minutes later with 89 of her crew.
Meanwhile, Sprague had ordered all three Taffy groups to launch their planes with whatever they had, even if they were machine guns or depth charges. Even after many aircraft expended their ammunition they made dry runs to threaten and distract Japanese warships and their gunners. Instead of being easily overrun, the Americans had turned it into a bloody all-out brawl with their attackers.
The carriers of Taffy 3 turned south and fled through shellfire. The armor-piercing (AP) shells intended for Halsey's battleships flew right through the thin-skinned escort carriers without triggering their fuses. A switch to High Explosive (HE) shells holed, slowed, and finally sank the Gambier Bay at the rear of the American formation, while most of the others were also damaged. Their single stern-mounted five-inch (127 mm) guns returned fire. The St. Lo scored a hit on the magazine of a cruiser, the only hit ever known to have been inflicted directly on an opposing surface vessel by a gun mounted on an aircraft carrier .
The tide soon turned against Taffy 3's destroyers. Two hours into the attack, Comdr. Evans aboard the Johnston spotted a line of four destroyers led by the light cruiser Yahagi making a torpedo attack on the fleeing carriers and moved to intercept. Johnston poured fire on the attacking group, forcing them to prematurely fire their torpedoes, missing the carriers. Their gunfire then turned to the weaving Johnston. At 09:10 the Japanese scored a direct hit on one of the forward turrets, knocking it out and setting off many 5-inch shells that were stored in the turret, and her damaged engines stopped, leaving her dead in the water. The Japanese destroyers closed in on the sitting target, and the Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat." At 09:45 (2 hours and 45 minutes into the battle), Comdr. Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Commander Evans abandoned ship with his crew but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Just as it seemed the end was near for the Taffy 3 and the other two Taffy groups, at 09:20 Kurita suddenly broke off the fight and, giving the order "all ships, my course north, speed 20", retreated north. Though many of his ships were not even damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. Three heavy cruisers (Chōkai, Kumano, Chikuma) had been sunk, and the ferocity of the determined concentrated sea and air attack had led him to calculate that continuing was not worth further losses.
Signals from Ozawa had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the whole of the 3rd Fleet, which meant that the longer he continued to engage, the more likely it was that he would suffer devastating air strikes from Halsey's main attack carriers which were even more threatening than the tiny force of Taffy 3. He retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait. Nagato, Haruna and Kongō were severely damaged from the torpedoes of Taffy 3's destroyers. Kurita had begun the battle with five battleships. On return to Japan, only Yamato remained combat-worthy, and she had not even taken a major part in the battle.
The spirit of Taffy 3 was shown when, while watching the Japanese retreat, Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim: "Dammit boys, they're getting away!"
The American destroyers Hoel and Johnston, and destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts were sunk, and four others were damaged. The destroyer Heermann, despite her fight with Japanese battleships many times her size, finished the battle with only six of her crew dead. However, in total over one thousand American sailors and pilots were killed.
As the battle ended Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi had put his "Special Attack Force" into operation launching kamikaze attacks against the Allied ships in Leyte Gulf, but these attacks were hampered by bad weather and fuel shortages. On 25 October, the escort carrier [[USS St. Lo (CVE-63)St. Lo]] of Clifton Sprague's Taffy 3 was hit and sunk, and the cruiser HMAS Australia was hit for a second time and forced to retire for repairs.
Because of communication errors, the Taffy 3 survivors of the Battle off Samar who had abandoned ship were not rescued for a few days, by which time many more had gone mad or died because of sharks or thirst. Finally, the captain of a LST took his ship to rescue the Americans, using a rather peculiar method of identifying who was American, as survivor Jack Yusen related:
- "We saw this ship come up, it was circling around us, and a guy was standing up on the bridge with a megaphone. And he called out 'Who are you? Who are you?' and we all yelled out 'Samuel B. Roberts!' He's still circling, so now we're cursing at him. He came back and yelled 'Who won the World Series?' and we all yelled 'St. Louis Cardinals!' And then we could hear the engines stop, and cargo nets were thrown over the side. That's how we were rescued."
Taffy 3 was awarded the following Presidential Unit Citation: "For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ...the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy ...two of the Unit's valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells ... The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."
Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers (Zuikaku — the last survivor of the six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 — Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers (Hyūga and Ise — the aft turrets had been replaced by hangar, deck and catapult, but neither carried any planes in this battle), three light cruisers (Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. He had only 108 planes.
Ozawa's force was not located until 16:40 on 24 October, because the Americans were too busy attacking Kurita and dealing with the air strikes from Luzon. On the evening of 24 October, Ozawa intercepted a (mistaken) American communication of Kurita's withdrawal and began to withdraw as well. But at 20:00, Toyoda Soemu ordered all forces to attack.
Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, and was determined to seize what he saw as a golden opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Japanese Center Force had been neutralized by Third Fleet's air strikes on 24 October in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring to Brunei, Halsey radioed "Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn."
The force which Halsey was taking north with him - three groups of Mitscher's Task Force 38 - was overwhelmingly stronger than the Japanese Northern Force. Between them these groups had five large fleet carriers (Intrepid, Franklin, Lexington, Enterprise, and Essex), five light fleet carriers (Independence, Belleau Wood, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto - a sixth, Princeton, had been destroyed by a Japanese air attack on 24 October just as its aircraft were taking off to attack Kurita's Center Force), six battleships (Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington), eight cruisers and more than forty destroyers. The air groups of the ten US carriers present contained a total of more than six hundred aircraft.
At 0240 on 25 October Halsey 'officially' formed Task Force 34, built around the Third Fleet's six battleships and commanded by Vice Admiral Lee. As the dawn approached the ships of Task Force 34 drew ahead of the carrier groups. Halsey's intention was follow up Mitscher's initial air strikes with the heavy gunfire of Lee's battleships.
Around dawn on 25 October Ozawa launched 75 aircraft to attack the Third Fleet. Most of these were shot down by the American combat air patrols, and no damage was done to US ships. A handful of surviving Japanese 'planes made it to land bases on Luzon.
During the night Halsey had passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Admiral Marc Mitscher, who ordered the American carrier groups to launch their first strike wave, of 180 aircraft, at dawn - before the Northern Force had been located. The search aircraft made contact at 07:10. At 08:00, the American fighters destroyed the defensive screen of 30 aircraft. Air strikes began and continued until the evening, by which time the American aircraft had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, sinking Zuikaku, the light carriers Chiyoda and Zuiho, and the destroyer Akitsuki. Chiyoda was lost with all hands. The light carrier Chitose was crippled, as was the cruiser Tama. Ozawa transferred his flag to the light cruiser Oyodo.
The Crisis - Seventh Fleet calls for help
Shortly after 0800 desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from Seventh Fleet. One from Kinkaid, sent in plain language, read: "MY SITUATION IS CRITICAL. FAST BATTLESHIPS AND SUPPORT BY AIR STRIKES MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP ENEMY FROM DESTROYING CVES AND ENTERING LEYTE." Halsey recalled in his memoirs that he was shocked at this message, recounting that the radio signals from the Seventh Fleet had come in at random and out of order due to a backlog in the signals office. It seems that he did not receive this vital message from Kinkaid until around 1000 hours. Halsey later claimed that he knew Kinkaid was in trouble, but had not dreamed of the scale of the crisis.
One of the most alarming signals from Kinkaid reported that, after their action in Surigao Strait, Seventh Fleet's own battleships were critically low on ammunition. Even this failed to persuade Halsey to send any immediate assistance to Seventh Fleet.
From 3,000 miles (5,000 km) away in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz had been monitoring the desperate calls from Taffy 3, and sent Halsey a terse message: "TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS" The first four words and the last three were "padding" used to confuse enemy listeners (the beginning and end of the true message was marked by double consonants, flanked by nonsense words known as 'padding'). The communications staff on Halsey's flagship correctly deleted the first section of padding but mistakenly retained the last three words in the message finally handed to Halsey. The last three words, probably selected by a communications officer at Nimitz' headquarters, may have been meant as a loose quote from Tennyson's poem on "The Charge of the Light Brigade," suggested by the coincidence that this day, 25 October, was the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of Balaklava - and was not intended as a commentary on the current crisis off Leyte. Halsey, however, upon reading the message, thought that the last words - 'THE WORLD WONDERS' - were a biting piece of criticism from Nimitz, threw his cap on the deck and broke into 'sobs of rage'. (Realizing their mistake, the communications staff on New Jersey later explained to Halsey what had happened [2]).
Eventually, at 1115, more than two hours after the first distress messages from Seventh Fleet had been received by his flagship, Halsey ordered Task Force 34 to turn around and head southwards towards Samar. At this point Lee's battleships were almost within gun range of Ozawa's force. Two-and-a-half hours were then spent refuelling Task Force 34's accompanying destroyers.
After this succession of delays it was too late for this force to give any practical help to Seventh Fleet, other than to assist in picking up survivors from Taffy 3, and it was too late even to intercept Kurita's force before it made its escape through San Bernadino Strait.
Battle of Cape Engano - Final Actions
When Halsey turned Task Force 34 southwards at 1115 he detached 4 of its cruisers and 9 of its destroyers under Rear Admiral DuBose and reassigned them to Task Force 38. At 1415 Mitscher ordered DuBose to pursue the remnants of Ozawa's force. His cruisers finished off the light carrier Chiyoda at around 1700, and at 2059 his force sank the destroyer Hatsuzuki after a very stubborn fight.
When Admiral Ozawa learned of the deployment of the DuBose force he ordered the battleships Ise and Hyuga to turn southwards and attack it. The battleships however failed to locate DuBose's ships, which would have been heavily outgunned.
At about 2310 the American submarine Jallao torpedoed and sank the light cruiser Tama of Ozawa's force. This was the last act of the Battle of Cape Engano, and - apart from some final air strikes on the retreating Japanese forces on 26 October - the conclusion of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.
Halsey was criticized for his decision to take Task Force 34 north in pursuit of Ozawa, and for failing to detach it when Kinkaid first appealed for help. US Navy slang for Halsey's actions has ever since been Bull's Run, a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname "Bull" (in the US Navy he was instead known as 'Bill' Halsey) with an allusion to the Battle of Bull Run in the American Civil War.
In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey justified the decision as follows:
- Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of 24 October, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn. I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet. [Morison 1963. Emphasis added]
Halsey also argued that he had feared that leaving Task Force 34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft, while leaving one of the fast carrier groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the concentration of air power going north to strike Ozawa. However Morison states that Admiral Lee told him that he would have been prepared for his battleships to cover San Bernadino Strait without carrier support. [Morison 1963]
Moreover, if Halsey had been in proper communication with Seventh Fleet it should have been a simple matter for the escort carriers of Task Force 77 to provide adequate air cover for Task Force 34 - a much simpler matter than it would prove to be for those escort carriers to defend themselves against the onslaught of Kurita's heavy ships.
It may be argued that the fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships, and 'would have had to remain behind' with Task Force 34 (while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers) may have contributed to this decision. However, it would have been perfectly feasible (and logical) to have taken one or both of Third Fleet's two fastest battleships (Iowa and/or New Jersey) with the carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the Battle Line off San Bernadino Strait. (Indeed, Halsey's original plan for the composition of Task Force 34 was that it would contain only four, not all six, of the Third Fleet's battleships). Therefore, to guard San Bernadino Strait with a powerful battleship force would not have been incompatible with Halsey's personally going north aboard the New Jersey.
It does seem likely that Halsey was strongly influenced by his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Robert 'Mick' Carney, who was also wholeheartedly in favour of taking all Third Fleet's available forces northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.
Clifton Sprague, commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar, was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision, and of his failure to clearly inform Kinkaid and Seventh Fleet that their northern flank was no longer protected:
- In the absence of any information that this exit [of the San Bernardino Strait] was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.
Regarding Halsey's failure to turn Task Force 34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Samuel Eliot Morison writes:
- If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force ... Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and completed the destruction of Center Force.
Instead, as Morison also observes:
- The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships.
[Morison 1963, pp. 336-7 - Emphasis added by contributor]
The battle of Leyte Gulf secured the beachheads of the U.S. Sixth Army on Leyte against attack from the sea. However, much hard fighting would be required before the island was completely in Allied hands at the end of December 1944: the Battle of Leyte on land was fought in parallel with an air and sea campaign in which the Japanese reinforced and resupplied their troops on Leyte while the Allies attempted to interdict them and establish air-sea superiority for a series of amphibious landings in Ormoc Bay — engagements collectively referred to as the Battle of Ormoc Bay.
The Imperial Japanese Navy suffered its greatest loss since the Meiji Restoration. Its failure to dislodge the Allied invaders from Leyte meant the loss of the Philippines, which in turn meant that Japan would be cut off from her occupied territories in Southeast Asia. These provided crucial resources, in particular the oil for her ships and aircraft, and this problem was compounded because the shipyards and sources of manufactured supplies such as ammunition were in Japan. The fleet returned to their bases to sit inactive for the remainder of the war. The only major operation by its surface ships during the remainder of the war was the disastrous Operation Ten-Go in April 1945, in which the battleship Yamato was destroyed. The loss of Leyte opened the way for the invasion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1945.
J.F.C. Fuller, in "The Decisive Battles of the Western World," writes of the outcome of Leyte Gulf:
The Japanese fleet had [effectively] ceased to exist, and, except by land-based aircraft, their opponents had won undisputed command of the sea. When Admiral Ozawa was questioned . . after the war he replied 'After this battle the surface forces became strictly auxiliary, so that we relied on land forces, special [Kamikaze] attack, and air power . . there was no further use assigned to surface vessels, with the exception of some special ships'. And Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, said that he realised that 'the defeat at Leyte 'was tantamount to the loss of the Philippines' -
As for the larger significance of the battle, he said 'I felt that it was the end.'
[Fuller, 1956]
- ^ Smith, Robert Ross. Chapter 21: Luzon Versus Formosa. United States Army. Retrieved on 2007-12-08.
- Cutler, Thomas (2001). The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-243-9.
- D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
- Drea, Edward J. (1998). "Leyte: Unanswered Questions", In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-1708-0.
- Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
- Field, James A. (1947). The Japanese at Leyte Gulf;: The Sho operation. Princeton University Press. ASIN B0006AR6LA.
- Friedman, Kenneth (2001). Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-756-7.
- Fuller, J.F.C. (1956). The Decisive Battles of the Western World - Volume III. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. ISBN10: 1135317909.
- Hornfischer, James D. (2004). The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Bantam. ISBN 0-553-80257-7.
- Hoyt, Edwin P.; Thomas H Moorer (Introduction) (2003). The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Lyons Press. ISBN 1-58574-643-6.
- Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1963 (reissue 2004)). Leyte, June 1944-January 1945, vol. 12 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A.: University of Illinois Press; Reprint edition. ISBN 0-252-07063-1.
- Potter, E. B. (2005). Admiral Arleigh Burke. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-692-5.
- Potter, E. B. (2003). Bull Halsey. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-691-7.
- Sauer, Howard (1999). The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait. Glencannon Press. ISBN 1-889901-08-3.
- Thomas, Evan (2006). Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-5221-7.
- Willmott, H. P. (2005). The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-34528-6.
- Woodward, C. Vann (1947 (reissue 2007)). The Battle for Leyte Gulf: The Incredible Story of World War II's Largest Naval Battle. Skyhorse Publishing. ISBN 1602391947.
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) - Interrogations of Japanese Officials
- Animated History of The Battle of Leyte Gulf
- Battle Experience: Battle for Leyte Gulf [Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 22]
- Task Force 34 Action Report: 6 October 1944 - 3 November 1944 (VAdm Lee)
- Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf (VAdm Kinkaid)
- "Turkey Trots to Water" — detailed description of the battle from battleship.org
- Orders of battle: Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Cape Engaño, Samar.
- "Glorious Death: The Battle of Leyte Gulf" by Tim Lanzendörfer
- battle-of-leyte-gulf.com
- Leyte Gulf - a Brief Account of the Battle
- The Battle Off Samar — Taffy III at Leyte Gulf by Robert Jon Cox
- Leyte Gulf Naval Chess Game, a free, educational boardgame of the battle, to print off, assemble, and play
- Return to the Philippines: public domain documents from ibiblio.org
- The Battle for Leyte Gulf Revisited by Irwin J. Kappes
- Timeline for USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE 413)
- Japan's TA-Operation: A Blueprint for Disaster by Irwin J. Kappes
- Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. History Channel TV
- Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy. History Channel. TV
