From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Zama
Part of the Second Punic War
The Battle of Zama by Cornelis Cort, 1567
Date October 19, 202 BC Location Zama, near Carthage Result Decisive Roman victory; Marks end of Second Punic War
Combatants
Carthage	Roman Republic Massyli (East Numidia)
Commanders
Hannibal	Scipio Africanus Masinissa
Strength
almost 50,000 infantry 4,000 cavalry 80 war elephants	34,000 Roman infantry, 3,000 Roman cavalry, 6,000 Numidian cavalry
Casualties
20,000 killed, 11,000 wounded, 15,000 captured	1,500 killed, 4,000 wounded

Second Punic War

Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene – Ebro River – Ager Falernus – Geronium – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus – 3rd Nola – Beneventum – 1st Tarentum – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Cartagena – Numistro – Asculum – Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Bagbrades – Cirta – Po Valley – Great Plains – Zama

The Battle of Zama, fought around October 19 of 202 BC, marked the final and decisive end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio defeated a Carthaginian force led by Hannibal Barca. Soon after this defeat on their home ground, the Carthaginian senate sued for peace, ending the 17-year war.

Contents 1 Prelude 2 Battle 3 Aftermath 4 References

Despite nearly two decades of constant victories, much of it on Italian soil, the Carthaginian commander Hannibal Barca was still in Italy, although confined to the south of the peninsula. A decisive victory by Gaius Claudius Nero in the brief Metaurus campaign ended with the death of Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal Barca, and permanently severed Hannibal from all hope of reinforcements. Hannibal was now stranded and forced to sustain a scorched earth policy throughout Southern Italy. Hannibal had entered Italy as a victorious conqueror. He humiliated the Romans at Ticinus, Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and finally Cannae where the cream of the Roman army was slaughtered. Hannibal had anticipated using these victories to convince the Italian city-states to mutiny. Instead, they only produced a growing resolve in the Italian states to rally to Roman leadership.

Following his decisive, victorious campaign in Spain, Scipio proposed ending the war by invading Carthage's home territories, an area now roughly comprising modern-day Tunisia. Despite the cautious Senate's opposition to this plan, the Roman people gave Scipio the requisite authority to attempt the invasion. At first Scipio operated cautiously, acting mostly to reinforce his army with local defectors. After Massinissa replaced the pro-Carthage Syphax as chieftain of the Numidians, Scipio felt able to risk a decisive battle and began menacing the city of Carthage itself. The Carthaginian senate recalled Hannibal from Italy and he met Scipio on the plains of Zama leading a ragtag army composed of local citizens and veterans from his Italian campaigns.

The two men are said to have met face-to-face before the battle. Hannibal reminded Scipio of fate's role in the war, and how lenient Hannibal was to Rome when it was on the brink of destruction. Scipio replied that chance played a role in every decision every day, and would not give peace without battle.

Zama was a reversal from typical battles of the Second Punic War in which the Romans had fewer infantry, while the Carthaginians — by the defection of the Numidians — were outnumbered almost 2 to 1 in cavalry. Hannibal gathered about 50,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, while Scipio had a total of 34,000 infantry and 8,700 cavalry. Putting his inexperienced cavalry on the flanks, Hannibal aligned his troops in three straight lines behind eighty war elephants. The first line consisted of mixed infantry from Gaul, Liguria, and Baleria. In his second line he placed the Carthaginian and Libyan levies while his veterans from Italy were placed in the third line. Hannibal intentionally held back his third infantry line, in order to thwart Scipio's tendency to pin the Carthaginian center and envelop his opponent's lines, as he had previously done at the Battle of Ilipa.

Hannibal hoped that the combination of the war elephants and the depth of the first two lines would weaken and disorganize the Roman advance, whereupon he would complete a victory with his reserves in the third line and overlap Scipio's lines. Though this formation was indeed well-conceived, it failed to produce a victory for Hannibal.

At the outset of the battle, the superior Roman cavalry swept aside their Carthaginian counterparts and pursued them off the field— depriving Hannibal of his entire body of cavalry (though it is sometimes claimed that Hannibal had intended his cavalry to lure their opponents away from the battlefield, in effect eliminating the advantage the Romans enjoyed in this arm). Likewise, Hannibal’s first two lines, unable to cope with the well-trained and confident Roman soldiers, were dispersed soon thereafter. For years, Hannibal had won victories with his experienced army, but now he faced the best of the Roman army, while he commanded a hastily assembled army, which fared poorly against the Romans. As Livy states “...the Romans immediately drove back the line[s] of their opponents; then pushing their elbows and the bosses of their shields, and pressing forward into the places which they had pushed them, they advanced at a considerable pace, as if there had been no one there to resist them...” [10].

Moreover, Scipio came up with an inventive method of neutralizing Hannibal's elephants. Hannibal lost all of his original elephant troops (who crossed the Alps with him) after the battle of the Trebia, but they were replenished in Africa. First of all, Scipio knew that elephants could be ordered to charge forward, but they could only continue their charge in a straight line. So rather than arranging the maniples in the traditional checker pattern manipular formation, Scipio instead put the velites, principes, and triarii in succeeding lines of 500 man groups. Scipio realized that intentionally opening gaps in his troops meant that the elephants would continue between them, without harming any of his soldiers. He did this, and the elephants passed through his troops harmlessly and were picked off on the other side (many of them were so distraught, in fact, they charged back into their own Carthaginian lines). Scipio's troops then fell back into formation and continued marching.

Despite these setbacks, the battle remained a closely contested engagement. When the Roman infantry confronted the Carthaginian third line, the resulting clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving local superiority. In fact, at one point during the battle, it seemed that Hannibal was on the verge of victory. However, Scipio was able to rally his men, and his cavalry, after pursuing the Carthaginian cavalry, returned in time to deliver a devastating blow in Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged attack caused the Carthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse. Unable to cope against the well-trained and confident Roman soldiers with his own indifferent troops after losing his advantage, Hannibal experienced a major defeat that put an end to all resistance on the part of Carthage. In total, as many as 20,000 men of Hannibal’s army were killed at Zama, while 11,000 were wounded and 15,000 were taken as prisoners. The Romans on the other hand, lost as few as 1,500 dead and 4,000 wounded.

Soon after Scipio's victory at Zama, the war ended with the Carthaginian senate suing for peace. Unlike the treaty that ended the First Punic War, and which amounted merely to an extended armistice, the terms Carthage acceded to were so punishing that it was never able to challenge Rome for supremacy of the Mediterranean again. When Rome waged a Third Punic War on Carthage 70 years later, the Carthaginians were far from having the power to invade Italy, because the Romans had tricked them into completely disarming beforehand. Unarmed, they could only organize a defense of their home city, which, after an extended siege, was captured and completely destroyed.

• Hans Delbrück; Warfare in Antiquity; 1920; ISBN 0-8032-9199-X
• Robert F. Pennel; Ancient Rome from the earliest times down to 476 A.D; 1890
• Theodore Ayrault Dodge; Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians and Romans down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., with a Detailed Account of the Second Punic War; 1891; ISBN 0-306-81362-9
• In fiction, Dante's Divine Comedy, poem, Inferno XXXI.97-132, 115-124