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Battle of the Coral Sea
Part of World War II, Pacific War
. An explosion aboard USS Lexington, May 8, 1942, seen from the cruiser Minneapolis
Date May 4 – May 8, 1942 Location Coral Sea, between Australia, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands Result Japanese tactical victory; Allied strategic victory
Combatants
United States Navy  Royal Australian Navy	Imperial Japanese Navy
Commanders
Frank J. Fletcher John G. Crace	Shigeyoshi Inoue Takeo Takagi
Strength
2 large carriers, 3 cruisers	2 large carriers, 1 light carrier, 4 cruisers
Casualties
1 fleet carrier, 1 destroyer, 1 oil tanker sunk 543 killed	1 light carrier, 1 destroyer sunk 69 aircraft destroyed,[1] 1,074 killed

v • d • e Pacific campaigns 1940-42
French Indochina – Thailand – Malaya – Pearl Harbor – Hong Kong – Philippines – Guam – Wake – Dutch East Indies – New Guinea – Singapore – Australia – Indian Ocean – Doolittle Raid – Solomons – Coral Sea – Midway

v • d • e New Guinea campaign
Rabaul (land battle) – Rabaul (1942 air raids) – Mo – Coral Sea – Kokoda Track – Milne Bay – Buna-Gona – Wau – Bismarck Sea – Salamaua-Lae – Cartwheel – Wewak raid – Finisterres – Huon Peninsula – Bougainville – Rabaul (1943 air raids) – New Britain – Admiralties – Western New Guinea

Battle for Australia
Air raids – Darwin – Broome – Coral Sea – Naval attacks – Sydney & Newcastle – Kokoda – Milne Bay

The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought from May 4-May 8, 1942, with most of the action occurring on May 7 and May 8, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States and Australia. It was the first fleet action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other. It was also the first naval battle in history in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other. The battle is considered a tactical victory for Japan since the United States carrier USS Lexington was lost, while Japan only lost the light carrier Shōhō in the battle. At the same time, the battle was a strategic victory for the Allies because the Japanese abandoned their attempt to land troops to take Port Moresby, New Guinea. The engagement ended with no clear victor, but the damage suffered and experience gained by both sides set the stage for the Battle of Midway one month later.

Contents 1 Background 2 Battle 2.1 Tulagi 2.2 May 6 2.3 May 7 2.4 May 8 3 Outcome 3.1 Tactical 3.2 Strategic 3.2.1 Carriers 3.3 Other considerations 4 See also 5 Notes 6 References 7 External links

In early 1942, having conquered nearly all of Southeast Asia in just a few months, Imperial Japan was at the apex of its power. Still reeling from a long series of humiliating defeats, the Allies were just beginning to develop the skills and gather the resources needed to survive, stem the tide of Japanese successes and eventually roll back their territorial gains. Allied strategy at this time was focused on a defensive buildup of the United States Army and Marine strength on New Caledonia (well to the south of the Solomon Islands), and Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force units in the south and east of the Australian Territory of New Guinea, just north of Australia.

On March 12, the Prime Minister of Japan, General Hideki Tōjō, said:

Australia and New Zealand are now threatened by the might of the Imperial forces, and both them should know that any resistance is futile. If the Australian government does not modify her present attitude, their continent will suffer the same fate as the Dutch East Indies.[1]

In April 1942, Japanese forces left their new stronghold of Rabaul (on New Britain, just north of New Guinea), and launched a two-pronged strategy: an amphibious assault against Port Moresby (Operation “MO”), and another against Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. The intent was threefold: to establish control of the Solomons, initially with a seaplane base; to occupy Port Moresby (the last Allied base between Japan and Australia); and in so doing, bring the American aircraft carrier fleet to battle for the first time in the war.

Historians remain divided about Japanese longer-term intentions. There seems little doubt Japan planned to greatly strengthen its hold on the Solomon Islands as a bastion against any future U.S. counterattacks and may have intended to later occupy other island groups in the South Pacific in order to cut Australia off from the United States. However, an invasion of Australia was not planned at any time.^[2] In practice, Japanese military planning was a complex process, with ill-defined areas of responsibility and crippled by endless, bitter debates between the Imperial Army and Navy. Regarding longer-range Japanese aims in the South Pacific, there was only one certainty: whatever strategy the navy put forward would be challenged by an army counterplan.

Three Japanese fleets set sail: the invasion forces for the Solomons and Port Moresby, and a covering force of two large modern aircraft carriers, Shōkaku and Zuikaku (both veterans of the attack on Pearl Harbor), a smaller carrier, Shōhō, two heavy cruisers, and supporting craft. Alerted by radio intercepts, the Allies knew that Japanese land-based aircraft were being moved south and that an operation was impending. To oppose it, there were three main groups: Yorktown already in the Coral Sea under the command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, with Lexington en route, and a joint Allied surface force. The carriers Hornet and Enterprise were heading south after the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, but they arrived too late to take part in the battle.

For more details on this topic, see Invasion of Tulagi (May 1942).

Lexington joined Yorktown on May 1. The Japanese occupied Tulagi without incident on May 3, and construction of a seaplane base began. After fueling, Yorktown closed on Tulagi and, on May 4, launched three successful strikes against Japanese shipping and aircraft there—revealing the presence of the carrier but sinking the destroyer Kikuzuki and five merchant ships, crippling the island's seaplane reconnaissance capability, and damaging other vessels, before retiring to the south to rendezvous with the Lexington and the newly-arrived cruisers.

Land-based B-17s attacked the approaching Port Moresby invasion fleet on May 6, with the usual lack of success. Almost another year would pass before the USAAF realized that high-level bombing raids against moving naval targets were pointless. Although both carrier fleets flew extensive searches on May 6, cloudy weather kept them hidden from each other, and the two fleets spent the night only 110 kilometres (70 mi) apart. Other Allied aircraft joined the battle, from airbases at Cooktown and Mareeba on Cape York Peninsula, Australia.

That night, Fletcher, mindful that his primary role was to protect Port Moresby, made the difficult decision to detach his main surface force, Task Force 44 under Australian Rear Admiral John Crace, to block the probable course of an invasion. Crace had the cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart, and USS Chicago, and the destroyers USS Perkins, USS Walke, and USS Farragut. Fletcher and Crace knew exposing surface ships to attack by land-based aircraft, without air cover, risked a repeat of the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse five months before. Their fears were nearly realized when the cruisers were spotted and came under an intense air attack from a squadron of torpedo bombers on the afternoon of May 7. The ships escaped with few casualties and little damage. Only minutes after the Japanese raid, Crace's force was inadvertently attacked by friendly B-17s; Farragut and Perkins once again had to endure near misses.

On May 7, both fleets launched all available aircraft, but neither found the main body of the other, mistakenly attacking subsidiary enemy forces instead. Japanese aircraft found and attacked the U.S. fleet oiler Neosho and her escorting destroyer Sims, mistaking them for a carrier and a cruiser. Sims was sunk and Neosho crippled. Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft had missed Shōkaku and Zuikaku, but found the invasion fleet, escorted by the small carrier Shōhō, which was soon sunk with heavy casualties. In the previous five months, the Allies had lost numerous major warships and had been unable to sink a single major Japanese ship in return. Shōhō was small by carrier standards, but the laconic phrase “scratch one flattop,” radioed back to the Lexington, announced the first Allied naval success of the Pacific War.

Finally, with dawn searches on May 8, the main carrier forces located one another and launched maximum effort raids, which passed each other in the air. Hidden by rain, Zuikaku escaped detection, but Shōkaku was hit three times by bombs. Listing and on fire, Shōkaku was unable to land her aircraft and was thus effectively put out of action.

Both American carriers were hit: Yorktown by a bomb; the larger, less maneuverable Lexington, by both bombs and torpedoes. Although the latter survived the immediate damage and was thought to be repairable, leaking aviation fuel exploded a little over an hour later. Lexington had to be abandoned and scuttled to prevent her capture.

Crace continued to stand between the invasion force and Port Moresby. Inoue was misled by returning fliers’ reports as to the strength of the Allied cruiser and destroyer force, and he recalled the invasion fleet. With Shōkaku damaged and Zuikaku short of aircraft, neither was able to take part in the crucial Battle of Midway a month later. The damaged Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor.

In tactical terms, the Japanese had achieved a narrow victory: one small carrier lost and a large carrier severely damaged against the Americans’ loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another. But from the Allied point of view, after five months of continuous defeat, a battle that came out almost even was close enough to a victory as not to matter.

In strategic terms, the Allies had won because the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby was averted. Port Moresby was vital to Allied strategy and could not have been defended by the ground forces stationed there. This was the first time that a Japanese invasion force had been turned back without achieving its objective. It had a substantial effect on the morale and the strategic planning of both sides. Without a hold in New Guinea, the subsequent Allied advance, difficult though it was, would have been much harder still. As a result, the Japanese were forced to attack Moresby overland. The consequent delay was just long enough to permit the arrival of the veteran Second Australian Imperial Force to fight the Kokoda Track campaign and the Battle of Milne Bay, which in turn relieved pressure on U.S. forces at Guadalcanal.

Overall, both Japanese fleet carriers survived, but both were not ready in time to participate at the decisive Battle of Midway, leaving them with four carriers to face the Americans. The U.S. had permanently lost a carrier, but quick repairs to another meant that they had three carriers to take to battle. Essentially, Coral Sea helped to bring the Americans up to parity with the Japanese.

Although Zuikaku was only slightly damaged, with only 40 aircraft left, she was in no condition to fight and had to return to Japan to replenish her air wings. Shōkaku was severely damaged, unable to operate aircraft, and took six months to repair. Despite the likely availability of sufficient aircraft between the two ships to re-equip Zuikaku with a composite air group, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her to Midway.^[3]

The loss of the Lexington was a severe blow, but in time, the U.S. was able to replace the ship, aircraft, and trained crew with others, superior in all respects. The damage to Yorktown was estimated to require months in port, but she could still operate aircraft, and she was made more-or-less battle-worthy in a miracle of improvisation after just two days in Pearl Harbor. Midway was her final battle; importantly, in that battle, she attracted torpedo assaults that might have otherwise gone to the undamaged Hornet and Enterprise.

The U.S. Navy learned a great deal from the Battle of the Coral Sea. From the loss of the Lexington, it realized that better ways were needed to contain aviation fuel and control defensive fighter aircraft. From the attacks on the Japanese carriers, coordination of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers had to be improved (though this hard-won knowledge came too late for the Battle of Midway). Most importantly of all, it was a significant morale boost because it showed that the Japanese could be beaten.

While Admiral Fletcher continued to command carrier forces and served as the senior USN officer at Midway, Admiral Takagi was relegated to less important assignments in the aftermath of Coral Sea.

• Coral Sea Order of Battle
• Battle of Midway
• Axis naval activity in Australian waters
• Planned invasion of Australia during World War II
• Christmas Island Invasion
• USS Coral Sea

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• Animated history of the Battle of the Coral Sea
• A6M2 shot down at Coral Sea A message board with userid and password.