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Battle of the Denmark Strait
Part of World War II
Bismarck firing at HMS Prince of Wales, shortly after the sinking of HMS Hood on the 24 May 1941.
Date May 24, 1941 Location Denmark Strait Result German victory
Combatants
Kriegsmarine	Home Fleet of the Royal Navy
Commanders
Günther Lütjens	Lancelot Holland † John Leach
Strength
1 battleship 1 heavy cruiser	1 battleship 1 battlecruiser
Casualties
1 battleship damaged	1 battlecruiser sunk 1 battleship heavily damaged 1428 dead 9 wounded

The Battle of the Denmark Strait was a World War II naval conflict between ships of the British Royal Navy and the German Kriegsmarine.

The British battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Hood fought the German battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, both of which were attempting to break out into the North Atlantic to destroy Allied merchant shipping.

Less than ten minutes after the British opened fire, a shell from Bismarck struck Hood near her aft ammunition magazines. The Hood exploded and sank within three minutes with the loss of all but three of her crew.

Prince of Wales continued to exchange fire with Bismarck but suffered serious malfunctions in her main armament. This, combined with the effects of the battle, left most of her main guns unusable and she broke off the engagement.

Bismarck, damaged but still very much operational, declined to chase Prince of Wales and instead headed for the Atlantic along with Prinz Eugen.

On May 18, 1941 the new Bismarck was prepared, after extensive trials, for her first voyage against enemy shipping. She was accompanied by Prinz Eugen, a new cruiser also on her first mission of the war; "Operation Rheinübung". Bismarck and her sister ship Tirpitz, each heavier than any battleship in the British fleet, were perhaps the strongest battleships in service at this time.

Admiral Lütjens, the German fleet commander, intended to break out into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland and attack Allied convoy traffic in the North Atlantic.

Earlier raids by German capital ships such as the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had done enough damage to cause the British to use some of their older battleships such as the Revenge class as convoy escorts. Although old and slow, these ships were well armed with 15-inch (381 mm) guns, more powerful than most of the guns of the German heavy cruisers and pocket battleships. The Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, though, could risk attacking a convoy escorted by one of these battleships: the Bismarck could engage and attempt to destroy the escorting battleship, leaving the Prinz Eugen to chase down and sink the fleeing merchant ships.

The two ships were expected to try to break westward through the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. Royal Navy ships and aircraft were watching their likely route. On the evening of May 23, 1941 they were spotted by the heavy cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, patrolling the Denmark Strait under the command of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker.

With the help of the Suffolk's newly-installed radar set, the cruisers shadowed the German ships through the night, reporting on their movements. The next morning the German ships were intercepted in the Strait between Iceland and Greenland by a force of British ships. These were the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Hood, along with a destroyer screen under the command of Vice-Admiral Lancelot Holland on the Hood.

Prince of Wales was a newly commissioned King George V class battleship, of much the same size and power as Bismarck. She had not yet been properly "shaken down," and her crew was green. She still had mechanical problems, especially with her main armament, and had sailed with shipyard workers still aboard working on her. When Bismarck and Prinz Eugen first sighted her in the Denmark Strait, they identified her as King George V, as they believed Prince of Wales could not yet have put to sea.

Hood, from her commissioning in 1918, for 20 years had been the largest warship afloat. Between the wars, more than any other ship she had represented British naval power in the eyes of Britain and the world. But her armour was less comprehensive than a battleship's. She had been designed in 1916, and then hastily and incompletely redesigned while still under construction, after three similarly designed British battlecruisers exploded in the Battle of Jutland that same year. Even so, Hood's firepower, 15-inch (381 mm) guns, were the equivalent of any battleship afloat, and she had been partially modernised in many areas over the years.

Far away to the south-east, Admiral Holland's superior, Admiral Sir John Tovey debated whether to order Admiral Holland to allow Prince of Wales ahead of Hood. In this position, the better-protected Prince of Wales would draw the enemy's fire. He decided not to give this order, claiming, "I did not feel such interference with such a senior officer justified." ^[1]

The last image of Hood as a fighting unit, taken from Prince of Wales en route to intercept Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.

Holland's battle plan was to have Hood and Prince of Wales engage Bismarck while Suffolk and Norfolk engaged Prinz Eugen (which, Holland assumed, still steamed behind Bismarck and not ahead of it). However, Holland did not radio his intentions to Wake-Walker for fear of disclosing his location. Instead, he observed radio silence. Holland hoped to meet the enemy at approximately 0200. Sunset in this latitude was at 0151. Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would be silhouetted against the sun's afterglow while Hood and Prince of Wales could approach rapidly, unseen in darkness, to a range close enough not to endanger Hood with plunging fire from Bismarck. The Germans would not expect an attack from this quarter, giving the British the advantage of surprise.

This plan's success depended on Suffolk's continually unbroken contact with the German ships. Suffolk lost contact, however, beginning at 0028. For an hour and a half Holland neither sighted the enemy nor received any further news from Norfolk or Suffolk. Reluctantly, he ordered Hood and Prince of Wales to turn south-south-west while the destroyers would continue searching to the north.

Before contact was reestablished, the two squadrons missed each other by a hairsbreadth. Had the German ships not altered course to the west at 0141 to follow the line of the Greenland icepack, the British would have intercepted them much earlier than they did. The British destroyers were just 10 miles to the south-east when the Germans made this course change. Had visibility not been reduced to between three and five miles, the German ships would likely have been spotted. ^[2]

Just before 0300, Suffolk regained contact with Bismarck. Hood and Prince of Wales were 35 miles away, slightly ahead of the Germans. Holland signaled to steer toward the Germans and increased speed to 28 knots. Suffolk's loss of contact had placed the British at a disadvantage. Instead of the swiftly closing head-on approach Holland had envisioned, he would have to converge at a wider angle, much more slowly. This would leave Hood vulnerable to Bismarck's plunging shells for a much longer period. The situation worsened further when, at 0320, Suffolk reported that the Germans had made a further course alteration to the west, placing the German and British squadrons almost abeam of each other.

At 0535, lookouts on the Prince of Wales spotted the German ships, 28 kilometres (17 miles) away. The Germans, already alerted to the British presence through their hydrophonic equipment, picked up the smoke and masts of the British ships 10 minutes later. Holland at this point had the option of joining Suffolk in shadowing Bismarck and waiting for Tovey to arrive with King George V and other ships to attack or to order his squadron into action, which he did at 0537. ^[3] The rough seas in the Strait kept the destroyers' role to a minimum. The cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk would be too far behind the German force to reach the battle.

Hood opened fire at 0552 at a distance of approximately 26,500 yards (24,200 m), about 13 nautical miles (24 km). Holland had ordered firing on the lead ship, Prinz Eugen, believing from its position that she was Bismarck. Holland soon amended his order and directed both ships to engage the rear ship, Bismarck. Prince of Wales had already correctly targeted Bismarck, whereas Hood is believed to have continued to target Prinz Eugen for some time.

Holland ordered his ships to close with the enemy. Since Hood's deck armour was weak in places, Holland wanted to reduce the range as quickly as possible, since at a shorter range the trajectory of Bismarck's shells would be flatter and they would be more likely to hit the sides of the ship rather than the decking, or to glance off the top deck. However, by closing the range at the angle at which his ships faced the enemy, he could use only 10 of his capital ships' 18 heavy guns, yet he presented the Germans more at which to aim than necessary. Those 10 guns became nine when a defect in one of Prince of Wales' forward guns rendered it inoperative after the first salvo.

Also, while the British fire was divided between two targets, all the German fire was concentrated on Hood. Had Norfolk and Suffolk been ordered to close on Bismarck and worry her from the rear, that might have distracted the German ship enough to draw fire from the aft turrets toward them. This might have been one possibility Holland had considered. Orders sent to Bismarck's after fire control room to keep an eye on the two cruisers show that Lütjens expected such a move. Since Holland had failed to give such an order to Wake-Walker, this opportunity was lost.

The Germans also had the weather gauge, meaning the British ships were steaming into the wind, spray drenching the lenses of the forward turrets' two-foot rangefinders. This necessitated using smaller rangefinders in the control towers instead. In addition, Admiral Holland had Prince of Wales stay close to Hood, conforming to Hood's movements instead of varying course and speed. This made it easier for the Germans to find the range to the British ships, as well as harder for the British ships to observe each other's fall of shot.

Prince of Wales struck her target first. She would ultimately hit Bismarck three times. One shot struck the commander's boat and put the seaplane catapult amidships out of action. The second shell passed through the bow from one side to another. The third struck the hull underwater. These last two caused minor damage and flooding. More importantly, the damage to the bow cut access to the forward fuel tanks' 1,000 tons of fuel oil. It also caused Bismarck to trail a visible oil slick.

Lutjens held fire until 0555, when both German ships targeted Hood. A shell hit Hood's boat deck, starting a sizable fire in the ready-use 4 inch ammunition stored there, but this fire did not spread to other areas of the ship or cause the later explosion. Although unconfirmed, it is possible that Hood was struck again at the base of her bridge and in her foretop radar director.

A sketch prepared by Captain JC Leach (commanding HMS Prince of Wales) for the 2nd Board of Enquiry, 1941. The sketch represents the column of smoke or flame that erupted from the vicinity of the mainmast immediately before a huge detonation which obliterated from view the after part of the ship. This phenomenon is believed to have been the result of a cordite fire venting through the engine-room ventilators (see article).

At 0600, Holland ordered his force to turn once again to port to ensure that the after main guns on both Hood and Prince of Wales could bear on the enemy. During the execution of that turn, a salvo from Bismarck was seen by men from Prince of Wales to straddle Hood abreast her mainmast. It is believed that at least one 380 mm (15 inch) shell struck somewhere between the mainmast and "X" turret astern of it. Hood was hit amidships by at least one shell from Bismarck at a distance of about 9 miles (14 km).

This was immediately followed by a huge pillar of flame that shot upward like a giant blowtorch, in the vicinity of the mainmast. This was followed by an explosion that destroyed a large portion of the ship from amidships clear to the rear of "Y" turret. The ship broke into two. The stern broke away and sank. The bow, pointed upward and pivoting about, followed shortly thereafter. Its forward turret did manage to fire one last salvo, possibly from the doomed gun crew, just before the bow section sank.^[4] Splinters rained down on the Prince of Wales half a mile away. The Hood sank in about three minutes, taking 1,415 men, including Vice-Admiral Holland, with her. Only three of her crew (Ted Briggs, Bob Tilburn and Bill Dundas) survived to be rescued two hours later by the destroyer Electra.

The British Admiralty later concluded that the most likely explanation for the loss of the Hood was a penetration of her magazines by a single 380 mm shell from Bismarck, causing the subsequent catastrophic explosion. Recent research by submersible craft suggests that the initial explosion was in the after 4-inch magazine and that it spread to the 15-inch magazines via the ammunition trunks.

It has been suggested from examination of the wreckage, found in 2001, that the magazine explosion in the 4-inch armament near the mainmast caused the vertical blast of flame seen there, and this in turn ignited the magazines of the aft 15-inch (381 mm) guns that caused the explosion that wrecked the stern. This explosion might have traveled through the starboard fuel tanks, igniting the fuel oil there, setting off the forward magazines and completing the destruction of the ship. While this is possible, it is also possible that the forward magazines did not blow up. The forward part of the ship might have been damaged by hydrodynamic forces during the sinking.^{[citation needed]}

Prince of Wales (smoke column in left center) under fire from Bismarck and Prince Eugen after the sinking of Hood (right). Photographed from Prince Eugen

Prince of Wales found herself steering towards the sinking Hood. Her commanding officer, Captain John C. Leach, ordered an emergency avoidance turn away from Hood's wreckage. This violent change of course disrupted her aim and put her in a position that made it easier for the Germans to target her. She resumed her previous course, but was now under the concentrated fire of both German ships.

Prince of Wales was struck four times by Bismarck and three times by Prinz Eugen. One shell passed through her upper superstructure, killing or wounding several crewmen in the Compass Platform and Air Defense Platform. Pieces of another shell struck her radar office aft killing crewmen within. A 203 mm shell from Prinz Eugen found its way to the propelling charge/round manipulation chamber below the aft 5.25" gun turrets, and a 380 mm shell from Bismarck hit underwater below the armour belt, and penetrated about 13 ft (4 m) into the ship's hull, about 25 ft (8 m) below the waterline, but was stopped by the armoured, anti-torpedo, bulkhead. Fortunately for Prince of Wales, neither shell exploded, but she still suffered minor flooding and the loss of some fuel oil. Contrary to some mistaken opinion, the 380 mm shell that struck Prince of Wales below the waterline did not endanger her magazines, as it came to rest abreast an auxiliary machinery room.^[5]

By this time, serious gunnery malfunctions had put most of the main guns out of action. Captain Leach realized that continuing the action would risk losing Prince of Wales without inflicting further damage on the enemy. He therefore ordered the ship to make smoke and withdraw. Prince of Wales turned away just after 0604, firing from her rear turret under local control until the turret's shell ring jammed, making the guns inoperable. The salvos were ragged and are believed to have fallen short. She retired from the battle around 0610. Thirteen of her crew were killed, nine wounded.^[6] The timing of Prince of Wales' withdrawal was fortuitous, as she had come into torpedo range of Prinz Eugen and turned away as the German cruiser was about to fire. ^[7] Lütjens broke off combat instead of pursuing Prince of Wales.

Between 0619 and 0625, Suffolk fired six salvoes in the direction of Bismarck, having mistaken for Bismarck a radar range coming in from an aircraft. She was actually out of gun range of both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at the time.^[8]

Prince of Wales and the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk continued to shadow the German ships, but they slipped away from their pursuers. Shortly afterwards, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen separated and escaped into the Atlantic.

The Captain of Suffolk remains on the bridge for lunch whilst shadowing the Bismarck

The damage to Bismarck's forward fuel tanks, combined with a missed opportunity to refuel at Bergen earlier in the voyage, left less than 3,000 tons of fuel remaining, not enough to operate effectively against the Atlantic convoys. Bismarck headed for Saint-Nazaire for repairs.

Prinz Eugen, undamaged, went further south into the Atlantic where she refueled from a tanker at sea. She suffered engine troubles, abandoned her commerce raiding mission without having sunk any merchant ships, and returned to Brest.

The British public were shocked that their most emblematic warship and more than 1,400 of her crew had been destroyed so suddenly. The Admiralty mobilised every available warship in the Atlantic to hunt down and destroy the Bismarck. The Royal Navy forces pursued and brought Bismarck to battle and the German battleship sank on the morning of the 27 May.

Later, moves were made to court-martial Prince of Wales' captain, John Leach, and Frederick Wake-Walker, the Admiral commanding Suffolk and Norfolk. The view was taken that they were wrong not to have continued the battle with Bismarck after Hood had sunk. John Tovey, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, was appalled at this criticism. A row ensued between Tovey and his superior, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound. Tovey stated that the two officers had acted correctly, not endangering their ships needlessly and ensuring that the German ships were tracked. Furthermore, Prince of Wales's main guns had repeatedly malfunctioned and she could not have matched the Bismarck. Tovey threatened to resign his position and appear at any court-martial as 'defendant's friend' and defense witness. No more was heard of the proposal.

A British board of enquiry quickly investigated the cause of Hood's explosion and produced a report. After criticism that the initial enquiry did not record all the available evidence, a second board of enquiry more extensively investigated Hood's loss, and examined the vulnerabilities of other large British warships still in service in light of the probable causes of the explosion. It, like the first enquiry, concluded that a 380 mm shell from Bismarck caused the explosion of Hood's aft ammunition magazines. This led to refitting some older British warships with increased protection for their ammunition magazines and some other related improvements.

Intensely private, Lütjens never explained his orders to not pursue the Prince of Wales. Technically, he was adhering to Grand Admiral Raeder's orders not to engage unnecessarily against enemy capital ships but to instead find and attack merchant convoys. He also had already received damage reports on Bismarck taking on water and leaking fuel from the bow. Nevertheless, since the British knew Bismarck's position and had been shadowing her for some time, Lütjens could realistically have considered his mission compromised. Sinking Prince of Wales would have allowed him to keep Bismarck on its present course, back along the way he had come, to safety in Norway 1000 miles away. ^[9] On the other hand, Lütjens did not know the position of the British Fleet and the fear to direct his damaged ship right into the enemy fleet may have been the reason he decided to try to escape, which he nearly did achieve.

• Simon Adams, World War II. Dorling Kindersley Publishing, 2000. ISBN 0-78946-990-1
• Dewar, A.D. Admiralty report BR 1736: The Chase and Sinking of the “Bismarck”. Naval Staff History (Second World War) Battle Summary No. 5, March 1950. Reproduced in facsimile in Grove, Eric (ed.), German Capital Ships and Raiders in World War II. Volume I: From “Graf Spee” to “Bismarck”, 1939-1941. Frank Cass Publishers 2002. ISBN 0-71465-208-3
• Garzke and Dulin Battleships, USNI, 1980. ISBN 0-87021-100-5
• Ludovic Kennedy Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of the "Bismarck", Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2004. ISBN 0-30435-526-7.
• Storia Militare, La battaglia dello Stretto di Danimarca, 2005
• B.B. Schofield Loss of the Bismarck, Ian Allen Ltd. 1972.
• VE Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, Arms and Armour Press, 1991. ISBN 1-85409-524-2.

• Rheinübung Sortie of the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen

• HMS Hood Association: Battle of the Denmark Strait Documentation Resource
• The Battleship Bismarck
• The Heavy Cruiser Prinz Eugen