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Battle of the Granicus
Part of the Wars of Alexander the Great
The Battle of the Granicus
Date May 334 BC Location At Modern Biga Çayı Result Macedonian victory
Combatants
Macedon, Greek allies	Persia, Greek mercenaries
Commanders
Alexander the Great Parmenion Clitus the Black	Spithridates Mithridates † Memnon of Rhodes
Strength
20,000 peltasts[1] 22,000 heavy infantry[2] 5,000 cavalry[2]	9,500 peltasts[2] 5,000 Greek hoplites[3] 10,000 cavalry[3]
Casualties
350 killed	4,000 killed, 2,000 captured

v • d • e Wars of Alexander the Great
Chaeronea (338 BC) – Thebes (338 BC) – Granicus (334 BC) – Miletus (334 BC) – Halicarnassus (334 BC) – Issus (333 BC) – Tyre (332 BC) – Gaugamela (331 BC) – Persian Gate (330 BC) – Siege of the Sogdian Rock (327 BC) – Hydaspes River (326 BC)

The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC was the first of three major battles fought between Alexander the Great and the Persian Empire. Fought in Northwestern Asia Minor, near the site of Troy, it was here where Alexander defeated the forces of the Persian satraps of Asia Minor, including a large force of Greek mercenaries.

Contents 1 Location 2 Prelude 3 Battle 4 Aftermath 5 Notes 6 Sources 7 See also

The battle took place on the road from Abydos to Dascylium (near modern day Ergili, Turkey), at the crossing of the Granicus River (modern day Biga Çayı).

Alexander set out into Asia in 334 BC after he finished consolidating his Greek and Macedonian positions after the assassination of his father Philip II of Macedon.

He crossed the Hellespont from Sestos to Abydos, and advanced up the road to Dascylium, which is the capital of the Satrapy of Phrygia. The various satraps of the Persian empire united and offered battle on the banks of the Granicus River. A Greek mercenary, Memnon of Rhodes suggested a scorched-earth policy of burning the grain and supplies and retreating in front of Alexander, but his suggestion was rejected.

Arrian, Diodorus, and Plutarch all mention the battle, with Arrian providing the most detail. The Persians placed their cavalry in front of their infantry, and drew up on the right (east) bank of the river. Historians differ significantly on the effectiveness of the Persian dispositions. Some consider it a tactical mistake on the Persian side, others feel it was an attempt to take advantage of their superior number of cavalry, while Sir William Tarn felt "the Persian leaders had in fact a very gallant plan; they meant if possible to strangle the war at birth by killing Alexander."

Alexander's army met the Persians on the third day of May from Abydos. Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenion suggested crossing the river upstream and attacking at dawn the next day, but Alexander attacked immediately.

The Macedonian line was arrayed with the heavy Phalanxes in the middle, and cavalry on either side. Alexander was with the Companions on the right flank. The Persians expect the main assault to come from Alexanders's position and moved units from their center to that flank.

The battle started with a cavalry and light infantry feint from the Macedonian left, from Parmenion's side of the battle line. The Persians heavily reinforced that side, and the feint was driven back, but at that point, Alexander led the horse companions in their classic wedge-shaped charge, and smashed into the center of the Persian line. The Persians countercharged with a squadron of nobles on horse, and accounts show that in the melee, several high-ranking Persian nobles were killed by Alexander himself or his bodyguards, although Alexander was stunned by an axe-blow from a Persian nobleman named Spithridates. Before the noble could deal a death-blow, however, he was himself killed by Clitus the Black. Alexander quickly recovered.

The Macedonian cavalry then turned left and started rolling up the Persian cavalry, which was engaged with the left side of the Macedonian line after a general advance. A hole opened in the recently vacated place in the battle line, and the Macedonian infantry charged through to engage the poor quality Persian infantry in the rear. At this, and with many of their leader already dead, both flanks of the Persian cavalry retreated, seeing the collapse of the center. The infantry also routed, with many being cut down as they fled.

Total casualties for the Macedonians were between 300 and 400. The Persians had 2,000 infantry captured, which were of the Greek mercenaries who decided to fight on after the Persian retreat; roughly 1,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry were killed, mostly in the rout.

Historian Peter Green has a different theory of the battle. According to Green, the riverbank was guarded by infantry, not cavalry, and Alexander 's forces were badly mauled and forced to retire. Alexander then grudgingly accepted Parmenion’s advice, crossed the river during the night in an uncontested location, and fought the battle at dawn the next day. The Persian army hurried to the location of Alexander’s crossing and with the cavalry reaching the scene of the battle first before the slower infantry, and then the battle continued largely as described by the ancient sources. Green accounts for the differences between his theory and all the ancient accounts by saying Alexander then covered up his initial failed crossing. {{}}

Alexander came close to dying in the battle. Mithridates , Rhoesaces, Spithridates and several other Persian leaders were killed. The Greek cities in Asia Minor were liberated by Alexander, and a beachhead was established so that further campaigns against the Persian empire could be accomplished. Darius III continued to leave the responsibility of battling against Alexander to his satraps, primarily those on the western front. Not until the Battle of Issus would Darius decide to confront the Macedonian conqueror in person.

• Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.
• Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.
• Fuller, John F. C. (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Jersey: De Capo Press.
• Green, Peter (1974). Alexander of Macedon: A Historical Biography.
• Moerbeek, Martijn (1997). The battle of Granicus, 333 BC. Universiteit Twente.
• Rogers, Guy (2004). Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House.
• Warry, J. (1998), Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.
• Welman, Nick. Battles (Major) and Army. Fontys University.

• Battle of Issus