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Central Intelligence Agency
Seal of the Central Intelligence Agency
Agency overview
Formed	26 July 1947
Preceding Agency	Central Intelligence Group
Headquarters	Langley, Virginia, United States
Employees	Classified[1][2]
Annual Budget	Classified[3][4]
Minister Responsible	John Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence
Agency Executives	General Michael Hayden USAF, Director   Stephen Kappes, Deputy Director   Michael Morell, Associate Deputy Director
Website
www.cia.gov

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a civilian intelligence agency of the United States government. Its primary function is collecting and analyzing information about foreign governments, corporations, and persons in order to advise public policymakers.

Prior to December 2004, the CIA was literally the central intelligence organization for the US government. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who took over some of the government and intelligence community(IC)-wide function that had previously been under the CIA. Among those functions were the preparation of estimates reflecting the consolidated opinion of the 16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the President. When discussing the CIA, it is critical to understand when one is speaking of the older IC-wide responsibilities, or its present set of responsibilities.

To make the topic manageable, it is split into sub-articles:

The geographic divisions are:

• CIA Activities by Region: Americas (includes legal and questionable domestic activities)
• CIA Activities by Region: Africa
• CIA Activities by Region: Asia-Pacific
• CIA Activities by Region: Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia
• CIA Activities by Region: Russia and Europe

The initial set of transnational sub-articles are:

• CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Terrorism
• CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Arms Control, WMD, and Proliferation
• CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Crime and Illicit Drug Trade
• CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Counterintelligence
• CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Human Rights

The geographic sub-articles roughly follow the geographic divisions of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, which publishes its general structure. It is probable but not definitive that the clandestine and covert side of the Agency uses roughly the same geographic areas, but a different transnational and support organization.

At the present time, the CIA is both an analytic and a collection organization. See Relationship with other US intelligence agencies

Its headquarters is in the community of Langley in the McLean CDP of Fairfax County, Virginia, a few miles west of Washington, D.C. along the Potomac River.

The CIA is part of the U.S. Intelligence Community, led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who manages the Community. See Relationship with other US intelligence agencies

The role and functions of the CIA are roughly equivalent to those of the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) and Israel's Mossad. While the preceding agencies both collect and analyze information, some like the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are purely analytical agencies.

The CIA is sometimes referred to euphemistically in government and military parlance as Other Government Agencies (or OGA), particularly when its operations in a particular area are an open secret.^[5][6] Other terms include The Company and The Agency.

Contents 1 Organization 1.1 Executive offices 1.2 Directorate of Intelligence 1.2.1 Regional groups 1.2.2 Transnational groups 1.2.3 Support and general units 1.3 National Clandestine Service 1.4 Directorate of Science and Technology 1.5 Directorate of Support 1.6 Other offices 2 Relationship with other US intelligence agencies 3 Relationship with foreign intelligence services 4 History 4.1 1990s 4.2 2000 4.3 Criticism for ineffectiveness 4.3.1 "The Family Jewels" 5 Activities by Geographic Region 5.1 Europe 5.1.1 Western Europe 5.1.1.1 Belgium 5.1.1.1.1 Belgium 1951 5.1.1.2 France 5.1.1.2.1 France 1950 5.1.1.2.2 France 1992 5.1.1.2.3 France 1993 5.1.1.2.4 France 1995 5.1.1.3 Germany 5.1.1.3.1 Germany 1945 5.1.1.3.2 Germany 1956 5.1.1.3.3 Germany 1990 5.1.1.4 Greece 5.1.1.4.1 Greece 1948 5.1.1.5 Italy 5.1.1.5.1 Italy 1948 5.1.1.6 Switzerland 5.1.1.6.1 Switzerland 1950 5.1.1.7 United Kingdom 5.1.2 Eastern Europe and Soviet Union 5.1.2.1 Hungary 5.1.2.1.1 Hungary 1956 5.1.2.2 Soviet Union 5.1.2.2.1 Soviet Union 1948 5.1.2.2.2 Soviet Union 1950 5.1.2.2.3 Soviet Union 1952 5.1.2.2.4 Soviet Union 1956 5.1.2.2.5 Soviet Union 1958 5.1.2.2.6 Soviet Union 1959 5.1.2.2.7 Soviet Union 1960 5.1.2.2.8 Soviet Union 1977 5.1.2.2.9 Soviet Union 1981 5.1.2.2.10 Soviet Union 1987 5.1.3 Middle East 5.1.3.1 Iraq 5.1.3.1.1 Iraq 1963 5.1.3.1.2 Iraq 1968 5.1.3.1.3 Iraq 1996 5.1.3.1.4 Iraq 2002 5.1.3.1.5 Iraq 2003 5.1.3.1.6 Iraq 2004 5.1.3.1.7 Iraq 2006 5.1.3.2 Syria 5.1.3.3 Turkey 5.1.3.4 Yemen 5.1.3.4.1 Yemen 2002 5.2 Africa 5.2.1 North Africa 5.2.1.1 Algeria 5.2.1.1.1 Algeria 1958 5.2.1.2 Libya 5.2.1.2.1 Libya 1981 5.2.2 Central Africa 5.2.2.1 Chad 5.2.2.1.1 Chad 1982 5.2.3 Southern Africa 5.2.3.1 Angola 5.2.3.1.1 Angola 1975 5.2.3.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo 5.2.4 East Africa 5.2.4.1 Eritrea 5.2.4.1.1 2002 5.2.4.2 Ethiopia 5.2.4.2.1 Ethiopia 2005 5.2.4.2.2 Ethiopia 2006 5.2.4.2.3 Ethiopia 2007 5.2.4.3 Somalia 5.2.4.3.1 Somalia 2006 5.2.4.3.2 Somalia 2007 5.2.4.4 Sudan 5.2.4.4.1 Sudan 1995 5.2.4.4.2 Sudan 1996 5.2.4.4.3 Sudan 2001 5.2.4.4.4 Sudan 2005 5.2.4.4.5 Sudan 2007 5.3 Latin America 5.3.1 Transnational issues: human rights 5.3.2 Transnational issues: drug trade 5.3.3 Caribbean 5.3.3.1 Cuba 5.3.3.1.1 Cuba 1959 5.3.3.1.2 Cuba 1960 5.3.3.1.3 Cuba 1961 5.3.3.1.4 Cuba 1962 5.3.3.1.5 Cuba 1963 5.3.3.1.6 Cuba 1965 5.3.3.1.7 Cuba 1967 5.3.3.1.8 Cuba 1976 5.3.3.2 Dominican Republic 5.3.3.2.1 Dominican Republic 1961 5.3.3.2.2 Dominican Republic 1967 5.3.4 Central America 5.3.4.1 Guatemala 5.3.4.1.1 Guatemala 1952 5.3.4.1.2 Guatemala 1953 5.3.4.1.3 Guatemala 1954 5.3.4.1.4 Guatemala 1965 5.3.4.1.5 Guatemala 1967 5.3.4.1.6 Guatemala 1993 5.3.4.2 Guyana 5.3.4.3 Honduras 5.3.4.3.1 Honduras 1984 5.3.4.3.2 Honduras 1987 5.3.4.3.3 Honduras 1995 5.3.4.4 Nicaragua 5.3.4.4.1 Nicaragua 1985 5.3.4.4.2 Nicaragua 1987 5.3.4.4.3 Nicaragua 1989 5.3.5 South America 5.3.5.1 Argentina 5.3.5.1.1 Argentina 1965 5.3.5.1.2 Argentina 1977 5.3.5.1.3 Argentina 1978 5.3.5.1.4 Argentina 1979 5.3.5.2 Bolivia 5.3.5.2.1 Bolivia 1964 5.3.5.2.2 Bolivia 1965 5.3.5.2.3 Bolivia 1967 5.3.5.3 Brazil 5.3.5.3.1 Brazil 1965 5.3.5.4 Chile 5.3.5.4.1 Chile 1964 5.3.5.4.2 Chile 1970 5.3.5.4.3 Chile 1973 5.3.5.5 Ecuador 5.3.5.6 Peru 5.3.5.7 Venezuela 5.3.5.7.1 Venezuela 2007 5.4 Asia 5.4.1 South and Southwest Asia 5.4.1.1 Afghanistan 5.4.1.1.1 Afghanistan 1973 5.4.1.1.2 Afghanistan 1978 5.4.1.2 Iran 5.4.1.2.1 Iran1953 5.4.1.2.2 Iran 1957 5.4.1.2.3 Iran 1979 5.4.1.2.4 Iran 1980 5.4.1.2.5 Iran 1983 5.4.1.2.6 Iran 2000 5.4.1.2.7 Iran 2007 5.4.1.3 Pakistan 5.4.1.3.1 Pakistan 1977 5.4.1.3.2 Pakistan 1979 5.4.1.3.3 Pakistan 2005 5.4.1.3.4 Pakistan 2006 5.4.2 East Asia 5.4.2.1 China 5.4.2.1.1 China 1952 5.4.2.1.2 China 1962 5.4.2.1.3 China 1964 5.4.2.1.4 China 1975 5.4.2.2 Japan 5.4.2.2.1 Japan 1950s-1960s 5.4.2.3 Korea 5.4.2.3.1 Korea 1945 5.4.2.3.2 Korea 1950 5.4.3 Southeast Asia and Indochina 5.4.3.1 Cambodia 5.4.3.1.1 Cambodia 1954 5.4.3.1.2 Cambodia 1967 5.4.3.1.3 Cambodia 1970 5.4.3.1.4 Cambodia 1972 5.4.3.1.5 Cambodia 1978 5.4.3.2 Indonesia 5.4.3.2.1 Indonesia 1958 5.4.3.2.2 Indonesia 1964 5.4.3.2.3 Indonesia 1965 5.4.3.2.4 Indonesia 1998 5.4.3.3 Laos 5.4.3.3.1 Laos 1962 5.4.3.3.2 Laos 1964 5.4.3.3.3 Laos 2007 5.4.3.4 Philippines 5.4.3.4.1 Phillipines 1948 5.4.3.4.2 Phillipines 1958 5.4.3.5 Singapore 5.4.3.5.1 Singapore 1961 5.4.3.6 Vietnam 5.4.3.6.1 Vietnam 1945-1947 5.4.3.6.2 Vietnam 1954 5.4.3.6.3 Vietnam 1955 5.4.3.6.4 Vietnam 1961 5.4.3.6.5 Vietnam 1963 5.4.3.6.6 Vietnam 1964 5.4.3.6.7 Vietnam 1967 5.5 Oceania and Southern Hemisphere 5.5.1 Australia 6 Recent controversies 6.1 Other controversies 7 Publications 8 CIA in fiction 9 See also 10 References 11 Further reading 12 External links 12.1 Official websites and documents 12.2 Other links

The heraldic symbol of the CIA consists of 3 representative parts: the left-facing bald eagle head atop, the compass star (or compass rose), and the shield. The eagle is the national bird, standing for strength and alertness. The 16-point compass star represents the CIA's world-wide search for intelligence outside the United States, which is then reported to the headquarters for analysis, reporting, and re-distribution to policymakers. The compass rests upon a shield, symbolic of defense.

The CIA has an executive office, four major directorates, and a variety of specialized offices.

Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the Intelligence Community, serving as the president's principal intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the National Security Act to provide for a Director of National Intelligence who would assume some of the roles formerly fulfilled by the DCI, with a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (DCIA), serving as head of the CIA.

Currently, the Central Intelligence Agency answers directly to the Director of National Intelligence, although the CIA Director may brief the President directly. The CIA has its budget approved by the Congress, a subset of which do see the line items. The intelligence community, however, does not take direct orders from the Congress. The National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent information collected by all 16 U.S. Intelligence Community agencies are under the policy, but not necessarily budgetary, authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

The head of the CIA is given the title of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) . The act that created the CIA in 1947 also created a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to serve as head of the United States intelligence community, act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security, and serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

A Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DDCIA) Assists the Director in his duties as head of the CIA and exercises the powers of the Director when the Director’s position is vacant or in the Director’s absence or disability. Either the Director or Deputy Director may be a military officer, but both positions may not be filled, at the same time, by military officers.

Previously, the Agency had a post of Executive Director, who managed day-to-day operations. On July 5, 2006, the position of Executive Director was replaced with a Associate Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (ADD) ^[7]

As the DCIA's principal adviser and representative on military issues, the Associate Director for Military Support (AD/MS)coordinates Intelligence Community efforts to provide Joint Force commanders with timely, accurate intelligence. The AD/MS also supports Department of Defense officials who oversee military intelligence training and the acquisition of intelligence systems and technology. A senior general officer, the AD/MS ensures coordination of Intelligence Community policies, plans and requirements relating to support to military forces in the intelligence budget.

The "DI" is the analytical branch of the CIA, responsible for the production and dissemination of all-source analysis intelligence analysis on key foreign issues.^[8]. Sherman Kent is sometimes called the father of US intelligence analysis.^[9] While it has, like most government agencies, reorganized over the years, its current structure has four regional analytic groups, six groups for transnational issues, and two support units. ^[10] Prior to the formation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the President's Daily Brief was prepared by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence.

There is an Office dedicated to Iraq. In addition, there are regional analytical Offices covering:

• Near East, North Africa and South Asia
• Russia and Europe
• Asian-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa

The Office of Terrorism Analysis is the analytic component of the CIA Counterterrorism Center, which is operated jointly by the CIA and FBI

The Office of Transnational Issues applies unique functional expertise to assess existing and emerging threats to US national security and provides the most senior US policymakers, military planners, and law enforcement with analysis, warning, and crisis support.

The CIA Crime and Narcotics Center researches information on international narcotics trafficking and organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community. Since the CIA has no domestic police authority, it sends its analytic information to the FBI and other law enforcement organizations, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration.

A Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center provides intelligence support deals with national and non-national threats, as well as supporting threat reduction/arms control. This works with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Again cooperating with the FBI for domestic activity, the Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group identifies, monitors, and analyzes the efforts of foreign intelligence entities, both national and non-national, against US interests.

The Information Operations Center Analysis Group evaluates foreign threats to US computer systems, particularly those that support critical infrastructures. It works with critical infrastructure protection organizations in the Department of Defense(e.g., CERT Coordination Center) and the Department of Homeland Security (e.g., United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team)

The Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis provides comprehensive intelligence collection expertise to the DI, a wide range of senior Agency and Intelligence Community officials, and key national policymakers.

The Office of Policy Support customizes DI analysis and presents it to a wide variety of policy, law enforcement, military, and foreign liaison recipients.

The National Clandestine Service, a semi-independent service which was formerly the Directorate of Operations, is responsible for the clandestinecollection of foreign intelligence and covert action. The new name reflects its having absorbed the Defense HUMINT Service, which did strategic human intelligence HUMINT collection for the Department of Defense (DoD). HUMINT directly related to military missions remains under the DoD.

A major headquarters imot was the Counterintelligence Staff, most powerful when headed by James Jesus Angleton. It was the principal US organization responsible for vetting potential new clandestine HUMINT assets, and for US offensive counterespionage and deception.

Under an assortment of names, such as Special Activities Division, there is a paramilitary function that may enter and prepare an area of operations before United States Army Special Forces enter in a more overt military role.

Various groups provide support services, such as cover documentation and disguise.^[11]

The Directorate of Science & Technology creates and applies innovative technology in support of the intelligence collection mission.^[12]

The CIA has always shown a strong interest in how to use advances in technology to enhance its effectiveness. This interest in modern technology came from two main aims: firstly, to harness these techniques its own use, and second to counter any new technologies the Soviets might develop. The agency has always been at the edge computer and information technology.

In 1999, CIA created the venture capital firm In-Q-Tel to help fund and develop technologies of interest to the agency.^{[13] [14]}

The Directorate of Support provides necessary "housekeeping" functions, but in a manner consistent with the need to keep their details protected. These functions include personnel, security, communications, and financial operations. Most of this Directorate is sub-structured into smaller offices based on role and purpose, such as the CIA Office of Security, which is concerned both with personnel and physical security. Other major offices include the Office of Communications and the Office of Information Technology.

This Directorate, and its predecessors, operated proprietaries, or companies with no public relationship to the US. Among these organizations were airlines that provided covert logistical support, such as Civil Air Transport, Southern Air Transport, and consolidated them into Air America. The latter was heavily involved in support with the war in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s. Air America disbanded in 1975. ^[15][16]

The Center for the Study of Intelligence maintains the Agency's historical materials and promotes the study of intelligence as a legitimate and serious discipline.^[17]

The Office of the General Counsel advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all legal matters relating to his role as CIA director and is the principal source of legal counsel for the CIA.^[18]

The Office of Inspector General promotes efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in the administration of Agency activities. OIG also seeks to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The Inspector General is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Inspector General, whose activities are independent of those of any other component in the Agency, reports directly to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. OIG conducts inspections, investigations, and audits at Headquarters and in the field, and oversees the Agency-wide grievance-handling system. The OIG provides a semiannual report to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency which the Director is required by law to submit to the Intelligence Committees of Congress within 30 days.

The Office of Public Affairs advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all media, public policy, and employee communications issues relating to his role as CIA director and is the CIA’s principal communications focal point for the media, the general public and Agency employees.^[19]

The Office of Military Affairs provides intelligence and operational support to the US armed forces.^[20]

The CIA acts as the primary American HUMINT and general analytic agency, under the Director of National Intelligence, who directs or coordinates the 16 member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community. A number of those organizations are fully or partially under the budgetary control of the Secretary of Defense or other cabinet officers such as the Attorney General. Its National Clandestine Service (formerly the Directorate of Operations), which collects clandestine human intelligence collection, and conducts deniable psychological and paramilitary operations. ^[21]

As do other analytic members of the U.S. intelligence community such as the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the analytic division of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), its raw input includes imagery intelligence IMINT collected by air and space systems of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) processed by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency(NGA), signal intelligence SIGINT of the National Security Agency (NSA), its own open source collection OSINT, and measurement and signature intelligence MASINT from the DIA MASINT center.

Various news reports and declassified documents indicate that the clandestine side has also worked with other agencies to install clandestine technical collection devices for SIGINT^{[22] [23]} and MASINT^[24] in areas to which there is no conventional access, or in embassies in foreign locations.

The CIA also has strong links with other foreign intelligence agencies such as the UK's Secret Intelligence Service, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Spain's CNI, Israel's Mossad, and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service. Further, it is currently believed to be financing several Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers^{[citation needed]}. One of these, known under the codename of Alliance Base, was allegedly set up in Paris and jointly run in cooperation with France's DGSE^{[citation needed]}. The CIA may also be actively cooperating with India's Research and Analysis Wing^{[citation needed]} and possibly Russia's SVR^{[citation needed]}. The CIA worked extensively with Pakistan's ISI throughout the Afghan-Soviet War, and works with this agency closely for the War on Terror.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by Congress with National Security Act of 1947, signed into law by President Harry S. Truman. It is the descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II, which was dissolved in October 1945 and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. Eleven months earlier, in 1944, William J. Donovan, the OSS's creator, proposed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt creating a new organization directly supervised by the President: "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies."^[25] Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."^[26]

Despite opposition from the military establishment, the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)^[25], President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946.^[27] Later, under the National Security Act of 1947 (effective September 18, 1947), the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were established.^[28] Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was appointed as the first Director of Central Intelligence.

The National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948 (NSC 10/2) further gave the CIA the authority to carry out covert operations "against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons."^[29] Those operations, however, were initially conducted by other agencies such as the Office of Policy Coordination. See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for details of the eventual merger of these operations with the CIA, as well as how the equivalent functions were done in other countries.

In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act (Public Law 81-110) was passed, permitting the agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures, and exempting it from most of the usual limitations on the use of Federal funds. The act also exempted the CIA from having to disclose its "organization, functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It also created the program "PL-110", to handle defectors and other "essential aliens" who fall outside normal immigration procedures, as well as giving those persons cover stories and economic support.^[30] During the first years of its existence, other branches of government did not exercise much control over the Central Intelligence Agency; justified by the desire to match and defeat Soviet actions throughout the globe, a task many believed could be accomplished only through an approach similar to the Soviet intelligence agencies, under names including NKVD, MVD, NKGB, MGB, MVD, and KGB. Those Soviet organizations also had domestic responsibilities. The rapid expansion of the CIA, and a developed sense of independence under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles added to US intelligence not having a great deal of independent review. After the Bay of Pigs in 1961, President John F. Kennedy exercised greater supervision, although the agency stepped up its activity in Southeast Asia under Lyndon B. Johnson.

In the early 1970s, partially as a result of the Watergate break-ins under President Richard M. Nixon, the United States Congress took a more active role in intelligence agencies, as did independent commissions such as the 1975 United States President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States, also called the Rockefeller Commission after its chairman. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, drew considerable Congressional oversight that had not been previousy exercised. It was determined, by several investigating committees, that the CIA had given inappropriate assistance to persons affiliated with the White House and the 1972 Nixon reelection campaign. Certain of the individuals involved in the Watergate breakins had worked, in the past, for the CIA. In an audio tape provoking President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay Of Pigs of Cuba, and, therefore, that the CIA should tell the FBI to cease investigating the Watergate burglary, due to reasons of "national security".^[31]

In 1973, then-DCI James R. Schlesinger commissioned reports — known as the "Family Jewels" — on illegal activities by the Agency. In December 1974, Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh broke the news of the "Family Jewels" in a front-page article in The New York Times, revealing that the CIA had assassinated foreign leaders, and had conducted surveillance on some seven thousand American citizens involved in the antiwar movement (Operation CHAOS).

Congress responded to the charges in 1975, investigating the CIA in the Senate via the Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), and in the House of Representatives via the Pike Committee, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY). President [[Gerald Ford created the aforementioned Rockefeller Commission, and issued an Executive Order prohibiting the assassination of foreign leaders.

Repercussions from the Iran-Contra arms smuggling scandal included the creation of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991^[32]. It defined covert operations as secret missions in geopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither openly nor apparently engaged. This also required an authorizing chain of command, including an official, presidential finding report and the informing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, which, in emergencies, requires only "timely notification".

In 1996, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that: "Hundreds of employees on a daily basis are directed to break extremely serious laws in countries around the world in the face of frequently sophisticated efforts by foreign governments to catch them. A safe estimate is that several hundred times every day (easily 100,000 times a year) DO officers engage in highly illegal activities (according to foreign law) that not only risk political embarrassment to the US but also endanger the freedom if not lives of the participating foreign nationals and, more than occasionally, of the clandestine officer himself."^[33][34]

In the same document, the committee wrote, "Considering these facts and recent history, which has shown that the [Director of the Central Intelligence Agency], whether he wants to or not, is held accountable for overseeing the [Clandestine Service], the DCI must work closely with the Director of the CS and hold him fully and directly responsible to him."^[34]

Many of the post-Watergate restrictions upon the Central Intelligence Agency were lifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the The Pentagon. Fifty-two years earlier, in 1949, Congress and President Harry S. Truman had approved arrangements that the national intelligence funding could be hidden in the U.S federal budget. Some critics charge this violates the requirement in the U.S. Constitution that the federal budget be openly published

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2007)

.

A claim that the black sites existed was made by The Washington Post in November 2005 and before by human rights NGOs.^[35] US President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA during a speech on September 6, 2006. ^{[36] [37]}

The agency has also been criticized for ineffectiveness as an intelligence gathering agency. Former DCI Richard Helms commented, after the end of the Cold War, "The only remaining superpower doesn't have enough interest in what's going on in the world to organise and run an espionage service." ^[38]

These criticisms included allowing a double agent, Aldrich Ames, to gain high position within the organization, and for focusing on finding informants with information of dubious value rather than on processing the vast amount of open source intelligence. In addition, the CIA has come under particular criticism for failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union and India's nuclear tests or to forestall the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Proponents of the CIA respond by stating that only the failures become known to the public, whereas the successes usually cannot be known until decades have passed because release of successful operations would reveal operational methods to foreign intelligence, which could affect future and ongoing missions. Some technical collection successes for the CIA include the U-2 and SR-71 programs, as well as the follow-on satellite and UAV IMINT systems. In operations, anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s were cosidered successful, although critics charge that these helped foster the genesis of today's terrorist groups.

The executive summary of a report which was released by the office of CIA Inspector General John Helgerson on August 21, 2007 concluded that former DCI George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with the danger posed by Al Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The report had been completed in June, 2005 and was partially released to the public in an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General Michael V. Hayden, who said its publication would "consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed.”^[39]

On 27 June 2007 the CIA released two collections of previously classified documents which outlined various activities of doubtful legality.

The first collection, the "Family Jewels," consists of almost 700 pages of responses from CIA employees to a 1973 directive from Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger requesting information about activities inconsistent with the Agency's charter.

The second collection, the CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers, consists of 147 documents and 11,000 pages of research from 1953 to 1973 relating to Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, and Sino-Soviet relations.^[40]

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. This section has been tagged since December 2007.

This article gives an overview by geographic region, country and date of CIA activities related to specific geographic area, including:

• general intelligence analysis and reporting
• estimates (when CIA was still responsible for community-wide estimates
• confirmed and asserted CIA covert and clandestine operations.

^{[41] [42]}

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a radio and communications organization funded by the United States Congress. It was founded in 1950 by the National Committee for a Free Europe. T This Free Europe Committee, headed by John Foster Dulles, was an instrument of the CIA until RFE received its funds from the Congress of the United States and until 1971 they were passed to RFE through the CIA. During the earliest years of Radio Free Europe's existence, the CIA and the U.S. State Department issued broad policy directives, and a system evolved where broadcast policy was determined through negotiation between the CIA, the U.S. State Department, and RFE staff.

This system continued until the controversy surrounding Radio Free Europe's broadcasts to Hungary during the 1956 revolt. There is some evidence, however, that the CIA did involve itself in RFE projects at least through the mid-1950's.^[43]

The CIA funding of RFE ended in 1971 at which point the organization was rechartered in Newton as a non-profit corporation, oversight was moved to the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), and the budget was moved to open appropriations.

After World War II, there was serious concern that the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, would attack and overrun Western Europe. From 1945 to 1948, there were ad hoc military stay-behind plans (see Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action). In 1948, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was formed, under interagency but not CIA direction, to run behind-the-lines operations, probably including covert action behind the Iron Curtain. The separate Office of Special Operations had intelligence-gathering responsibilities.

A clandestine NATO "stay-behind" operation called Operation Gladio was set up to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, using US and UK unconventional warfare specialists. Gladio networks were set up in Italy, Belgium, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Turkey.

In 1952, the CIA Directorate of Plans was formed from the merger of OPC and OSO. United States Army Special Forces were established in June 1952, with the 10th Special Forces Group deploying to Bad Tölz, West Germany, in September. Special Forces had stay-behind unconventional warfare as one of their basic missions.

In 1967 it was revealed that the Congress of Cultural Freedom, founded in 1950, had been sponsored by the CIA. It published literary and political journals such as Encounter (as well as Der Monat in Germany and Preuves in France), and hosted dozens of conferences bringing together some of the most eminent Western thinkers; it also gave some assistance to intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA states that, "Somehow this organization of scholars and artists — egotistical, free-thinking, and even anti-American in their politics — managed to reach out from its Paris headquarters to demonstrate that Communism, despite its blandishments, was a deadly foe of art and thought".^[44]

CIA forms the Belgian branch of Operation Gladio.

While the CIA cooperates with its French counterpart, the DGSE, the countries do collect information on one another, especially in the economic and scientific areas.

CIA forms the French branch of Operation Gladio.

"According to the Director of Central Intelligence, Bob Gates, at least 20 nations from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America are involved in intelligence activities that are detrimental to our economic interests. Some of the specific cases are shocking. According to a recent New York Times article by Peter Schweizer, `between 1987 and 1989, French intelligence planted moles in several U.S. companies, including IBM. In the fall of 1991, a French intelligence team attempted to steal `stealth' technology from Lockheed.' Other accounts report that French intelligence units conduct 10 to 15 break-ins every day at large hotels in Paris to copy documents that belong to businessmen, journalists, and diplomats. According to other accounts, the French have been hiding listening devices on Air France flights in order to pick up useful economic information from business travelers. ^[45]

"In 1993, R. James Woolsey, then a new Director of Central Intelligence, publicly announced that economic intelligence was now a CIA program. French intelligence had been aggressively going after information from American executives. Woolsey said "No more Mr. Nice Guy."

Shortly afterwards, the CIA Paris station had at least five officers working on understanding French national trade policy, and countering French economic espionage against the US. Four were under diplomatic and one under nonofficial cover. ^[46]

The CIA Inspector General delivered a report on CIA clandestine service (CS) work on economic intelligence, which is likely to end the careers of several officers, including Paris station chief Dick Holm, European CS division chief Joseph DeTrani, and at least four case officers.

France's Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, revealed the problem in February 1995. The officer under nonofficial cover as a foundation representative made two errors in coperative posing as a foundation representative made fundamental mistakes: communicating too openly with the C.I.A. station and communing too secretly with her target, a French official. Mr. Holm, the station chief, found out about the love affair she was conducting with the official. It was clear that the romance could compromise the operation. Holm convinced his chief to continue the operation.

The French, however, broke the usual agreement among Western services and announced what they had learned, expelling the embassy-based officer "incompatible with their diplomatic status." Controversy flared over questions about whether spying on allies for economic data is a worthy pursuit for the CIA, even if the allies do it to the US, or if other missions have a higher priority. ^[46] While there were tragicomic aspects, the issue of what espionage is tolerable among nominal allies remains complex, especially when involving clear security issues as with Jonathan Pollard.

The former head of German intelligence for the Eastern Front, Reinhard Gehlen, approached US intelligence, in which the CIA did not yet exist. Gehlen offered to continue his operations against the Soviet Union. Gehlen, who had played a minor part in the 20 July Plot to kill Hitler, was not considered a political Nazi. In 1945-6, he went to work with US and allied organizations, forming the Gehlen Organisation to penetrate the Iron Curtain. Gehlen also informed the US of certain Office of Strategic Services personnel who worked for the USSR.

The Organisation moved to German control, as the core Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND or Federal Intelligence Service)

CIA acquired the Rosenholz files, containing the list of foreign spies of the Stasi, in the former GDR.^[47]

President Harry S. Truman authorized CIA to support aid to Greek anti-communists in cooperation with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service. The US Army Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) also provided personnel, and successfully resisted the takeover attempt.

CIA was successful in limiting native Communist influence in France and Italy, notably in the 1948 Italian election.

A clandestine NATO "stay-behind" operation in Italy called Operation Gladio, was set up to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe.

• 1960s-1980s

There are allegations that throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Operation Gladio operatives were involved in a series of "false flag" fascist terrorist actions in Italy that were blamed on the "Red Brigades" and other Left-wing political groups in an attempt to politically discredit the Italian Left wing.^[48]

The US state department has denied involvement in terrorism and stated that some of the claims have been influenced by a Soviet forgery, US Army Field Manual 30-31B.^[49]

CIA forms the Swiss branch of Operation Gladio.

There is a long history of close cooperation between the US and UK intelligence services; see Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for WWII and subsequent relationships. There are permanent liaison officers of each country in major intelligence agencies of the other, such as CIA and SIS, FBI and Security Service (MI5), and NSA and GCHQ.

Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet military intelligence colonel who was a defector in place, was a joint US-UK espionage operation. Much of Penkovsky's product is available online at the CIA FOIA Reading Room (http://www.foia.cia.gov/) by searching on the code name IRONBARK.

A major source of tension between the two countries was Kim Philby, a senior UK SIS officer who was a Soviet agent. Philby, at one point, was the SIS liaison officer resident in the US. James Jesus Angleton, head of CIA counterintelligence, was surprised by Philby's activity, and, as a consequence, began molehunts within CIA.

Operation Gladio was a joint US and UK operation. It makes little sense to allege that the CIS "allegedly operated" something the Special Air Service was quite competent to do. Indeed, SAS was the inspiration for the US Delta Force, according to the founder of Delta, COL Charles Beckwith. In like manner, British SIS and SOE helped the OSS special operations units establish themselves in WWII.

Radio Free Europe (RFE), a CIA-funded organization, broadcast to Hungary at least from 1950-1956, but operated on no directives to foment revolution.^[43]

CIA had one officer, Geza Katona, in Hungary from 1950 to 1957 period, and for several years that person spent "95 percent" of his time on "cover duties." "He mailed letters, purchased stamps and stationery ...," among other "support tasks," the history noted. At the time of the Revolution in fall 1956, he was preoccupied with official contacts, maintaining diplomtic cover, and doing interviews with Hungarian visitors.

CIA and was completely surprised by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A CIA Clandestine Service (CS) report of the events, written in 1958, said "This breath-taking and undreamed-of state of affairs not only caught many Hungarians off-guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside information, and could not read the Russians' minds."

After the revolt broke out, Katona asked for policy guidance regarding arms and ammunition. "On October 28, Headquarters responded, "we must restrict ourselves to information collection only [and] not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention...it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in." In fact, the implication in the histories is that transferring arms was never seriously contemplated: "At this date no one had checked precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons available to CIA. This was done finally in early December" of 1956."

Did US-sponsored group play a part in the revolution? From the CS Histories, they did not. "Small psychological warfare and paramilitary units came into being in the early 1950s, (including the Hungarian National Council headed by Bela Varga), and occasional reconnaissance missions took place at that time, the prospects for penetrating into Hungary deteriorated by 1953 when stepped up controls by Hungarian security forces and "the meager talent available" among potential agents made cross-border operations essentially untenable."

CS historians observe "The authors sarcastically write that "If we [the CIA] were in no position to act efficiently ... the military is, was, and always will be even worse off." ... in the future the CIA [should] keep the military "at arm's length" and only do what's necessary "to keep them happy.""

"Moscow was also taken by surprise by the Revolution despite the thousands of Soviet soldiers, KGB officers, and Party informants present in Hungary. Rather than understanding the sources of the discontent, it was easier for Soviet operatives and even the leadership to cast woefully misdirected blame on the CIA for the unrest. Klement Voroshilov remarked at the October 28 Presidium session: "The American Secret Services are more active in Hungary than Comrades Suslov and Mikoyan are," referring to the two Party leaders sent to Budapest to negotiate a modus vivendi with the new Nagy government. At that moment, of course, the Soviet Presidium had more active members (2) in Budapest than the CIA had case officers (1)"^[50]

After a few days of independence, the Soviet Union moved in with massive force, crushed the revolution, and later executed the Communist but rebel head of government, Imre Nagy, and the head of the military, Pal Maleter.

Until its collapse, the Soviet Union was the primary target of the CIA, just as the US was the "main enemy" to the Soviet KGB and GRU. Hostility was developing as the Second World War ended.

One major confrontation was the Berlin Blockade (24 June 1948 to 11 May 1949).

With Europe stabilizing along the Iron Curtain, the CIA tried to limit the spread of Soviet influence elsewhere around the world. Much of the basic model came from George Kennan's "containment" model from 1947, a foundation of US policy for decades.

In December 1950, with the Korean War in progress, National Intelligence Estimate 15 was issued: "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation". ^[51] It began with the estimate that "USSR-Satellite treatment of Korean developments indicates that they assess their current military and political position as one of great strength in comparison with that of the West, and that they propose to exploit the apparent conviction of the West of its own present weakness." At this time, there was no assumption that China and the USSR would differ on any policy "Moscow, seconded by Peiping with regard to the Far East, has disclosed through a series of authoritative statements that it aims to achieve certain gains in the present situation:

a. Withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and of the Seventh Fleet from Formosan waters.

b. Establishment of Communist China as the predominant power in the Far East, including the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

c.Reduction of Western control over Japan as a step toward its eventual elimination.

d. Prevention of West German rearmament.

"It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking toward negotiations, assuming virtual Western surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN is complete. A determined and successful stand by UN forces in Korea would, of course, require a Soviet re-estimate of the situation." Such a stand did take place, and the war ended in a stalemate.

"The scope of Soviet bloc preparations and the nature and extent of Soviet Communist official statements and propaganda raise the' question of Soviet or Satellite moves in other areas. The points that appear most critical are Berlin and Germany, Indochina, Yugoslavia, and Iran.

Regarding what was to become Vietnam: "An intensification of Communist efforts to secure Indochina is to be expected, regardless of development elsewhere. The Viet Minh has clearly indicated that its objective is to drive the French from Indochina at the earliest possible date. The Chinese Communists have at the same time repeatedly expressed their support of the Viet Minh. They have, moreover, officially claimed that Western resistance to the Viet Mmli is directed against Chinese Communist security. The Chinese Communists are already furnishing the Viet Minh with material, training, and technical assistance. If this assistance proves inadequate to enable the Viet Minh to accomplish its objectives, it is estimated that it will be supplemented, as necessary, by the introduction of Chinese Communist forces into the conflict, possibly as "volunteers." The extent of this Chinese Communist intervention, and whether it takes overt form, will probably depend on the degree of outside assistance furnished the French and the extent of Chinese Communist commitments elsewhere."

In operation HTLINGUAL CIA intercepts mail from the U.S. to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets put down a revolution in Hungary, using considerable force.

Following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the USSR put increased pressure on its satellite countries, and made it clear to the West that it did not want interference. This 1958 estimate by the IC, under CIA, explored the US understanding of the Soviet policy and actions.

"We believe the basic motivation behind Moscow's current tough line to be its grave concern over its power position in Eastern Europe, where it considers revisionism to have developed to dangerous proportions/Note 1. This concern has led the USSR to attack Tito [of Yugoslavia] and to cause the execution of Imre Nagy [the rebel Hungarian leader]--measures intended, at least in part, to put pressure on Gomulka [leader of Poland]. We believe that the Soviets will exert greater efforts to obtain Gomulka's compliance with Bloc requirements or, failing that, perhaps even to replace him.^[52] The analysts felt the USSR has not abandoned the idea of peaceful coexistence with the West, but it probably believes there is little chance for East-West negotiations favorable to it. If, however, these events reflect " differences within the Soviet leadership and a degree of Communist Chinese influence. If this is so, it may portend a new and stiffer policy towards the West as well as the Satellites."

"We believe that recent events do not indicate that the USSR has ceased to desire a conference at the summit or lower level negotiations on matters in which the Soviet leaders have an interest. At the same time, the Soviet leaders may have concluded prior to undertaking their recent moves that, since the chances of an early summit conference on their terms were waning, they could more easily accept the political losses they would suffer in international affairs by pursuing a harder policy in Eastern Europe." ^[52]

GRU officer Dmitri Polyakov walks in to offer his services to the US. He transmitted information to the US until his retirement, as a Soviet general in 1980, although he was compromised, probably by Aldrich Ames ^[53], and executed in 1986.

A November 1959 NIE, with the benefit of U-2 imagery, identified Soviet ground-to-ground missile capabilities from 75 nmi to intercontinental range. The ICBM, with a CEP of 3 nmi, was expected to reach operational status in January 1960. ^[54]

On May 1, 1960, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, operated by the CIA was shot down over the US, and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, captured. At first, the CIA claimed it was a lost weather plane.

In speaking with President Eisenhower, Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles said that Powers, the U-2 pilot, "had been with CIA four years and before that had been with the Air Force for six years. He had been selected for this mission because of his knowledge of Arctic navigation. The President said that when reconnaissance over-flights had been explained to him, he had been told that the pilots on such flights were taught to destroy the plane rather than to let it fall into Soviet hands. The President believed that the blunder of our first statement...[assumed] the plane was destroyed, Accordingly, we thought the story that a NASA weather reconnaissance plane was missing was a good cover story." ^[52]

Later in May, the President met with Congressional leaders. During that breakfast discussion, he said, " He said that intelligence and espionage were distasteful for many Americans, but that he as President … had to make decisions based on what was right for the United States concerning the fundamental intelligence knowledge that we had to have...Nevertheless the President has to accept responsibility for these decisions and also keep the knowledge of such activities in the fewest possible hands. Only a few people in State, Defense and CIA knew of this... The President said that he was responsible for the directive for the U-2... "There is no glory in this business," he said. "If it is successful, it can't be told."" ^[55]

Eisenhower expressed concern that Congress "would try to dig into the interior of the CIA and its covert operation. Such attempt would be harmful to the United States and he was sure that the leaders of the Congress would realize this. He repeated that the Administration people would cooperate with the inquiry--he called it "investigation" several times.

Senator Mike Mansfield asked "What would the President think if there were to be established in the Congress a joint Congressional Committee which would oversee the activities of the CIA." Eisenhower objected "that the operation of the CIA was so delicate and so secret in many cases that it must be kept under cover, and that the Executive must be held responsible for it. He said that he would agree to some bipartisan group going down occasionally and receiving reports from the CIA on their activities, but that he would hate to see it formalized--indeed would be against the proposal made by Senator Mansfield."

Senator Richard B. Russell "said that they do have a Congressional group that periodically went over reports. He said that they knew the U - 2 planes were under construction a long time ago. The Senator added that he was not afraid of the Senators on security matters but that he was afraid of staff leaks."

Charles E. Bohlen, special assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Menshikov about Soviet policy toward Cuba, with the response "he