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Correspondence theory of truth
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please improve this article if you can. (October 2006) |
The correspondence theory of truth states that something (for example, a proposition or statement or sentence) is rendered true by the existence of a fact with corresponding elements and a similar structure. The theory maintains that the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world. The theory presupposes an objective world and is therefore antagonistic to theories that problematise objectivity such as external world skepticism or metaphysical subjectivism.
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A practical example of correspondence is as follows. There is a true distance to the moon when we humans attempt to go there, and this true distance is necessary to know so that the journey can be successfully made. Another example of how some words can accurately describe the world around us, especially by demonstration, is the ability to teach a child that cars move at certain speeds, and that one can judge the proper time to cross the road or highway based on real distances and speeds. Plato and other classical philosophers helped to teach the idea of true or false statements in deductions and inductions, especially in the studies of logic, mathematics, geometry, astronomy, architecture, and natural philosophy.
Problems with the theory arise from consideration of precisely what is supposed to correspond with what. If a statement is just a sentence then it is merely a physical thing (for example, ink on a page, or sound waves in the air) with no intrinsic meaning. Therefore it is usually claimed that it is the proposition (or meaning) expressed by a statement that is supposed to correspond with the facts. Yet both these "entities", propositions and facts, may be unappealing to minimalists who refuse to admit such abstract entities to their ontology. Precisely defining what constitutes correspondence is also a problem.
The most commonly cited problem for the correspondence theory is defining the relation of correspondence, and when a proposition corresponds with the facts. Bertrand Russell, and shortly after, Ludwig Wittgenstein, suggested that proposition and fact "correspond" when their structure is isomorphic. See Richard Kirkham's book cited below for a discussion of this view.
- Armstrong, D.M. (1997), A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Davidson, Donald (1984), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- Haack, Susan (1993), Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
- Habermas, Jürgen (2003), Truth and Justification, Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- James, William (1907), Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
- James, William (1909), The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
- Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic. Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.), Barnes and Noble, New York, NY, 2005.
- Kirkham, Richard L. (1992), Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Neale, Stephen (2001), Facing Facts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- Popper, Karl R. (1979, Rev. ed.), Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK: 314-29 (Tarski's theory as a rehabilitation of the correspondence theory of truth).
- Quine, W.V., 1990 (Rev. ed., 1992), Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 79-82 (truth as intermediary between the world and a sentence as generalizable object).
- Runes, Dagobert D. (ed., 1962), Dictionary of Philosophy, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ. Cited as DOP.
- Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged (1950), W.A. Neilson, T.A. Knott, P.W. Carhart (eds.), G. & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, MA. Cited as MWU.
- Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983), Frederick C. Mish (ed.), Merriam–Webster Inc., Springfield, MA. Cited as MWC.