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The Gulf of Tonkin Incident a pair of supposed attacks allegedly carried out by naval forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (commonly referred to as North Vietnam) against two American destroyers, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy. The incident occurred on August 2 and 4, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin.^[1]

Although the first attack, on the destroyer Maddox, almost certainly did occur, the supposed second one most likely did not.

Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects and overeager sonarman may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.

—Captain John Herrick, TIME Magazine 1968

Indeed the Pentagon had criticized that this sonarman who reported 22 torpedoes may have confused them with the sound of the engine of his own vessel.^[2]

In a tape recording that surfaced in 2001, President Lyndon B. Johnson admits that the Gulf of Tonkin second "attack," which he used to obtain approval for the Vietnam War from Congress, never occurred.^[3]

In 1995 the retired General Vo Nguyen Giap confirmed nothing ever happened on August 4 -- although he admitted that the August 2 attack was real. He believed U.S. ships were trying to provoke an attack so President Johnson would have a pretext for greater U.S. involvement.^[4]

Later research, including a report released in 2005 by the National Security Agency, also indicated that the second attack most likely did not occur, but also attempted to dispel the long-standing assumption that members of the administration of President Johnson had knowingly lied about the nature of the incident.^[5][6]

The outcome of the incident was the passage by Congress of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), which granted Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose government was considered to be jeopardized by "communist aggression". The resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for escalating American involvement in the Vietnam Conflict.

Contents 1 Background 2 The incident 2.1 First attack 2.2 Alleged second attack 3 Differing views of the incident 4 Later statements 5 Southeast Asia Resolution 6 Interpretation 7 See also 8 Notes 9 References 10 External links

Main articles: Vietnam War, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, and Operation 34A

Although the United States attended the Geneva Conference (1954), it refused to sign the Geneva Accords (1954). The Accords mandated, among other measures, a ceasefire line, intended to separate Vietnamese independence and French forces, and elections to determine the rulership of Vietnam on both sides of the line, within 2 years. It also forbade the political interference of other countries in the area, the creation of new governments without the stipulated elections, and foreign military presence. The United States promptly subverted all of the measures of the Accords at once when it installed anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem as President of South Vietnam, and gave him military backing. By 1961, poor decisions by Diem, almost all against the counsel of his American advisors, including refusals to hold elections, and attacks on Buddhism (the majority religion in southern Vietnam), and other ethnic groups, had made him unpopular. In that year, a popular uprising began, headed by the National Liberation Front. The U.S. also began providing direct support to the South Vietnamese in the form of military and financial aid and military advisors, the number of which grew from 600 in 1961 to 16,000 by the end of John F. Kennedy's presidency in 1963.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration. While Kennedy had originally supported the policy of sending military advisors to Vietnam, he had begun to alter his thinking due to the military ineptitude of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms. Shortly before his assassination in November 1963, he had begun limited recall of American forces. Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military escalation in Vietnam as a means to challenge the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of containment was to be applied to prevent the "fall" of Southeast Asia under the precepts of the domino theory. After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more American forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia.

According to the U.S. Naval Institute[1], a highly classified program of covert attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) known as Operation 34A, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964 the program was transferred to the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (SOG). For the maritime portion of the covert operation, Tjeld-class fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. Although the crews of the boats were South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval of the plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Jr., CINCPAC in Honolulu. After the coastal attacks began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva Accords, but the U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South Vietnamese attacks against the DRV. The Maddox, although aware of the operations, was not directly involved in these attacks.

Veterans of U.S. Navy SEAL teams stated that U.S.-trained South Vietnamese commandos were active in the area on the days of the attacks. Deployed from Da Nang in Norwegian-built fast patrol boats, the Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN, 'soldiers that fight under the sea') made attacks in the Gulf area on the nights of 31 July and 3 August.

On July 31, LDNN commandos in "Nasty" fast attack boats attacked a radio transmitter on the island of Hon Nieu. On 3 August, they used a shipboard cannon to bombard a radar site at Cape Vinh Son. The North Vietnamese responded by attacking hostile ships visible in the area. While US officials were less than honest about the full extent of hostilities that led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, critical claims that a naval commander fired weapons solely to create an international incident tend to overlook circumstances and opportunistic responses that suggest a less intentional motivation.^{[citation needed]}

Daniel Ellsberg, who was on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from the ship, reports that the ships were on a secret mission (codenamed Desoto) near North Vietnamese territorial waters. On 31 July 1964, the American destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began an electronic intelligence collection mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Admiral George Stephen Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his flagship USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31). The ship was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles (13 km) from the North's coast and four miles (6 km) from Hon Nieu island. ^[7] When the SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was 120 miles (193 km) away from the attacked area. ^[8]

On 2 August the Maddox claimed it was attacked by three North Vietnamese P-4 patrol torpedo boats 28 miles (45 km) away from the North Vietnamese coast in international waters.^[9] The Maddox claimed to have evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127 mm) guns, forcing the patrol craft away. U.S. aircraft launched from Ticonderoga then attacked the retiring P-4s, claiming one as sunk and one heavily damaged. In fact, none of the three vessels was sunk.^{[citation needed]} The Maddox, suffering very minor damage from a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet, retired to South Vietnamese waters where she was joined by the destroyer Turner Joy.

However, this account has come into sharp dispute with an official 2005 NSA declassified report^[10] which stated:

"At 1500G, Captain Herrick ordered Ogier's gun crews to open fire if the boats approached within ten thousand yards. At about 1505G, the Maddox fired three rounds to warn off the communist boats. This initial action was never reported by the Johnson administration, which insisted that the Vietnamese boats fired first." [2] Page 17

If this new account is accurate, the U.S. fired the first shots in the Gulf of Tonkin. As the 2007 book Legacy of Ashes puts it:

It was not an honest mistake. The war in Vietnam began with political lies based on fake intelligence. Had the CIA been working as its charter intended, if McCone had fulfilled his duties under law as he saw them, the false reports might not have survived for more than a few hours. But the full truth did not come out until November 2005, in a highly detailed confession released by the National Security Agency. ... The United States stepped up commando raids at sea ... To bolster his forces, Washington increased surveillance on the North ... eavesdropping on encoded enemy communication ... SIGINT ... inside a black box ... lashed to the deck of a destroyer ..[with] attennas and monitors operated by at least a dozen officers of the Naval Security Group... data they collected was decrypted and translated by NSA. ... Shortly after 3 p.m. [on Aug 2], the Maddox fired three times at the North Vietnamese patrol boats. The shots were never reported or acknowledged by the Pentagon or the White House; they maintained the communists shot first. The Maddox was still firing when four navy F-8E jets blasted the patrol boats, killing four sailors .... On Aug 3 [Washington] proclaimed ... patrols would continue in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the State Department announced it had sent its first-ever diplomatic note to Hanoi, warning of "grave consequences" of "further unprovoked military action." At that hour, another provocative OPLAN 34A mission was dispatched to sabotage a radar station ... on island of Hon Matt. Then on ... August 4, the American commanders ... received urgent alert from onshore SIGINT operators: the three North Vietnamese patrol boats encountered off Hon Me Island on August 2 were returning ... McNamara called the President ... at 10 p.m. ... 10 a.m. in Washington ...American destroyers sent flash message they were under attack ... operators aboard Maddox and Turner Joy reported seeing ghostly blotches in the night. Their captains opened fire. The NSA report ... described how "these two destroyers gyrated wildly in the dark waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, the Turner Joy firing over 300 rounds wildly," both ships taking furious evasive maneuvers. "It was this high-speed gyrating by the American warships through the waters that created all the additional sonar reports of more torpedoes." They had been firing at their own shadows. The president immediately ordered an air strike ... to begin that night. Within an HOUR, Captain Herrick reported: "ENTIRE ACTION LEAVES MANY DOUBTS." Ninety minutes later these doubts vanished in Washington. The NSA told the secretary of defense and the president of the United States that it had intercepted a North Vietnamese naval communique reading: "SACRIFICED TWO SHIPS AND ALL THE REST ARE OKAY." But after the American air strikes against North Vietnam had begun, the NSA reviewed the day's communications intercepts. There was nothing. Every SIGNIT eavesdropper in South Vietnam and the Philippines looked again. Nothing. The NSA reexamined the intercept it had handed to the president, double-checking the translation and the time stamp on the original message. Upon review, the message actually read: "WE SACRIFICED TWO COMRADES BUT ALL ARE BRAVE." The message had been composed either immediately before or at the moment when the Maddox and the Turner Joy opened fire on August 4. It was not about what had happened that night. It was about the first clash, two nights earlier, on August 2. The NSA buried this salient fact. It told no one. Its analysts and linguists looked a third time, and a fourth time, at the time stamp. Everyone -- everyone, even the doubters -- decided to stay silent. ^[11]

On 4 August, another Desoto patrol on the North Vietnam coast was launched by Maddox and the Turner Joy, led by Captain John J. Herrick. This time their orders indicated that the ships were to close no more than 11 miles (18 km) from the coast of North Vietnam. ^[12] The destroyers received radar and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by the North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of enemies. An hour later, at 1:27 p.m. Washington time, Herrick sent a cable in which he admitted that the attack may never have happened and that there may actually have been no Vietnamese naval craft in the area: "Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken" (Ellsberg, 9-10).

An hour later, Herrick sent another cable, stating, "Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft" (Ellsberg 10). In response to requests for confirmation, at around 4:00 p.m. Washington time, Herrick cabled, "Details of action present a confusing picture although certain that the original ambush was bona fide." (Ellsberg 10).

At 6:00 p.m. Washington time (5:00 a.m. in the Gulf of Tonkin), Herrick cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat to close the Maddox probably fired a torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but not seen. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller beat" [sic] (Ellsberg 10).

In 1964, Lyndon Johnson commented: "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there." ^[13]

In 1981, Herrick and journalist Robert Scheer re-examined Herrick's ship's log and determined that the first 4 August torpedo report which Herrick had maintained had occurred -- the "apparent ambush" -- was in fact unfounded (Ellsberg 10).

Although information obtained well after the fact supported Turner Joy Captain Herrick's statements about the inaccuracy of the later torpedo reports as well as the 1981 Herrick/Scheer conclusion about the inaccuracy of the first, indicating that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, at the time U.S. authorities and all of the Maddox crew said they were convinced that an attack had taken place. As a result, planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities (Operation Pierce Arrow).

There are differing views about whether the 2 August incident was provoked by the U.S. One view is that the actions of the Maddox were provocative to the North Vietnamese because they coincided with the covert South Vietnamese raids. Since the Desoto patrols were conducted in order to gather just the sort of electronic emissions that the SOG 34A raids would provoke, it was a reasonable assumption that the two were "piggybacked." The destroyer's presence also may have been mistaken by the North Vietnamese as a sign that it was also involved directly in the raids.

Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the confirmed 2 August attack. He claimed that DRV radar had tracked Maddox along the coast, thus being aware that the destroyer had not actually attacked North Vietnam. Yet they ordered their patrol boats to engage it anyway. He also noted that orders given to Maddox to stay eight miles (13 km) off the DRV coast put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed only a five-mile (8 km) nautical limit as its territory. In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions all over the world, and the USS John R. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident.^[14]

On 4 August 1964, squadron commander James Stockdale was one of the U.S. pilots flying overhead during the second alleged attack; unlike the first attack, this one was believed to have been a false alarm. Stockdale wrote in his 1984 book Love and War: "[I] had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there… There was nothing there but black water and American fire power." Stockdale said his superiors ordered him to keep quiet about this. After he was captured, this knowledge became a heavy burden. He later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him to reveal what he knew about this terrible secret.^[15][16]

In 1995, retired Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, meeting with former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, categorically denied that Vietnamese gunboats had attacked American destroyers on 4 August, while admitting to the attack on 2 August.^[17][18] A taped conversation of a meeting several weeks after passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was released in 2001, revealing that McNamara expressed doubts to President Lyndon B. Johnson that the attack had even occurred. Taking into consideration documents and transcripts released by the U.S. National Security Agency and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, the consensus is that this second attack never happened.^{[citation needed]}

In the Fall of 1999, retired senior CIA engineering executive S. Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August 1964 to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an imagined one. He asked for further details on time, weather and surface conditions. No further details were forthcoming. In the end he concluded that there were no torpedo boats on the night in question, and that the White House was interested only in confirmation of an attack, not that there was no such attack.^[19] In October, 2005 the New York Times reported that Robert J. Hanyok, a historian for the U.S. National Security Agency, had concluded that the NSA deliberately distorted the intelligence reports that it had passed on to policy-makers regarding the 4 August incident. He concluded that the motive was not political but was probably to cover up honest intelligence errors. ^[20]

Mr. Hanyok's conclusions were initially published within the NSA in the Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition of Cryptologic Quarterly, about five years before they were revealed in the Times article. According to intelligence officials, the view of government historians that the report should become public was rebuffed by policymakers concerned that comparisons might be made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq war that commenced in 2003.^[21]

Reviewing the NSA's archives, Mr. Hanyok concluded that the NSA had initially misinterpreted North Vietnamese intercepts, believing there was an attack on 4 August. Midlevel NSA officials almost immediately discovered the error, he concluded, but covered it up by altering documents, so as to make it appear the second attack had happened. Robert McNamara, said in October 2005 that he believed intelligence reports regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident were decisive to the war's expansion.^{[citation needed]}

On 30 November 2005, the NSA released the first installment of previously classified information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including Mr. Hanyok's article, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.

The Hanyok article stated that intelligence information was presented to the Johnson administration "in such a manner as to preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events." Instead, "only information that supported the claim that the communists had attacked the two destroyers was given to Johnson administration officials."^{[citation needed]}

Main article: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Lyndon Johnson, who was up for election that year, launched retaliatory air strikes and went on national television on 4 August. Although the Maddox had been involved in providing intelligence support for South Vietnamese attacks at Hon Me and Hon Ngu, Defense Secretary McNamara denied, in his testimony before Congress, that the U.S. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the Gulf. He thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in international waters. He also claimed that there was "unequivocable proof" of an "unprovoked" second attack against the Maddox.^{[citation needed]}

As a result of his testimony, on 7 August, Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J. RES 1145), titled the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Johnson the authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a declaration of war. The Resolution gave President Johnson approval "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." Both Johnson and President Richard Nixon used the Resolution as a justification for escalated involvement in Indochina.^{[citation needed]}

The "Gulf of Tonkin Incident" defined the beginning of large-scale involvement of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. Historians have shown that the second incident was, at its best interpretation, an overreaction of eager naval forces.

Vietnam's Navy Anniversary Day is August 5, the date of the second attack, Vietnamese time, where "one of our torpedo squadrons chased the U.S.S. Maddox from our coastal waters, our first victory over the U.S. Navy". ^[22]

• Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
• The Fog of War
• Operation Rolling Thunder

• Ellsberg, Daniel (2002). Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking.

• The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later; Flawed Intelligence and the Decision for War in Vietnam — National Security Archive at George Washington University
• NSA declassified documents released on 11/30/05
• Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret
• From Vietnam to Iraq: Lessons from Tonkin Gulf Lies by Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq
• Tonkin Gulf reports cooked? Historian's research finds intelligence errors covered up
• LBJ's address to the nation, August 5, 1964
• Pentagon Papers[3]
• Cronkite: Gulf of Tonkin's Phantom Attack
• US Navy Historical Site showing charts and photos of the incident
• Analysis Casts Doubt on Vietnam War Claims — Calvin Woodward, Associated Press, Dec. 1, 2005. "A spy-agency analysis released Thursday contends a second attack on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin never happened, casting further doubt on the leading rationale for escalation of the Vietnam War."
• Robert J. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.
• 30-year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam War — Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR): Media Beat July 27, 1994
• Tonkin Gulf Intelligence "Skewed" According to Official History and Intercepts — National Security Archive at George Washington University
• Ronnie E. Ford "New Light on Gulf of Tonkin"
• Original Document: Tonkin Gulf Resolution
• Bibliography: Tonkin Gulf Incidents