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Battle of the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
German Sd.Kfz 251 series armoured personnel carriers of Korpsgruppe Breith.
Date March 25, 1944 – April 15, 1944 Location Kamenets-Podolsky / Tarnopol, USSR Result Soviet Victory
Combatants
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders
Erich von Manstein (Army Group South) Hans-Valentin Hube (First Panzer Army)	Georgi Zhukov Nikolai Vatutin (1st Ukrainian Front) Ivan Koniev (2nd Ukrainian Front)
Strength
200,000	500,000
Casualties
?	? 357 tanks

v • d • e Eastern Front

Barbarossa – Baltic Sea – Finland – Leningrad and Baltics – Crimea and Caucasus – Moscow – 1st Rzhev-Vyazma – 2nd Kharkov – Blue – Stalingrad – Velikiye Luki – 2nd Rzhev-Sychevka – Kursk – 2nd Smolensk – Dnieper – 2nd Kiev – Korsun – Hube's Pocket – Baltic – Bagration – Lvov-Sandomierz – Lublin-Brest – Balkans (Iassy-Kishinev) – Budapest – Vistula-Oder – East Prussia – East Pomerania – Silesia – Berlin – Prague – Vienna

The Battle of the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket, also known as Hube's Pocket, was a battle on the Eastern Front of World War II. In March 1944 two Soviet fronts encircled Generaloberst Hans-Valentin Hube's 1st Panzer Army north of the Dniestr river. The Germans escaped the pocket in April, saving most of their men but losing their heavy equipment.

Contents 1 Attack 2 Encirclement 3 Hube's Pocket 4 Breakout 5 Freedom 6 Order of Battle for First Panzer Army, March 1944 7 References

In mid-February 1944, the 1st Panzer Army found itself defending the line in the north-western Ukraine. The army had just completed operations to rescue the two corps trapped in the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket, which had exhausted the army's III Panzerkorps.

In February 1944, the 1st Panzer Army, commanded by Generaloberst Hans-Valentin Hube consisted of four corps, three of which were tank-heavy Panzerkorps (a force of roughly 20 divisions). Together with the attached army units, the First comprised over 200,000 men, and was the most powerful force of Field Marshall Erich von Manstein's Army Group South. Annihilation of the First Panzer Army would result in a collapse of the entire South-Eastern Front.

Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov realised this and began working to bring about the 1st's decline. Zhukov planned a joint attack, involving his own 1st and Ivan Koniev's 2nd Ukrainian Front. This massive force, over nine armies, was to attempt to outflank and encircle Hube's army, and then, in a repeat of the Battle of Stalingrad, reduce the enemy pocket (in German, kessel, meaning "cauldron") to nothing. The attacks were to take place on the extreme right and left of the German front.

Manstein was informed of heavy troop movements all across Hube's front, however with Adolf Hitler's refusal to allow strategic withdrawals, there was little he could do. The Soviet attacks began in early March, with Zhukov taking personal command of Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian front. The Soviet's massive advantage in men and material forced Hube to pull his right flank back until it rested on the Dniester river. Despite constant Soviet attacks, this line held until late March. On 22 March 1944, five Soviet tank corps penetrated the extreme left of Hube's line and poured south between the Zbruch and Seret rivers. The force was racing for the Dniester, in an attempt to outflank and surround Hube's army, and was followed by infantry who quickly began shoring up the corridor.

Both Hube and Manstein realised the danger of encirclement. With the right flank on the Dniester, and the recent Soviet attacks on the left, the First Panzer Army was now in a salient. Manstein requested that the arm be pulled back to avoid encirclement, but Hitler refused, sticking to his "no retreat" order. In a matter of days, Zhukov and Konev's forces had crossed the Dniester and were racing to complete the encirclement. On 25 March 1944, the last supply corridor out of Hube's bridgehead was cut.

The entire 1st Panzer Army was now encircled in a pocket centred around the town of Kamenets-Podolsky. While the encircled forces had food and ammunition for over two weeks, the vehicles were extremely low on fuel. Supply by the Luftwaffe was hampered by heavy snow, and soon only the combat vehicles were running. Meanwhile, Hube had ordered all service units south beyond the Dniester, away from the main Soviet attacks which were taking place to the east. Zhukov, seeing this movement to the south, decided that Hube was in full retreat and would soon attempt a breakout to the south. Zhukov stripped units from the encircling forces and sent them to the south side of the pocket. When Hube attempted to attack south, he would be met with a solid wall of Russian guns.

Hube now ordered the pocket to be reduced in size, shortening the lines and allowing an easier defence. Just before the Russians had completed the encirclement, Hube had requested the authority to conduct a mobile defence, a request which was quickly turned down. Once the encirclement was complete, however, things changed. The heavy snow meant that the few supplies which got through were insufficient to maintain the Army's fighting power. The neighbouring German armies, the 8th and 4th Panzer, were unable to attempt a full-scale relief operation. The Soviets sent a terse ultimatum: surrender, or every German soldier in the pocket would be shown no quarter.

Hube moved quickly. He ordered that the organisation of the forces in the kessel be restructured. The four corps were to be dissolved and reformed into three Korpsgruppen (corps groups). General der Infanterie Hans Gollick, commander of XLVI Panzer Corps, was to form Korpsgruppe Gollick. General der Panzertruppen Hermann Breith of III Panzer Corps was to form Korpsgruppe Breith and LIX Army Corps' General der Infanterie Kurt von der Chevallerie was to form Korpsgruppe von der Chevallerie.

While all this was going on, Manstein had been arguing with Hitler for the trapped army to be allowed to attempt a breakout, and that a relief force should be sent to assist in the breakout. After one heated argument, Hitler gave in and ordered Hube to attempt a breakout. The decision for the direction of the breakout was difficult. Hube wanted to attempt to head south, over the Dneister and into Romania. Manstein realised that such a move would rob his army group of a panzer army which was desperately needed, as a long march would be required to move the army from Romania back into the line. The weak Hungarian VII Corps was holding the line to the west of the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket. A move west would allow the First Panzer Army to rejoin the front almost immediately. Manstein ordered Hube to break out to this area to provide support for the Hungarians.

Hube's army was to break out towards Tarnopol, where relief forces, led by Paul Hausser's II SS Panzerkorps, were to meet them. From Kamenets-Podolsky to Tarnopol was a distance of over 150 miles (250 km), over several rivers and across muddy terrain. To add to this, the west was where Hube expected to meet the strongest enemy resistance. He divided his forces into two columns and prepared to head west.

On 27 March 1944, the lead elements of Hube's army moved west towards the Zbruch river. Simultaneously, the rearguard began a fighting withdrawal. 200,000 men were beginning to move. The attack went well. The northern column quickly captured three bridges over the Zbruch, while the southern column was battered by a Soviet counterattack which penetrated deep into the pocket, capturing Kamenets-Podolsky. The loss of this major rail and road hub meant that the escaping Germans had to detour around the city, slowing the movement to a crawl. A counterattack soon cut off the Russians in the city, and the breakout once more got underway. Moving by day and night, the kessel kept moving. Soon bridgeheads were formed over the Seret river.

While Hube's army escaped west, Zhukov and Konev continued to believe that the major breakout attempt would be to the south. He ordered the attacks on the north and eastern flanks of the pocket stepped up. These attacks achieved nothing, and many fell on positions which had been abandoned. Despite the attacks to the West, the Soviets kept pouring men to the southern flank of the kessel in anticipation of an attack that would never come.

On 30 March, Manstein was informed by OKH that he had been relieved of command. His many heated arguments with the Führer had not been forgotten. Hube was on his own.

The next day, the Soviets began to react. A strong armoured force from the 4th Tank Army struck north between the Seret and Zbruch. Hube's southern spearhead turned and halted the Soviet attack, severing the enemy force's supply lines and rendering the T-34s of the Fourth Tank Army immobile. Despite the fact that he was now taking the breakout attempt seriously, Zhukov did not move to block the escaping Germans. The way to Tarnopol was still clear.

Despite heavy snowfalls, low supplies and the fact that they were completely surrounded, the constant movement of Hube's army meant that kessel fever did not set in. The troops were still orderly and disciplined, and desertions were almost non-existent. A far cry from the panicked situation within the Stalingrad and Korsun encirclements.

By 5 April, the spearheads of both the northern and southern columns had reached the Strypa River, and on the 6th, near the town of Buczacz, they linked up with the spearheads of Hausser's SS Divisions. In over two weeks of heavy combat, during horrid weather and with few supplies, the First Panzer Army had managed to escape encirclement while suffering only moderate casualties. The army was put back into the line and established itself between the Dniester and the town of Brody. During the two week escape, Hube's men had destroyed 357 tanks, 42 assault guns and 280 artillery pieces, as well as causing severe casualties to the enemy's attacking forces. The quick thinking of Manstein and the operational planning and skill of Hube had resulted in the 200,000 man army escaping the fate of Stalingrad. While Hube's men were still disciplined and equipped with light and personal weapons, only 45 armoured vehicles had escaped. Despite the escape and low casualty rate, Hube's First Panzer Army was no longer able to perform large scale offensive operations and required thorough refitting.

The Kamenets-Podolsky pocket is still studied in military academies today as an example of how to avoid annihilation when forces are trapped in a pocket.

1.Panzerarmee (Generaloberst Hans-Valentin Hube)

• • 1.Panzer Division (Generalleutnant Werner Marcks)
  • 17.Panzer Division (Generalleutnant Karl-Friedrich von der Meden)

• III. Panzerkorps (General der Panzertruppe Hermann Breith)
  • 16.Panzer Division (Generalmajor Hans-Ulrich Back)
  • 11.Panzer Division (Generalleutnant Wend von Wietersheim)
  • Kampfgruppe from 1.SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler
  • 249th StuG Brigade
  • schwere Panzer Regiment Bäke (Oberst Franz Bäke)
  • schwere Panzer Abteilung 509 (Oberleutnant Dr. König)

• LIX. Armeekorps (General der Infanterie Kurt von der Chevallerie)
  • 96.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Richard Wirtz)
  • 291.Infanterie Division (Generalmajor Oskar Eckholt)
  • 6.Panzer Division (Generalleutnant Walter Denkert)
  • 19.Panzer Division (Generalleutnant Hans Källner)
  • 2.SS Panzer Division Das Reich - Kampfgruppe (SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Weidinger)
  • StuG Brigade Nr.276
  • StuG Brigade Nr.280
  • 616.Panzerjäger Abteilung
  • 88.Panzerjäger Abteilung
  • 509.Panzerjäger Abteilung

• XXIV. Panzerkorps (General der Panzertruppen Walther Nehring)
  • 25.Panzer Division(remnants) (Generalleutnant Hans Tröger)
  • 20.Panzergrenadier Division (General der Panzertruppen Georg Jauer)
  • 168.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Werner Schmidt-Hammer)
  • 208.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Hans Pieckenbrock)
  • 371.Infanterie Division (General der Infanterie Hermann Niehoff)
  • StuG Brigade Nr.300
  • 731.Panzerjäger Abteilung
  • Motorisierte Abteilung Nr.473

• XXXXVI. Panzerkorps (General der Infanterie Friedrich Schulz)
  • 1.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Ernst-August von Krosigk)
  • 82.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Walter Heyne)
  • 75.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Helmuth Beukemann)
  • 254.Infanterie Division (Generalleutnant Alfred Thielmann)
  • 101.Jäger Division, (General der Gebirgstruppen Emil Vogel)
  • 18.Artillerie Division (General der Artillerie Karl Thoholte)
  • StuG Bataillon Nr.300

• Alan Clark, Barbarossa.
• John Erickson, The Road To Berlin: Stalin's War With Germany Volume II.
• Perry Moore, Kesselschlacht (Hube's First Panzer Army 1944).
• Bryan Perret, Knights of the Black Cross: Hitler's Panzerwaffe and Its Leaders.
• Carl Wagener, Der Ausbruch der 1. Panzerarmee aus dem Kessel von Kamenez-Podolsk März/April 1944.
• Encirclement of a Panzer Army Near Kamenets-Podolskiy (chapter 6 of Operations of Encircled Forces, United States Department of the Army).