Military of East Timor

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Timor-Leste Defense Force
Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste
F-FDTL coat of arms
F-FDTL coat of arms
Founded 2001
Service branches Army, Naval Component
Headquarters Dili
Leadership
President José Ramos Horta
Minister for Defence Xanana Gusmão
Commander, Timor-Leste Defense Force Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak
Manpower
Available for
military service		 235,198 males, age 18-49 (2005 est),
223,069 females, age 18-49 (2005 est)
Fit for
military service		 179,422 males, age 18-49 (2005 est),
184,533 females, age 18-49 (2005 est)
Reaching military
age annually		 12,740 males (2005 est),
12,438 females (2005 est)
Active personnel 1286 (IISS, 2007) (ranked 156)
Reserve personnel None
Expenditures
Budget Unknown
Industry
Domestic suppliers None
Foreign suppliers Donations from foreign governments
Related articles
Ranks Military ranks of East Timor

The Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (Tetum: Forcas Defensa Timor Lorosae English: Timor Leste Defence Force) or FALINTIL-FDTL (often F-FDTL) - the Military of East Timor - comprises an Army and a small Naval component. The F-FDTL was established in February 2001 and currently comprises two small infantry battalions, a small naval component and several supporting units. The F-FDTL suffers from considerable internal divisions and is currently under-strength.

Contents

The Constitution of East Timor assigns the F-FDTL responsibility for protecting East Timor against external attack. The Constitution states that the F-FDTL "shall guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the populations against any aggression or external threat, in respect for the constitutional order". The Constitution also states that the F-FDTL "shall be non-partisan and shall owe obedience to the competent organs of sovereignty in accordance with the Constitution and the laws, and shall not intervene in political matters". The East Timorese police and security forces have responsibility for internal security.

In practice the responsibilities of the F-FDTL and the Policia National de Timor Leste (PNTL) are not clearly delineated, and this has led to conflict between the two organisations.[1] While the F-FDTL has no formal police functions, it has taken on a policing role, particularly during an incident in the Atsabe sub-district of the Ermera District in January 2003.[2] Conversely, the National Police (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL) have been involved in border defence operations near the western border.

See also: History of East Timor

The F-FDTL was reconstituted from the national liberation movement guerrilla army known as Falintil (Portuguese acronym for Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor). During the period prior to 1999 some East Timorese leaders, including the current President José Ramos Horta, proposed that a future East Timorese state would not have a military. The widespread violence and destruction which followed the independence referendum in 1999 and the need to provide employment to Falintil veterans led to a change in policy, however.[3] Following the end of Indonesian rule Falintil proposed the establishment of a large military of about 5,000 personnel.[4]

In mid-2000 UNTAET invited a study team from King's College London to conduct a study of East Timor's security force options. The team's report identified three different options for an East Timorese military. Option 1 was based on Falintil's preference for a relatively large and heavily armed military of 3,000-5,000 personnel, Option 2 was a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 conscripts and Option 3 was for a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 volunteer reservists.[5] The study team recommended Option 3 as being best suited to East Timor's security needs and economic situation. This recommendation was accepted by UNTAET in September 2000 and formed the basis of East Timor's defence planning.[6] The plan was also accepted by all of the countries which had contributed peacekeeping forces to East Timor.[7]

East Timor's decision to form a military has been criticised by some commentators. The King's College report has been criticised on the grounds that it led to East Timor establishing a large police force and a large Army when its security needs may have been better met by a single smaller paramilitary force.[8] More generally, these commentators argue that as East Timor does not face external threats the government's limited resources would be better spent on strengthening the PNTL. While East Timor's political leadership recognises that the country does not currently face an external threat, they believe that it is necessary to maintain a military capacity to deter future aggression. In addition, the establishment of the F-FDTL was seen as being an effective means of integrating Falintil into an independent East Timor.[9]

FALINTIL officially became F-FDTL on February 1, 2001. The first 650 members of the F-FDTL were selected from 1,736 former Falintil applicants and began training on 29 March. The FDTL's 1st Battalion was established on 29 June 2001 and reached full strength on 1 December. Most members of the battalion were from East Timor's eastern provinces.[10] The 2nd Battalion was established in 2002 and was manned mainly by new personnel under the age of 21 who had not participated in the independence struggle.[11] The F-FDTL's small Naval Component was established in December 2001.[12]

After a period of training the F-FDTL assumed responsibility for the Lautém district from the UN peacekeeping force in July 2002. It assumed responsibility for the entire country's external security on 20 May 2004 though foreign troops remained in East Timor until mid-2005.[13]

The F-FDTL has suffered from serious morale and disciplinary problems since its establishment.[14] These problems have been driven by uncertainty over the F-FDTL's role, poor conditions of service due to limited resources, tensions arising from Falintil's transition from a guerilla organisation to a regular military and political and regional rivalries. The F-FDTL's morale and disciplinary problems have resulted in large numbers of soldiers being disciplined or dismissed[15] and contributed to a major crisis in 2006.

Main article: 2006 East Timor crisis

In late February 2006, it was reported that over one quarter of Army personnel had quit in the last few weeks in protest over conditions and promotion rules. (ABC) 591 soldiers were dismissed for desertion the following month, and on Sunday 26 March 2006 some soldiers looted shops in Dili and threw stones at their opponents. (Radio NZ) More violence developed on 28 April 2006 from a protest march in support of the soldiers. Two people were killed and 34 injured. [16]

Violence continued to escalate in May 2006. Gun battles in Dili on May 24 led to at least two deaths and eight injuries [17], prompting President Xanana Gusmão to call for international intervention. Australia, Portugal, Malaysia and New Zealand quickly responded and pledged to send in troops to help maintain order.[18] A total of 37 people were killed in the fighting and 155,000 Timorese fled their homes. A United Nations inquiry found that the interior and defence ministers and the Commander of the F-FDTL illegally transferred weapons to civilians during the crisis.[19]

The Constitution of East Timor states that the President is the supreme commander of the defence force and has the power to appoint the F-FDTL's Commander and Chief of Staff. The Council of Ministers and National Parliament are responsible for funding the F-FDTL and setting policy relating to East Timor's security.[20]

A small Ministry of Defence was established in 2002 to provide civilian oversight of the F-FDTL. However, a lack of suitable staff for the Ministry and the personal relationships between senior F-FDTL officers and government figures has rendered this oversight largely ineffectual has retarded the development of East Timor's defence policy.[21] This failure to institute effective civilian oversight of the F-FDTL contributed to the 2006 crisis.[22] The lack of oversight has also limited the extent to which foreign countries are willing to provide assistance to the F-FDTL.[23]

The F-FDTL is organised into an Army of two light infantry battalions, a naval component and supporting units. These support units include a logistic support unit and a military police company. East Timor does not have an air force and the F-FDTL does not currently operate any aircraft. The F-FDTL also possesses the "largest and most sophisticated" intelligence network in East Timor.[24]

While the F-FDTL has an authorised strength of 1,500 regular troops and 1,500 reservists it does not appear to have ever reached these totals. Due to funding shortfalls the reserve component has not been formed and the two regular battalions have remained under-strength.[25]

The F-FDTL's structure in 2007
The F-FDTL's structure in 2007

Members of the F-FDTL Army and Naval Component on parade in 2007 after being issued with new uniforms.
Members of the F-FDTL Army and Naval Component on parade in 2007 after being issued with new uniforms.[26]

The land force of the F-FDTL consists of two light infantry battalions, each with an authorised strength of 600 personnel. This force was predominantly trained by the Australian and Portuguese militaries.[27] Each battalion has three rifle companies, a support company and a headquarters company.[28] Although small in number, the guerrilla tactics employed by the force, prior to the Indonesian military departing in 1999, were extremely effective against overwhelming numbers on the Indonesian side.[29]

The IISS reported the Army's size in 2007 as 1,250. The Army has suffered a high loss of personnel as a result of the 2006 crisis and only 700 of the 1,450 soldiers who were in the Army in 2005 were still in the Army in August 2007. In August 2007 the commander of the F-FDTL sought government approval to recruit 600 soldiers in 2008 and a further 600 in 2009.[30]

The 1st Battalion was initially manned by veterans of the pre-independence guerrilla force and is based at Baucau, with a contingent in the seaside coastline village of Laga.[31] The 1st Battalion was formed in January 2000 and reached its full strength in December 2000.[32]

The 2nd Battalion was formed in 2002-03 from a cadre of the 1st Battalion and was manned largely by new recruits. The battalion is stationed at Nicolau Lobato Training Centre, near Metinaro.[33] Most of the 2nd Battalion's soldiers were dismissed during the 2006 East Timor crisis.

Logistics and service support is provided through Headquarters F-FDTL in Dili. There is also a Military Police Company, which as been in the centre of the recent unrest (May 2006). Major Alfredo Reinado, former commander of both the MP Unit and the Naval Unit, is one of the most important faces of the rebels.

The F-FDTL is armed only with small arms and does not possess any crew-served weapons. The 2007 edition of Jane's Sentinel states that the F-FDTL has the following equipment in service: 1,560 M16 rifles and 75 M203 grenade launchers, 75 FN Minimi squad automatic weapons, 8 sniper rifles and 50 .45 M1911A1 pistols. A further 75 Minimis are to be ordered. The majority of the F-FDTLs weapons were donated to East Timor.[34]

The Naval Component of the F-FDTL was established in December 2001 when Portugal transferred two small Albatroz class patrol boats from the Portuguese Navy. The establishment of the Naval Component was not supported by King's College study team, the UN or East Timor's other donor countries on the grounds that it would be too expensive for East Timor.[35]

The role of the Naval Component is to conduct fishery and border protection patrols and ensure that the maritime line of communication to the Oecussi enclave remains open. The two ships are named Oecussi and Atauro and are each armed with a single 20mm Oerlikon cannon and two 12.7mm machine guns. The Naval Component is based at Hera Harbor in Dili.[36] The two ships were built in the early 1970s and were in the process of being decommissioned from the Portuguese Navy at the time they were offered to East Timor.[37] The patrol boats' high operating costs form a significant constraint on the Naval Component.[38]

Reports on the Naval Component's strength are contradictory; while the 2007-2008 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships states that there are 150 personnel under training, the 2007 edition of the IISS Military Balance says the Naval Component's size is only 36. Ball states that the Naval Component's authorised strength is 50 personnel.[39]

While all of the F-FDTL's personnel were initially Falintil veterans the force's composition has changed over time and few soldiers from the insurgency remain in the forces due to the narrow age requirement.[40] These changes have contributed to tensions within the military. After the F-FDTL's 1st Battalion was established in 2001 recruitment was opened to all East Timorese above the age of 18, including women.[41] Few women have joined F-FDTL, however.[42]

East Timor's current defence expenditure is not known and the country is reliant on foreign aid to fund and equip the F-FDTL. This aid is provided in the form of military equipment such as weapons and uniforms and through the provision of training and assistance with logistics. No military production currently takes place in East Timor, though the country may eventually manufacture its own military uniforms.[43] The King's College report estimated that a military of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 reservists would cost approximately one percent of East Timor's GDP and that this was the highest level of military expenditure which the country could sustain.[44]

Funding shortfalls have constrained the development of the F-FDTL. The Government has been forced to indefinitely postpone plans to form an independent company stationed in the Oecussi enclave and two reserve infantry battalions. These units formed an important part of the King's College report's Option 3 force structure and their absence may have impacted on East Timor's defence policy.[45]

In June 2007 it was reported that contractors working for the East Timorese Government had developed a plan calling for the expansion and modernisation of the F-FDTL. This plan, Força 2020 (Force 2020), which is of equivalent status to a defence white paper, proposes expanding the military to a strength of 3,000 regular personnel through the introduction of conscription, establishing an air component and purchasing modern weapons including anti-armour weapons, armoured personnel carriers and missile boats.[46]

The Force 2020 plan has proven controversial. It has been criticised by the United Nations and the governments of Australia and the United States as being unaffordable and in excess of East Timor's needs.[47] However, East Timorese President José Ramos Horta has defended the Force 2020 plan, arguing that it will transform the F-FDTL to a professional force capable of defending East Timor's sovereignty and contributing to the nation's stability.[48]

The Force 2020 plan is similar to Option 1 in the King's College report. The King's College study team strongly recommended against such a policy, labelling it "unaffordable" and raising concerns over the impact of conscription upon East Timorese society and military readiness. The team estimated that sustaining such a force structure would cost 2.6 to 3.3 percent of East Timor's annual Gross Domestic Product and would "represent a heavy burden on the East Timor economy".[49] Moreover, the Force 2020 plan may not be realistic or suitable as it appears to emphasise military expansion over spending on other government services and outlines ideas such as the long term (~2075) development of space forces.

See also: Foreign relations of East Timor

The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) is tasked with supporting the East Timorese government and security institutions, including the F-FDTL. UNMIT was established on 25 August 2006 and replaced the United Nations Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL). As at 30 June 2007 UNMIT had a strength of 1,661 uniformed personnel, including 1,628 police and 33 military observers. These personnel were supported by 274 international civilians, 938 local civilian workers and 301 UN Volunteers.[50]

UNMIT is supported by an Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF). The ISF was deployed to East Timor in late May 2006 under Operation Astute and includes units from the Australian Defence Force, New Zealand Defence Force and Malaysian Armed Forces. The main element of the ISF is the ANZAC Battle Group which has a strength of about 850 Australians and 170 New Zealanders.[51] About 200 personnel from the Portuguese paramilitary Republican National Guard are also deployed to East Timor but do not come under the command of the ISF.[52]

The presence of UN police and Australian troops was a key issue in the 2007 East Timorese presidential election. The winning candidate, José Ramos Horta, backed the presence of foreign forces and told rallies that he would like these forces to remain for at least five years. Most other candidates called for the UN and ISF to withdraw as soon as possible, arguing that their presence limits East Timor's sovereignty. Despite the differing views on how long the UN and ISF should remain in East Timor, all the parties regard the presence of foreign peacekeepers as being necessary until the F-FDTL and PDTL are ready to take responsibility for the country's security.[53]

  1. ^ Rees (2004). Page 14.
  2. ^ Amnesty International 2003
  3. ^ Wainwright (2002). Page 23.
  4. ^ The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraph 205.
  5. ^ The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.2 to 7.4
  6. ^ Wainwright (2002). Page 23.
  7. ^ Fawthrop and Harris (2001). Page 37.
  8. ^ Sheridan, Greg. "Fretilin still a stranger to democracy", The Australian, 2007-08-09. Retrieved on 2007-08-09. 
  9. ^ Smith (2005). Pages 31-32.
  10. ^ Ball (2002). Page 180.
  11. ^ Rees (2004). Page 31.
  12. ^ Jane's sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia. Issue 20 - 2007. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. . Page 148.
  13. ^ Jane's sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia. Issue 20 - 2007. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. . Page 116.
  14. ^ Horta, Loro (2006). "Young and Wild. Timor Leste's troubled military". Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Retrieved on 2007-09-01.
  15. ^ Rees (2004). Pages 32-33.
  16. ^ Radio Australia at [1]
  17. ^ CNN, at [2]
  18. ^ Wikinews at [3] and CNN at [4]
  19. ^ UN News Centre (2006-10-17). UN commission of inquiry issues report on violent crisis that shook Timor-Leste. Press release. Retrieved on 2007-09-01.
  20. ^ Rees (2004). Pages 7-9.
  21. ^ Rees (2004). Pages 11-14.
  22. ^ United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (8 August 2006). Page 17.
  23. ^ Rees (2004). Page 28.
  24. ^ Rees (2004). Page 56.
  25. ^ Rees (2004). Page 29.
  26. ^ "Kiwis Contribute to Peaceful Timor Elections", New Zealand Army News, 2007-07-17. Retrieved on 2007-08-12. 
  27. ^ Ball (2002). Pages 179-180.
  28. ^ Rees (2004). Pages 28-29.
  29. ^ Wainwright (2002). Page 34.
  30. ^ "F-FDTL to recruit 600 soldiers", Kamis, 2007-08-16. Retrieved on 2007-11-11. 
  31. ^ Rees (2004). Page 29.
  32. ^ Ball (2002). Page 180.
  33. ^ Lowry (2006), page 4 and Rees (2004), pages 29-31.
  34. ^ Jane's sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia. Issue 20 - 2007. Pages 146 and 152.
  35. ^ Jane's sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia. Issue 20 - 2007. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. . Page 148.
  36. ^ Saunders, Stephen (editor). Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110, 2007-2008. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group, 190. 
  37. ^ Ball (2002). Page 181.
  38. ^ Wainwright (2002). Page 25.
  39. ^ Ball (2002). Page 179.
  40. ^ La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 2005
  41. ^ Jane's sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia. Issue 20 - 2007. Page 116
  42. ^ UNMIT (2006). Page 29.
  43. ^ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Southeast Asia. Issue 20 - 2007. Pages 142 and 153.
  44. ^ The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.4 and 158.
  45. ^ Rees (2004). Page 27.
  46. ^ Dodd, Mark. "Secret missile plan for East Timor", The Australian, 2007-06-08. Retrieved on 2007-08-10. 
  47. ^ Dodd, Mark. "Timor military blueprint unrealistic: Downer", The Australian, 2007-06-08. Retrieved on 2007-08-10. 
  48. ^ East Timor Ministry of Defence (2007-07-03). Force 2020 is important for the East Timor Government. Press release. Retrieved on 2007-08-11.
  49. ^ The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.2 and 205 - 212.
  50. ^ United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. United Nations website. Retrieved on 2007-08-10.
  51. ^ Australian Department of Defence. About Operation Astute. Retrieved on 2007-09-01.
  52. ^ "Portuguese refuse Australian command", The Australian, 2006-06-03. Retrieved on 2007-09-01. 
  53. ^ International Crisis Group (2007). Page 6.

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