South Moluccas
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The South Moluccas consists of about 150 islands in the Banda Sea. The main islands are Ceram, Ambon, and Buru. The people of the South Moluccas are mainly Melanesians, numbering about one million. The islands are a part of the Republic of Indonesia.
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A relatively large number of the professional soldiers serving in the Dutch colonial (KNIL) army were recruited among the population of Ambon and the surrounding South Moluccan islands. The South Moluccan islands were among the first to get under the European sphere of influence in the 16th century. The Protestant mission had been more successful there than elsewhere in the East Indies. Half the Ambonese population adhered to the Calvinist branch of Protestantism. During the era of the VOC the Moluccans were not only forced to trade with the VOC only, but also to focus solely on the production cloves. After the downfall of the VOC and the collapse of the trade in cloves they were fully dependent on the colonial structure and found occupation in the colonial army. The Ambonese were regarded as fierce fighters, reliable soldiers and absolutely loyal to the Dutch Crown. It was precisely this reputation that made them unpopular with other Indonesian nationalities. The malay nickname for them was ‘Belanda Hitam’, which translates in English to ‘Black Dutch’. All of this put them in a difficult position during both the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian national revolution.
During the Japanese occupation in the second world war most of the Moluccan soldiers were only shortly interned as pow’s. Initially the Japanese occupational force decided to release them from military duty, and send them home. However the Japanese quickly discovered their miscalculation, when the Moluccans became among the most active in the resistance movement against them. Throughout the occupied Dutch East Indies Moluccan soldiers created underground resistance cells aiding the Allied forces. Some of these cells were active in gathering intelligence other sleeping cells hid weapons in strategic locations waiting to take up arms during an Allied invasion. The Japanese secret police (Kempeitai) responded by torturing and beheading any suspect, which in general did not deter the Moluccans. After the capitulation of the Japanese royal army to the Allied forces the Moluccan soldiers reacted equally deviant towards the Indonesian revolutionaries trying to fill the power vacuum left by the Japanese. Smaller scale conflicts in the Bersiap period between regrouped Moluccan fighting units and Pemuda groups usually left the well trained Moluccan military men victorious.
During the Indonesian national revolution the Dutch had to disband the reinstated KNIL and the native soldiers had the choice of being demobilised or joining the army of the Republic of Indonesia. Due to a deep distrust of the Republican leadership, being predominantly Javanese muslim, this was a extremely difficult choice for the Protestant Ambonese and only a minority chose to serve with the Indonesian Army. Disbanding proved a complicated process and, in 1951, two years after the transfer of sovereignty, not all soldiers had been demobilised. The Dutch were under severe international pressure to disband the colonial army and made these men temporarily part of the normal Dutch army, while trying to demobilise them in Java.
Herein lay the problem of great disconsent among the Moluccan soldiers as, according to the KNIL policy, soldiers had the right to choose the place where they were to be discharged at the end of their contract. The political situation in the new Republic of Indonesia was initially unstable and, in particular, controversy over a federal or centralised form of the state resulted in armed conflicts in which Ambonese ex-KNIL men were involved. In 1951 an independent Republic of South Moluccas (Indonesian: RMS, Republik Maluku Selatan) was proclaimed at Ambon. The RMS had strong support among the Ambonese KNIL soldiers. As a consequence the Moluccan soldiers located outside the South Moluccas demanded to be discharged at Ambon. But Indonesia refused to let the Dutch transport these soldiers to Ambon as long as the RMS was not repressed, fearing prolonged military struggle. When after heavy fighting the RMS was repressed at Ambon, the soldiers refused to be discharged there. They now demanded to be demobilised at Ceram, where counter revolutionary pockets of resistance against Indonesia still existed. This was again blocked by Indonesia.
At their wits end the Dutch government finally decided to transport the remaining men and their families to the Netherlands. They were discharged on arrival and 'temporarily' housed in camps until it was possible for them to return to the Moluccan islands. [1] In this way around 12,500 persons were settled in the Netherlands, more or less against their will and certainly also against the original plans of the Dutch government. The reaction of the Dutch government to the settlement of the Moluccan soldiers was exactly the opposite of the reaction to the Indo repatriates. [2] Whereas the latter were defined as fellow-citizens who had to be integrated as quickly and as fully as possible, the Moluccans were considered to be temporary residents who had to be repatriated to Indonesia. [3] They were 'temporarily' housed in camps, mostly in rural areas and near small towns. A special agency was set up to manage all matters concerning these temporary residents, the 'Commissariaat Ambonezenzorg' (CAZ).
To deal with all kinds of daily matters the CAZ created 'representatives' in the camps who regulated the lives of the inhabitants in accordance with the rules. These representatives were (mostly) recruited from among the non-commissioned officers, who were in this way able, to a certain extent, to re-establish their status in the new circumstances. The housing situation in the camps resembled in many ways the barracks of the colonial army, where the soldiers were housed, together with their families, under the direct supervision of non-commissioned officers. This specific housing situation contributed greatly to the isolation of the Moluccan population from Dutch society. The camps, and later the neighbourhoods, became enclaves where the schools, though officially Dutch in programme and language, became exclusively Moluccan and where access to the labour market was geographically often restricted. Even when it became more and more obvious that there was no possibility to repatriate the ex-servicemen to Indonesia, the Dutch government did not formulate a radically different policy.
This situation dragged on until 1970 when the CAZ was finally dissolved and normal ministerial and other agencies became responsible. The Dutch government had at last admitted that the Moluccans were not temporary residents and that their future lay in the Netherlands. Still in 1968 more than 80 per cent of the Moluccans were still without official citizenship i.e. stateless. The ex-soldiers were deeply frustrated by the demise of the colonial army. The KNIL had offered not only an income, but also a whole way of life in which their status was secure. They had always been loyal to the Dutch Crown and had felt betrayed when their services were no longer rewarded. In response they had pinned their hopes on an independent RMS and had expected that the Dutch would help them to realise it.
These feelings continued and were even strengthened in the years of isolated settlement in the Netherlands. There seemed to be only one worthwhile ideal and that was the creation of the RMS. But whatever the merits of this ideal, the Moluccans in the Netherlands could do nothing to bring its realisation any nearer. Moreover the isolated situation in the camps and neighbourhoods had given rise to a type of expressive leadership that could only manifest itself in opposing and confronting the CAZ and the Dutch in general. The older generation of Moluccans was caught in a web of emotions around a traumatic past, where only the hope of realising the RMS gave meaning to their lives.
This situation led to growing tension and to splits within the RMS movement. The older generation of leaders of the RMS movement saw their authority challenged. Finally the crisis in the Ambonese communities exploded in a decade of violence against internal rivals and Dutch society. A series of terrorist attacks started in 1970 with a raid on the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar. The Dutch reaction to this attack was constrained. The attackers received mild sentences and were still seen as misguided idealists. Within the Moluccan community the 'boys of action' gained great prestige. This fuelled further terrorist actions in 1975 and 1977. As with the attack in Wassenaar, the aims of these actions were not very clear; apart from restoring unity within the RMS movement, it is difficult to see any concrete objectives in the vague rhetoric and impossible political demands made by the attackers. [4] Attacks on a train and on a village school in 1977 led to a final escalation of the violence. The Dutch government saw no other way out than to use military force to end the action. Meanwhile, support for this kind of action within the Moluccan community was ebbing. Instead of reuniting the Moluccans in the Netherlands, this aimless radicalism threatened to lead to more split-offs. When, in 1978, a group of youngsters raided the seat of the provincial government in Assen, they received not the slightest support. The time for terrorist action was clearly over.
Towards the end of this period of terrorist violence, the Dutch government had already dropped the misguided idea that the Moluccans were temporary residents, but had not been able to create a channel of communication through which to discuss and implement policy measures that opened a way to the future. The social situation left much to be desired, school attainments were low and unemployment high. Earlier attempts to set up a communal platform for the government and Moluccan representatives had not been successful, because of antagonism within the Moluccan communities and impossible political demands made at the outset by the Moluccans. But now both sides realised that it was necessary to let bygones be bygones and to make a new start. In 1976 a platform was formed where government policy measures could be discussed with representatives of the Moluccan community, the IWM (Dutch abbreviation for: Inspraakorgaan Welzijn Molukkers). In 1978 a substantial White Paper (De Problematiek van de Molukkers in Nederland) was sent by the government to parliament. It offered measures to enhance Moluccan participation in Dutch society, in particular in the fields of education and the labour market.
The IWM has proved a valuable communication channel for communal projects. A case in point was the plan to create thousands of jobs for Moluccans in government service. The primary goal was to combat high unemployment, but a secondary goal was to open up a particular section of the labour market where Moluccans were significantly underrepresented. The recognition that employment, education and social welfare in general were important fields where the situation of the Moluccan population, and especially of the new generation, had to be improved, was a positive development. Partly because the second generation was already much more oriented to Dutch society, partly as a result of the policy of affirmative action, participation in the labour market and in the school system developed positively after 1980. Levels of educational attainment rose, unemployment levels were lower and the jobs fulfilled were also somewhat higher in scale. In general the second-generation Moluccans made a great leap forward in this period, compared to the first 'soldier generation'. They are more and more at home in the Netherlands. [5]
The situation of the Moluccans in the Netherlands is at present remarkably different from that in 1970. Practically all Moluccans are now Dutch citizens. This makes it more difficult to give the precise number of Moluccans in the Netherlands, though research shows that there are to date about 40,000 persons who can be classified as Moluccan.[6] A majority of this population identifies itself to a certain extent with the Moluccan islands where their families once came from, but this identification seems less and less an impediment to integration in Dutch society. In this sense the Moluccans have at last become 'normal immigrants'.[7]
The Republic of the South Moluccas, or Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS), was a self-proclaimed republic in the Maluku Islands, founded April 25, 1950.
The Moluccas were part of the Dutch East Indies, a colony of the Netherlands, since its conception in the 18th century. When Indonesian revolutionary leaders declared the independent Republic of Indonesia, the south Moluccas were considered part of that country, by its freedom fighters. Indonesia's struggle for recognition of its independence lasted from 1945 until December 27, 1949 when under heavy international pressure, especially from the United States which threatened to cut off Marshall Plan funds to the Netherlands, the Dutch acknowledged a federal Indonesian republic.
In first instance the Netherlands acknowledged the independence of Indonesia as a federation of autonomous states, of which one was the South Moluccas. On April 25, 1950 demobilized ex-colonial KNIL army men who remained loyal to the Dutch crown, staged a revolt and proclaimed what they called the "Republic of the South Moluccas". They wanted a totally independent country, so even more than just a federal state. On August 17, 1950, the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, as originally proclaimed, was restored by millitary force. The liberal democratic system of government, whereby the cabinet would be accountable to the House of Representatives was retained. This was a source of political instability in the young Republic with frequent changes in government until the rise of the so called New Order. Still from within Indonesia the call for an independent Republic of the South Moluccas was never again heard as loudly as in 1950.
The rebellious RMS group was defeated by Indonesian forces in November 1950. The defeat resulted in the flight of the self-declared RMS government from the islands, and the formation of a government in exile in the Netherlands. The following year some 12,000 Moluccan soldiers accompanied by their families went to the Netherlands, where they established a "Republic of the South Moluccas" government-in-exile.
During their exile parts of the RMS movement have committed terror attacks. Some say this caused the Dutch government to withdraw their support for the RMS. Others argue that the attacks were caused by frustration of the non support of the Dutch government in the first place.
The first attack took place in 1970 at the Indonesian Ambassador's house at Wassenaar, during which a Dutch policeman was shot and killed. This attack was followed up in 1975 with the hijacking of a train at Wijster which was spontaneously supported by an other, improvised, attack on the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam. Three hostages where executed in the train and one Indonesian man was mortally wounded while trying to escape the consulate. In 1977 another train was hijacked, this time at De Punt, supported by a primary school hijack at Bovensmilde. These actions where ended with force by marines of the BBE in which 6 hijackers and 2 hostages died. The last action took place in 1978 when the provincial building in Assen was occupied. This action too was ended by BBE marines.
From the 80s to the present day no such actions re-occurred.
The first president in exile was Prof. Johan Manusama.
Dr. Chr. R. S. Soumokil was the RMS president in 1954 who went into hiding on Ceram island. He was only captured by the Indonesian Army in Ceram on December 2, 1962. Brought to trial before a military tribunal in Jakarta, he was sentenced to death and executed under President Suharto's rule on April 12, 1966.
The government-in-exile continues to exist, with Frans Tutuhatunewa as head of state. However does not proclaim any violent action towards either the Netherlands or Indonesia. The president in exile has said that the young generations should focus on their education and development opportunities in the Netherlands if they want to potentially support and develop the South Moluccas.
The current Indonesian ambassador to the Netherlands Junus Effendi Habibie, brother to the third president of Indonesia, has said that he would do all he can to facilitate the repatriation of first generation Moluccans to their beloved homeland.[8]
The South Moluccan people are predominantly Christian, unlike most regions in Indonesia which is overwhelmingly Muslim. The South Moluccan Republic, however, was also supported by some Moluccan Muslims in the region at that time.Today, while the majority of Christians on the Moluccas do not support separatism, the memory of the RMS and its separatist objectives still resonates in Indonesia. Moluccan Christians, lately during the chaos in Moluccas, are accused by Muslim groups of having independence as their goal. This accusation has been useful in galvanizing Muslims to fight (Jihad), and the situation has not been aided by the fact that some diaspora Moluccan Christian groups have taken up the RMS banner.
In the Moluccas agreement in Malino (Malino II), signed to end conflict and create peace in the Moluccas, Moluccans claimed "to reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements, among others the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS), that threaten the unity and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia". However during the visit to Ambon of the Indonesian president in the summer of 2007, RMS symphatisers disturbed ceremonies by performing the Mollucan war dance and hoisting the RMS flag.[9]
Since 1999, a new organization known as the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM) has operated in Ambon, stockpiling weapons and flying the RMS flag in public places.
- Alba, R. and Nee, V. (2003) Remaking the American Mainstream. Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. Ambonezen (1957)
- Ambonezen in Nederland. Rapport van de commissie ingesteld door de minister van Maatschappelijk Werk's. Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij.
- Bartels, D. (1989) Moluccans in Exile. A Struggle for Ethnic Survival. Leiden: COMT/ IWM.
- de Vries, M. (1999) 'Why ethnicity? The ethnicity of Dutch Eurasians raised in the Netherlands" in Crul, M., Lindo, F. and Pang, C.L. (eds) Culture, Structure and Beyond. Changing Identities and Social Positions of Immigrants and their Children. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 28-48. Ellemers, J.E. and Vaillant, R.E.F. (1987) 'Indische Nederlanders en gerepatrieerden: de grootste categorie naoorlogse immigranten, Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis, 100(3): 412-31.
- 'Einwanderung als koloniales Erbe', by Hans van Amersfoort, Professor Emeritus in Cultural and Population Geography, and Research Associate in the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), both at the University of Amsterdam and Mies van Niekerk, Cultural Anthropologist and Senior Researcher at IMES, published in a special issue of the German journal Leviathan to celebrate its 50th anniversary named ‘Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globaliserung und Nationalstaat’. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 135-60. (2003)
- Ex, J. (1966) Adjustment After Migration. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Gans, H.J. (1979) 'Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2(1): 1-20.
- Goudsblom, J. (1968) Dutch Society. New York: Random House.
- Hagendoorn, L. and Hraba, J. (1989) 'Foreign, different, deviant, seclusive and working class: anchors to an ethnic hierarchy in the Netherlands" Ethnic and Racial Studies, 12(4): 441-68.
- Lijphart, A. (1968) The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Manuhutu, W. (1987) 'Molukkers in Nederland. Migranten tegen wil en dank', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 100(3): 432-45. *Repatriering (1957) De Repatriering uit Indonesie Een onderzoek naar de integratie van de gerepatrieerden uit Indonesie in de Nederlandse samenleving. The Hague: no publisher given.
- Siahaya, T. (1972) Mena-Muria. Wassenaar '70: Zuid Molukkers slaan terug. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
- Steylen, F. (1996) RMS van Ideaal tot Symbool. Moluks Nationalisme in Nederland 1951-1994. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Surie, H.G. (1973) 'De gerepatrieerden', in Verwey-Jonker, H.J. (ed.) Allochtonen in Nederland. The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 47-110.
- van Amersfoort, H. (1982) Immigration and the Formation of Minority Groups. The Dutch Experience 1945-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Amersfoort, H. (1999) 'Migration control and minority policy: the case of the Netherlands', in Brochmann, G. and Hammar, T. (eds) Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies. Oxford and New York: Berg, 135-67.
- Veenman, J. (1990) De Arbeidsmarktpositie van Allochtonen in Nederland, in het Bijzonder van Molukkers. Groningen: Wolters Noordhof.
- Veenman, J. (2001) Molukse Jongeren in Nederland. Integratie met de rein erop. Assen: van Gorcum.
- Veenman, J. (ed.) (1994) De Sociale lntegratie van Molukkers. Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande.
- Willems, W. (2001) De Uittocht uit Indie 1945-1995. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
- Wittermans, T. (1991) Social Organization Among Ambonese Refugees in Holland. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- ^ The complicated story of the disbanding of the KNIL is set out here, of course, only briefly. For a more extended analysis see Manuhutu (1987); Steylen (1996: 33-63); van Amersfoort (1982: 101-8). The psychological impact of the dissolution of the KNIL on the Ambonese servicemen is described in Wittermans (1991).
- ^ The history of the Indos and their emigration from Indonesia after World War II is also reflected in interesting ways in the Dutch literature: the circumstances of the repatriation are, for instance, spiritedly evoked in the stories of Springer (2001: 179-239).
- ^ In this article the words Ambonese and Moluccans are used synonymously. This is strictly speaking not correct. The Protestant Ambonese form about 90 per cent of the Moluccans in the Netherlands and have played a decisive role. There is also a small number of Muslim Ambonese and of Moluccans from the islands of Kei and Tanimbar.
- ^ Siahaya (1972) paints a good picture of the mind of a Moluccan terrorist.
- ^ Smeets, H. and Veenman, J. (2000) 'More and more at home: three generations of Moluccans in the Netherlands', in Vermeulen, H. and Penninx, R. (eds) Immigrant Integration. The Dutch Case. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 36-63.
- ^ Beets, G., Walhout, E. and Koesoebjono, S. (2002) 'Demografische ontwikkeling van de Molukse bevolkingsgroep in Nederland; Maandstatistiek van de bevolking, 50(6): 13-17.
- ^ van Amersfoort, H. (2004) 'The waxing and waning of a diaspora: Moluccans in the Netherlands, 1950-2002', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1): 151-74.
- ^ Dutch television interview with Junus Habibie
- ^ Dutch television report
- History of South Moluccas
- Briefing Paper Presented to The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1996 Session March at Geneva by Karen Parker, J.D.
- RMS Terror Activities in The Netherlands
- Moluccans reject RMS
- History of RMS
- Territorial Disputes: South Moluccas at the Open Directory Project
- Dutch television news item on recent RMS activity