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Optical scan voting system
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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An optical scan' or OpScan voting system is an electronic voting system and uses an optical scanner to read paper ballots.
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One technology used are marksense scanners where voters mark their choice by in a voting response location, usually filling a rectangle, circle or oval, or by completing an arrow. During tabulation the optical scan voting system interprets the votes using "dark mark logic", whereby the computer selects the darkest mark within a given set as the correct choice or vote. An examples of this is the Diebold AccuVote-OS.
The ballot can be immediately tabulated at polling stations allowing for voters to be notified by the voting system of voting errors such as over voting and can prevent residual votes. This is known as a precinct count voting system. Alternately the ballots can be collected in the polling station and tabulated later at a central facility, known as central count voting system
An Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM) is an electronic device that can aid a disabled voter in marking a paper ballot. This device can allow for audio interfaces and still provide paper ballots.
Digital pen voting systems use ballots on digital paper which is recognized by a small camera in the pen while it is marked by the voter.[1][2] The ballots are collected in a ballot box and the digital pen is returned to an election official for tabulation.
The this technology is expected to be used in the 2008 Hamburg state elections. The system is being used due to the complicated electoral system of Hamburg which uses a 30 page booklet of candidates as a ballot. Manual counting would be cumbersome and marksense scanners would be unable to process the paper format.
The technology was first used the town of Menstrie, Clackmannanshire Scotland in their 2006 local community council elections.[3]
With this systems there is no way for an automated recount.
Optical scan voting systems are a form of document ballot voting system, meaning that there is a tangible record of the voter's intent (a paper ballot). Like traditional paper ballots these are subject to electoral fraud and ballot stuffing.
One form of wholesale fraud possible with optical scan voting systems is during the recording of votes. Douglas Jones of the University of Iowa that if a potential attacker were to gain access to the voting system configuration files, they would be able to "credit one candidate with votes intended for another." He found these files are exposed in the computer system used to prepare the election, making them vulnerable to anyone setting up the election. The files are then transferred to the voting system using removable media, and "anyone with access to these media could potentially attack the system."[4]
Another form of wholesale fraud is during tabulation. Possible attacks have been demonstrated by Harri Hursti[5] and the University of Connecticut.[6]
If an attacker is able to obtain a blank ballot (by theft, counterfeit, or a legitimate absentee ballot) the attacker can then mark the ballot her chosen candidates and convince (through intimidation or bribery) a voter to take the pre-marked ballot to a polling station, exchange it for the blank ballot issued and and return the blank ballot to the attacker. This is known as chain voting/[7]
An advantage of these systems is that the voters don't have learn to use a voting machine. Physically able voters can simply use pen and paper to mark their intent.
Optical scan voting systems can allow for manual recounting of ballots. Statistically relevant recounting can serve as a tool to detect or deter malfunction or fraud. Once an error in the counting process is suspected a full recount can determine the proper results.
- Diebold Election Systems (USA)
- ES&S (USA)
- Sequoia Voting Systems (USA)
- Hart Intercivic (USA)
- ^ New Generation of Voting Machines in Germany
- ^ Ulrich Wienser, Hacking the Electoral Law, Page 37ff
- ^ Electronic voting 'world first', BBC News September 27, 2006
- ^ EXAMPLE ATTACK DOCUMENTATION: Optical Scan Configuration File, Douglas Jones Sept 15, 2005
- ^ The Harri Hursti Hack and its Importance to our Nation
- ^ Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal (UConn VoTeR Center and Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut, October 30. 2006)
- ^ Chain Voting, Douglas Jones Aug 26, 2005