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Populism is the use of discourses, ideas or policies which try to appeal to "the people" by setting up a dichotomy between "the people" and "the elite". This populist appeal to "the people" has often been associated with an emotional appeal to identities, including national, class, ethnic and regional ones. Populism may involve either a political philosophy urging social and political system changes — as used by various populist parties such as the Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy ^[1], the Reform Party in Canada and the "One Nation" movement in Australia ^[2] — and/or a rhetorical style, deployed by members of the political class competing for advantage within the existing regime. Today the term "populism" is often used both by journalists and politicians as a vague, frequently pejorative description, whether to describe vote-grabbing measures and rhetoric or in connection with new right-wing nationalist movements as well as many left-wing socialist movements in Latin America.

Contents 1 Academic definitions 2 Populist styles and methods 2.1 Populism and Fascism 3 History in Europe 3.1 Classical Populism 3.2 Early modern period 3.3 Religious revival 3.4 Rejection of ultramontanism 3.5 Elitist nationalism 4 Populism in various countries 4.1 Populism in Latin America 4.1.1 History 4.1.2 Inequality 4.1.3 The economics debate on populism and socialist populism 4.1.4 US policy 4.1.5 Populist strength and current socialist tendency 4.1.6 Mexico: A case study of populism in political campaigns 4.2 Populism in Russia and the former Soviet Union 4.3 Populism in the United States of America 4.4 Populism in Europe 4.4.1 Germany 4.4.2 France 5 See also 6 External links 6.1 Footnotes 6.2 Bibliography 6.3 General 6.4 Europe 6.5 United States

Academic definitions of populism vary widely. ‘To each his own definition of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds’ wrote Peter Wiles in the first major comparative study of populism by Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu, Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics (1969)^[3]. In fact, among both journalists and scholars, the term is often employed in loose, inconsistent and undefined ways to denote appeals to ‘the people’, ‘demagogy’ and ‘catch-all’ politics or as a receptacle for new types of parties whose classification observers are unsure of. Another factor held to diminish the value of ‘populism’ is that, as Margaret Canovan notes in her 1981 study, unlike labels such as ‘socialist’ or ‘conservative’, the meanings of which have been ‘chiefly dictated by their adherents’, contemporary populists rarely call themselves ‘populists’ and usually reject the term when it is applied to them by others ^[4]. Nonetheless, in recent years, scholars have made advances in defining the term in ways which can be profitably employed in research. One of the latest of these is that by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell who, in their volume Twenty-First Century Populism, define populism as pitting "a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" ^[5].

Recent scholarship has also discussed populism as a rhetorical style; as such, the term "populist" may be applied to proponents of widely varying political philosophies. Leaders of populist movements in recent decades have claimed to be on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, while some populists claim to be neither "left wing," "centrist" nor "right wing."^{[6][7][8][9][10][11][12]}

A third group of recent scholars beginning with Lawrence Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America argues that populism is a “movement politics” of organizing for popular empowerment, including many elements beyond formal political parties such as cooperatives, community organizations, trade unions, and popular adult educational and cultural activity. Scholars writing about European populist movements in this vein have described connections between populism and Scandinavian folk schools or folkbildning. Harry Boyte and other scholars in this tradition have traced connections between the populist farmers’ movement of the late nineteenth century, the “popular front” movement of the New Deal, the Southern civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and recent examples of community organizing descended from the self-declared populist Saul Alinsky. ^{[13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]}

Lately, populism has been defined in an ideology sense in American politics as a person who is fiscally liberal and socially conservative. Often, liberals such as the U.S. politician Michael Dukakis will call themselves populists to avoid using the term liberal.

Leaders of populist movements have variously tried to stand up to corporate power, remove "corrupt" elites, fight for the "poor people of the country", "put people first," and "build a cooperative commonwealth." Populism incorporates anti-regime politics, and sometimes espouses nationalism, jingoism, racism or religious fundamentalism, ^[6]but also sometimes more inclusive views and definitions of "the people" than prevailing ones ^[19][20][21]

Often populist movements employ dichotomous rhetoric, and claim to represent the majority of the people. Many populists appeal to a specific region of a country or to a specific social class, such as the working class, middle class, or farmers or simply "the poor".

Populism is characterized by a sometimes radical critique of the status quo, but on the whole does not have a strong ideological identity as either a [left-wing or right-wing movement. Some scholars argue that populist politics as organizing for empowerment represents the return of older "Aristotelean" politics of horizontal interactions among equals who are different, for the sake of public problem solving ^[22]. Populism has taken left-wing, right-wing, and even centrist forms, as well as forms of politics that bring together groups and individuals of diverse partisan views. ^[23] In recent years, conservative United States politicians have begun adopting populist rhetoric; for example, telling people to stand up to "the powerful trial lawyer lobby," "the liberal elite," or "the Hollywood elite." Also in recent years, "left-wing" United States politicians have increasingly begun adopting populist rhetoric; the use of the term "two Americas" in the 2004 Presidential Democratic Party campaign of John Edwards is an example of an attempt to employ Populist themes to persuade voters. In some contrast to both, Barack Obama, whose references to popular empowerment may reflect his experiences as a community organizer in one of the schools of organizing (the Gamaliel Foundation) descended from the late Saul Alinsky, also articulates populist themes. Populists are seen by some politicians as a largely democratic and positive force in society, even while a wing of scholarship in political science contends that populist mass movements are irrational and introduce instability into the political process. Margaret Canovan argues that both these polar views are faulty, and has defined two main branches of modern populism worldwide — agrarian and political — and mapped out seven disparate sub-categories:

• Agrarian populism
  • Commodity farmer movements with radical economic agendas such as the US People's Party of the late 19th century.
  • Subsistence peasant movements, such as the Eastern European Green Rising militias, which followed World War I.
  • Intellectuals who wistfully romanticize hard-working farmers and peasants and build radical agrarian movements like the Russian narodniki.
• Political populism
  • Populist democracy, including calls for more political participation through reforms such as the use of popular referendums.
  • Politicians' populism marked by non-ideological appeals for "the people" to build a unified coalition.
  • Reactionary populism, such as the white backlash harvested by George Wallace.
  • Populist dictatorship, such as that established by Juan Perón in Argentina. (Canovan, 1981)

Mass based right–wing populist movements are a precursor for and building blocks of fascist movements. Both often share elements of anti-elitist conspiracism and ethno-centric scapegoating.^[24][25][26] Conspiracist scapegoating employed by various right wing populist movements can create “a seedbed for fascism.”^[27] One way this can happen is in protest movements against globalization on behalf of corporate interests.^[28]

Right–wing populism interacted with and facilitated fascism in interwar Germany.^[29]. In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. The Nazis "parasitized the forms and themes of the populists and moved their constituencies far to the right through ideological appeals involving demagoguery, scapegoating, and conspiracism".^[30] According to Fritzsche:

• The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization....Against “unnaturally” divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public....[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people’s community... ^[31]

The word populism is derived from the Latin word populus, which means people in English (in the sense of "nation," as in: "The Roman People" (populus Romanus), not in the sense of "multiple individual persons" as in: "There are people visiting us today"). Therefore, populism espouses government by the people as a whole (that is to say, the masses). This is in contrast to elitism, aristocracy, or plutocracy, each of which is an ideology that espouse government by a small, privileged group above the masses.

Populism has been a common political phenomenon throughout history. Spartacus could be considered a famous example of a populist leader of ancient times through his slave rebellion against the rulers of Ancient Rome. In fact, such leaders of the Roman Republic as Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar, and Caesar Augustus were called populares, as all used referendums to go over the Roman Senate's head and establish the laws that they saw fit.

The same conditions which contributed to the outbreak of the English Revolution of 1642-1651, also known as the English Civil War, also led to a proliferation of ideologies and political movements among peasants, self-employed artisans, and working class people in England. Many, possibly most, of these groups had a dogmatic Protestant religious bent. They included Puritans and the Levellers.

Romanticism, the anxiety against rationalism, broadened after the beginnings of the European and Industrial Revolutions because of cultural, social, and political insecurity. Romanticism led directly into a strong popular desire to bring about religious revival, nationalism and populism. The ensuing religious revival eventually blended into political populism and nationalism, becoming at times a single entity, and a powerful force of public will for change. The paradigm shift brought about was marked by people looking for security and community because of a strong emotional need to escape from anxiety and to believe in something larger than themselves.

The revival of religiosity all over Europe played an important role in bringing people to populism and nationalism.

• In France, Chateaubriand provided the opening shots of Catholic revivalism as he opposed enlightenment's materialism with the "mystery of life," the human need for redemption.
• In Germany, Schleiermacher promoted pietism by stating that religion was not the institution, but a mystical piety and sentiment with Christ as the mediating figure raising the human consciousness above the mundane to God's level.
• In England, John Wesley's Methodism split with the Anglican church because of its emphasis on the salvation of the masses as a key to moral reform, which Wesley saw as the answer to the social problems of the day.

All of these were united by a search for something to believe in, Divine certainties in an increasingly uncertain age.

Chateaubriand's beginning brought about two Catholic Revivals in France: first, a conservative revival led by Joseph de Maistre, which defended ultramontanism, also known as the supremacy of the Pope in the church, and a second populist revival led by Felicite de Lamennais, an excommunicated priest. This religious populism opposed ultramontanism and emphasized a church community dependent upon all of the people, not just the elite. Furthermore, it stressed that church authority should come from the bottom-up and that the church should alleviate suffering, not merely accept it, both principles that gave the masses strength.

Nationalism turned in the second half of the 19th century and the nationalist sentiment was altered into an elitist and conservative doctrine.

Power-state theorist and multi-volume historian Heinrich von Treitschke's Politics talked about top-down nationalism in which the state is the creator of the nation, not a result thereof. His state's power fashions political unity because, as he asserts, the national unity was always in place. For von Treitschke, the state is artificially constructed by the elite who know that power counts, but who also form myths such as racism for the comfort and control of the nationalistic masses.

Von Treitschke's nationalism had a dark side. The eternal struggle of nations exposed the weakness of confederated states, via war as social hygiene, culminating in the thought that all nations are egoistic, but their struggles embody morality and embrace progress. Such notions would later be proliferated in the tenets of National Socialism, with strong "races" and states dutifully conquering, and even exterminating, the weak.

Populism has been an important force in Latin American political history (see José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia). In Latin America, many charismatic leaders have emerged since the 20th century, such as Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, Getúlio Vargas, Lázaro Cárdenas, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Juan Domingo Perón, Abdala Bucaram and recently Alan Garcia, Daniel Ortega, Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, Joaquin Balaguer, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner

Populism in Latin America has been traced by some to concepts taken from Perón's Third Position.^[32] Populist practitioners in Latin America usually adapt politically to the prevailing mood of the nation, moving within the ideological spectrum from left to right many times during their political lives. Latin American countries have not always had a clear and consistent political ideology under populism. Most of these countries cannot be as clearly and easily divided between liberals and conservatives, as in the U.S.A., or between social-democrats and Christian-democrats as in European countries. Nevertheless, the more recent pattern that has emerged in Latin American populists has been decidedly socialist populism that appeals to masses of poor by promising redistributive policies and state control of the nation's energy companies.

Populism has been fiscally supported in Latin America during periods of growth such as the 1950s and 1960's and during commodity price booms such as in oil and precious metals. Political leaders could gather followers among the popular classes with broad redistributative programs during these boom times. Populism in Latin America has been sometimes criticized for the fiscal policies of many of its leaders, but has also been defended for having allowed historically weak states to buy off disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability while initiating large-scale industrialization. Thus though specific populist fiscal and monetary policies may be criticized by economic historians, populism has also allowed leaders and parties to co-opt the radical ideas of the masses so as to redirect them in a non revolutionary direction.

Often adapting a nationalist vocabulary and rhetorically convincing, populism was used to appeal to broad masses while remaining ideologically ambivalent. Notwithstanding, there have been notable exceptions. 21st Century Latin-American populist leaders have had a decidedly socialist bent.

When populists do take strong positions on economic philosophies such as capitalism versus socialism, the position sparks strong emotional responses regarding how best to manage the nation's current and future social and economic position. Mexico's 2006 Presidential election was hotly debated within Mexicans who supported and opposed populist candidate Andre Manuel Lopez Obrador.

Thus populism in Latin American countries has both an economic and an idelogical edge. The situation is similar in many countries with the legacies of poor and low-growth economies: highly unequal societies in which people are divided between a relative few wealthy families and masses of poor (with some exceptions such as Argentina, where strong and educated middle classes are a significant segment of the population).

Other perspectives trace inequality to the formation of Latin America's governments and institutions, which were shaped by the Spanish crown upon the conquest of the Americas by the Spaniards. Latin America was not meant to be a colony for the settlers to live in and develop, like the United States, but a source of resources for the Spanish crown. After the nations obtained their independence, many colonial legacies survived.

Populist can be very successful political candidates in such countries. In appealing to the masses of poor people prior to gaining power, populists may promise widely-demanded food, housing, employment, basic social services, and income-redistribution. Once in political power, they may not always be financially or politically able to fulfill all these broad promises. However, they are very often successful in stretching to provide many broad and basic services.

In Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in a relatively short period of time, populist leaders were perceived to have delivered more to their lower class constituents than previous governments. Critics of populist policies point to the infamous consequences of spending and lack of reform on these countries' respective finances involving growing debt, pressured currencies, and hyperinflation, which in turn led to high interest rates, low growth, and debt crisis. The 1980s in Latin America became referred to as a lost decade during which the region experienced low economic growth and few if any reductions in poverty while the Asian Tigers have been consistently developing through high rates of savings, investments, and educational achievements. Supporters of past economic policies would point to the uncontrollable economic consequences of high oil prices to much of the world economy during the 1970s and the unanticipated fall in commodity prices that would later complicate financing past spending.

Reacting to the legacy of the debt-crisis and slow growth during the 1980s, many Latin American governments privatized state-owned enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications during the wave of privatizations that occurred in those countries in the 1990s, and opened to trade. This has also been done outside Latin American from Britain and the U.S. (during the Margaret Thatcher/Ronald Reagan years) to Russia and China's (accelerating economic liberalization during the 1990s) to speed economic growth and employment.

Populists with socialist bents maintain clear support in many cases.

In the Argentinian Corralito crisis, the government was forced to withdraw after three days of popular riots. In Mexico, tortilla price increases have sparked protests demanding price-controls which the leadership instead handled with a gentleman's agreement with major manufacturers capping prices for a fixed time period.

The economic debate continues as reforms to weak and closed Latin American economies opened up to external shocks and competition such as through privatizations and NAFTA in Mexico and other trade agreements and privatizations throughout Latin America. While orthodox economics point to longer term gains for quickly modernizing countries like Chile, slower moving countries have considered retracting from the initial shocks. Some blame a "neo-liberal" economic model favored by an unpopular US government. The "neo-liberal" name, along with the "Washington consensus" have been used to criticize harsh economic policies on the one hand, and on the other hand some have used to demonize modern economic science and policies by tying them directly to the unpopular U.S. government which faces widespread distrust in Latin America. Indeed throughout the world, economists generally agree that the older socialist policies favored by many populists have hindered Latin American economies and that today further economic reforms would be needed to compete in the international arena for more jobs and faster growth. Support for socialism continues within economic circles that rely on pro-socialist works such as "Whither Socialism" by Stiglitz.

US international policies have intervened in Latin American governments in many occasions where populism has threatened its interests: the interventions in Guatemala, when the popular Arbenz government was overthrown by a coup backed by the American company United Fruit and the American ambassador in 1954, and Augusto Pinochet's Chilean coup in 1973 are just two cases of American intervention responding to American interests. Daniel Ortega's Sandinista government in Nicaragua was also viewed as a threat to US foreign policy during the Cold War, leading the United States to place an embargo on trade with the Sadinista's Communist regime as well as support anti-Sadinista rebels.

Populism has nevertheless remained a significant force in Latin America. Populism has recently been re-appearing on the far left with promises of far-reaching socialist changes as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. These socialist changes have included policies nationalizing energy companies such as oil, and consolidation of power into the hands of the President so as to enable a socialist "transformation." The Venezuelan government often spars verbally with the United States and accuses it of attempting to overthrow its president Hugo Chavez after supporting a failed coup against him. Chavez himself has been one of the most outspoken and blunt critics of U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan and U.S. governments continue to rely on each other for oil sales from Venezuela to the United States.

In the 21st century, the large numbers of voters in extreme poverty in Latin America have remained a bastion of support for new populist candidates. Populist candidates have been defeated in middle-income countries such as Peru and Mexico, in part by comparing them to Venezuela's controversial Hugo Chavez, who's socialist policies have been used to scare the growing middle classes and who verbally criticized and belittled the popular Mexican president Vicente Fox. Nevertheless, populist candidates have been more successful in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia (under Morales), Ecuador (under Correa), and Nicaragua (under Ortega).

Wherever governments in Latin America maintain high rates of poverty and yet support unpopular privatizations and more orthodox economic policies without quickly delivering gains to enough people, they will continue to come under pressure from populist politicians who accuse them of focusing on securing more benefits for the upper and upper-middle classes rather than the people as represented by those in poverty and extreme poverty, and for being allied to foreign and business interests.

In Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's candidacy sparked very emotional debates throughout the country regarding policies that affect ideology, class, equality, wealth, and society. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's most controversial economic policies included his promise to expand monthly stipends to the poor and elderly from Mexico City to the rest of the country and to re-negotiate NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) to protect the Mexican poor. The ruling party in Mexico, known as the PAN (Spanish acronym for the National Action Party) portrayed him as a danger to Mexico's hard-earned economic stability. In criticizing his redistributive promises that would create new entitlement programs somewhat similar to social security in the US (though not as broad in scope) and his trade policies that would not fully uphold prior agreements (such as NAFTA), the economic debate between capitalists and socialists became a major part of the debate. The PAN candidate portrayed himself as not just a standard-bearer for recent economic policy, but rather more fully as a more pro-active candidate so as to distance himself from the main criticisms of his predecessor Vicente Fox regarding inaction. He labeled himself the "jobs president" and promised greater national wealth for all through steady future growth, fiscal prudence, international trade, and balanced government spending. During the immediate aftermath of the tight elections in which the country's electoral court was hearing challenges to the vote tally that had Calderon winning, Obrador showed the considerable influence over the masses that are a trademark of populist politicians. He effectively led huge demonstrations filling the central plaza with masses of sympathizers who supported his challenge. The demonstrations lasted for several months and eventually dissipated after the electoral court did not find sufficient cause from the challenges presented to overturn the results.

The Narodnichestvo movement in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century could be described as a populist movement.

• Vladimir Zhirinovsky in modern Russia is another good example of populist politician.
• Natalia Vitrenko of Ukraine is also sometimes characterised as left-wing populist politician.

The United States saw the formation of such political parties during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as the Populist Party, the Greenback Party, the Single Tax movement of Henry George, the Progressive Party of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey Long in 1933-35. Some left-wing populist parties advocated socialism, while other populists rejected both socialism and capitalism, notably Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin.

George Wallace of Alabama led a right-wing populist movement that carried five states and won 13.5% of the popular vote in the 1968 presidential election. Campaigning against intellectuals and liberal reformers, Wallace gained a large share of the white working class vote in Democratic primaries in 1972.

Populism continues to be a force in modern U.S. politics, especially in the 1992 and 1996 third-party presidential campaigns of billionaire Ross Perot. The 1996, 2000 and the 2004 presidential campaigns of Ralph Nader had a strong populist cast. The 2004 campaigns of Dennis Kucinich and Al Sharpton also had populist elements.

Comparison between earlier surges of Populism and those of today are complicated by shifts in what are thought to be the interests of the common people. Jonah Goldberg and others argue that in modern society, fractured as it is into myriad interest groups and microgroups, any attempt to define the interests of the "average person" will be so general as to be useless.

Over time, there have been several versions of a Populist Party in the United States, inspired by the People's Party of the 1890s. This was the party of the early U.S. populist movement in which millions of farmers and other working people successfully challenged much of the social ills engendered by the "Gilded Age" monopolists.

In 1984, the Populist Party name was revived by Willis Carto, and was used in 1988 as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of former Ku Klux Klan leader, and later member of the Republican Party, David Duke. Right-wing Patriot movement organizer Bo Gritz was briefly Duke's running mate. This incarnation was widely regarded as a vehicle for white supremacist recruitment.

In 1995, the Reform Party was organized after the populist presidential campaign of Ross Perot in 1992. After a disputed takeover of the party in 2000, Patrick J. Buchanan received the party's nomination for president.

In the 2000s, new populist parties were formed in America, including the Populist Party of Maryland, which ran candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. Senate and state delegate in the 2006 elections, Populist Party of America in 2002, and the American Populist Renaissance in 2005. The American Moderation Party, also formed in 2005, adopted several populist ideals, chief among them working against multinational neo-corporatism. Within the American media, CNN's Lou Dobbs and Fox News' Bill O'Reilly espouse themselves as voices of populism.

Senator Jim Webb (D-Va.) was elected in 2006 over incumbent George Allen. Webb held prominent offices in the Republican party during the 1980s, but became a Democrat in part because in his opinion, as he stated in a January 2007 NPR interview, the Democratic party seemed more aligned to his populist beliefs. This illustrates that populism can and does span the American political spectrum.

Further information: Radical right-wing populism

See: Völkisch movement

• Fichte began the development of nationalism by stating that people have the ethical duty to further their nation.
• Herder proposed an organic nationalism that was a romantic vision of individual communities rejecting the Industrial Revolution's model communities, in which people acquired their meaning from the nation. This is a philosophy reminiscent of subsidiarity.
• The Brothers Grimm collected German folklore to "gather the Teutonic spirit" and show that these tales provide the common values necessary for the historical survival of a nation.^{[citation needed]}
• Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a Lutheran Minister, a professor at the University of Berlin and the "father of gymnastics," introduced the Volkstum, a racial nation that draws on the essence of a people that was lost in the Industrial Revolution.
• Adam Mueller went a step further by positing the state as a bigger totality than the government institution. This paternalistic vision of aristocracy concerned with social orders had a dark side in that the opposite force of modernity was represented by the Jews, who were said to be eating away at the state.

In France, the populist and nationalist picture was more mystical and metaphysical in nature.

• Historian Jules Michelet fused nationalism and populism by positing the people as a mystical unity who are the driving force of history in which the divinity finds its purpose. For Michelet, in history, that representation of the struggle between spirit and matter, France has a special place because the French became a people through equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because of this, he believed, the French people can never be wrong. Michelet's ideas are not socialism or rational politics, and his populism always minimizes, or even masks, social class differences.

• In the late 18th century, the French Revolution, though led by wealthy intellectuals, could also be described as a manifestation of populist sentiment against the elitist excesses and privileges of the Ancien Régime.

• Jean Marie Le Pen can be characterised as right-wing populist.

This entry is related to, but not included in the Political ideologies series or one of its sub-series. Other related articles can be found at the Politics Portal.

• Black populism
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• Demagogy — as an abstract kind of untruthful speech
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• Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico
• The Return of Populism
• Right-Wing populist resources
• Study of populism that discusses Canovan
• The Populist Blog, A Blog written by a Progressive Populist from Detroit, Michigan
• 2007 University of Michigan 7th annual Dewey lecture, on populism as a politics of civic agency and popular empowerment
• Populist themes in 2008 US elections

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