Second Battle of El Alamein
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| Second Battle of El Alamein | |||||||
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| Part of World War II, North African Campaign | |||||||
October 24, 1942. This photograph, showing Australian soldiers "attacking", was staged by British Army photographer Sgt Len Chetwyn. |
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| Combatants | |||||||
| British Eighth Army: |
Panzer Army Africa: |
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| Strength | |||||||
| 220,000 men 1,100 tanks[1] 750 aircraft (530 serviceable) |
116,000 men[1] 559 tanks[2] 275 German (150) and 400 Italian (200) |
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| Casualties | |||||||
| 2,350 dead [3] 8,950 wounded[3] 2,260 missing[3] 500 tanks destroyed[2] 97 aircraft [3] 111 guns [3] Total: 13,560 |
German: 1,149 dead[4] 3,886 wounded[4] 8,050 captured[4] 64 aircraft[3] Italian: 971 dead[4] 933 wounded[4] 22,071 captured[3] 20 aircraft[3] Total: 37,060 (The Italian Ministry of Defence says that 4,814 Italians died in the battle). [1] |
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| Compass – Sonnenblume – Tobruk – Brevity – Battleaxe – Flipper – Crusader – Gazala – Bir Hakeim – Bir-el Harmat – 1st Alamein – Alam Halfa – Agreement – 2nd Alamein |
| The Second Battle of El Alamein | |
| Battle of El Alamein: map of the battlefield dynamics | |
| Battle of El Alamein: map of initial dispositions | |
The Second Battle of El Alamein marked a significant turning point in the Western Desert Campaign of World War II. The battle lasted from October 23 to November 5, 1942. Following the First Battle of El Alamein, which had stalled the Axis advance, General Bernard Montgomery took command of the British Eighth Army from Claude Auchinleck in August 1942.
Success in the battle turned the tide in the North African Campaign. Allied victory at El Alamein ended Axis hopes of occupying Egypt, controlling access to the Suez Canal, and gaining access to the Middle Eastern oil fields. The defeat at El Alamein marked the end of Axis expansion in Africa.
Contents |
- Further information: Second Battle of El Alamein order of battle
By July 1942, after its success at the Battle of Gazala, the Panzer Army Africa, comprising German and Italian infantry and mechanized units under General Erwin Rommel, had struck deep into Egypt, threatening the British Commonwealth forces' vital supply line across the Suez Canal. General Sir Claude Auchinleck withdrew the Eighth Army to within 50 miles of Alexandria to a point where the Qattara Depression came to within 40 miles of El Alamein on the coast. This gave the defenders secure flanks, because the depression was impassable by tanks, and a relatively short front to defend. Here the Axis advance was halted in the First Battle of El Alamein at the beginning of July.
Eighth Army counter-offensives during July were unsuccessful as Rommel decided to dig in to allow his exhausted troops to regroup. At the end of July Eighth Army called off all offensive action with a view to rebuilding its strength. In early August during a visit to Cairo by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Auchinleck was replaced as Eighth Army commander by Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery (William Gott was the original choice but he soon died in a plane crash after the plane he was on was shot down by German fighters) and as C-in-C Middle East Command by General Sir Harold Alexander.
Faced with overextended supply lines and a relative lack of reinforcements, yet well aware of massive Allied reinforcements due to arrive, Rommel decided to strike at the Allies while their build-up was still not complete. This attack spearheaded by the two armoured divisions of the Afrika Korps on 30 August 1942 at Alam Halfa failed; expecting a counter-attack by Montgomery's Eighth Army, the Panzer Army Afrika dug in.
The factors which favoured the Eighth Army defensive plan in the First Battle of El Alamein, the short front line and the secure flanks, now favoured Rommel. Furthermore, he had plenty of time to prepare his defensive positions and lay extensive minefields and barbed wire. Eighth Army would have to make a frontal attack against well prepared positions and Alexander and Montgomery were determined first to establish a superiority of forces sufficient not only to achieve a breakthrough but also to exploit it and destroy the Axis army. In all the previous swings of the pendulum in the Western Desert since 1941 neither side had ever had the strength after achieving victory in an offensive battle to exploit it decisively and the losing side had always been able to withdraw and regroup.
After six more weeks of building up their forces the Eighth Army was ready to strike. 200,000 men and 1,000 tanks under Montgomery made their move against the 100,000 men and 500 tanks of the Panzer Army Afrika.
With Operation Lightfoot, Montgomery hoped to cut two corridors through the Axis minefields in the north. Armour would then pass through and defeat the German armour. Diversionary attacks at Ruweisat Ridge in the centre and also the south of the line would keep the rest of the Axis forces from moving northwards. Montgomery expected a twelve-day battle in three stages: "The break-in, the dog-fight and the final break of the enemy."
For the first night of the offensive, Montgomery planned that four infantry divisions would advance to an objective codenamed the Oxalic Line, overrunning the forward Axis defences. Engineers would meanwhile clear and mark lanes through the minefields, through which the armoured divisions would pass to gain the Skinflint Report Line (where they would check and report their progress), and the Pierson Bound (where they would rally and temporarily consolidate their position) in the depths of the Axis defences.
The Commonwealth forces practised a number of deceptions in the months prior to the battle to wrong-foot the Axis command, not only as to the exact whereabouts of the forthcoming battle, but as to when the battle was likely to occur. This operation was codenamed Operation Bertram. In September, they dumped waste materials (discarded packing cases etc.) under camouflage nets in the northern sector, making them appear to be ammunition or ration dumps. The Axis naturally noticed these, but as no offensive action immediately followed and the "dumps" did not change in appearance over time, they subsequently ignored them. This allowed Eighth Army to build up supplies in the forward area unnoticed by the Axis, by replacing the rubbish with ammunition, petrol or rations at night. Meanwhile, a dummy pipeline was built, the construction of which would lead the Axis to believe the attack would occur much later than it in fact did, and much further south. To further the illusion, dummy tanks consisting of plywood frames placed over jeeps were constructed and deployed in the south. In a reverse feint, the tanks destined for battle in the north were disguised as supply lorries by placing removable plywood superstructures over them.
With the failure of the Axis offensive at Alam Halfa, the Axis forces were seriously depleted. The German and Italian armies were over-stretched and exhausted and were relying on captured Allied supplies and equipment. In August, Rommel still had an advantage in men and materials but this was quickly turning against him as no major reinforcements were being sent to him and the British Commonwealth forces were being massively re-supplied with men and materials from the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and some tanks and trucks from the USA. Rommel continued to request equipment and supplies but the main focus of the German war machine was on the Eastern Front and very limited supplies reached North Africa.
Rommel knew full well that the British Commonwealth Forces would soon be strong enough to launch an offensive against his army. His only hope now relied on the German forces fighting in the Battle of Stalingrad quickly defeating the Soviet forces and moving south through the Trans-Caucasus and threatening Persia (Iran) and the Middle East.
This would require large numbers of British Commonwealth forces to be sent from the Egyptian front to reinforce British forces in Persia, leading to the postponement of any British Commonwealth offensive against his Army.
Using this pause Rommel could urge the German High Command to reinforce his forces for the eventual link-up between his Afrika Korps and German armies battling their way through southern Russia enabling them to finally defeat the British and Commonwealth armies in North Africa and the Middle East.
In the meantime, his forces were dug-in and waiting for the eventual attack by the British Commonwealth forces or the defeat of the Soviet Army in Stalingrad. They had laid around half a million mines, mainly anti-tank, in what was called the Devil's gardens. (Many of these mines were of British origin, captured at Tobruk). Anti-personnel mines (such as the S-mine) were mixed with the anti-tank mines.
Rommel alternated German and Italian infantry formations in the forward lines. Rommel's reserves consisted of two German panzer divisions and one motor infantry division, and an Italian force of the same nominal size. Because the Allied deception measures had confused the Axis as to the point of attack, they had to be spread over the entire front. This would delay their concentration against any Allied attack, and also force them to use large amounts of fuel, which Rommel lacked.
The Battle of El Alamein is usually divided into five phases, consisting of the break-in (October 23-24), the crumbling (October 24-25), the counter (October 26-28), Operation Supercharge (November 1-2) and the breakout (November 3-7). No name is given to the period from October 29 to the 30th when the battle was at a standstill.
At 9.40p.m.[5] on a calm, clear evening under the bright sky of a full moon, Operation Lightfoot began but not with a 1000 gun barrage as in popular belief nor with all guns firing at the same time. The fire plan had been carefully planned so that all 882 guns from the Field and Medium batteries' first rounds would land across the entire 40 mile front at the same time[6]. After twenty minutes of heavy general bombardment, the guns switched to precision targets in support of the advancing infantry.[7]The shelling plan continued for five and a half hours, by the end of which each gun had fired about 600 rounds.
There was a reason for the name Operation Lightfoot; the infantry had to attack first. Many of the anti-tank mines would not be tripped by soldiers running over them since they were too light (hence the code-name). As the infantry advanced, engineers had to clear a path for the tanks coming up in the rear. Each stretch of land cleared of mines was to be 24 feet wide, which was just enough to get tanks through in single file. The engineers had to clear a five-mile route through the 'Devil’s Garden'. It was a difficult task and one that essentially failed because of the depth of the Axis minefields.
At 10 p.m., the four infantry divisions of XXX Corps began to move. The objective was an imaginary line in the desert where the strongest enemy defences were situated. Once the infantry reached the first minefields, the mine sweepers (sappers) moved in to create a passage for the armoured divisions of X Corps. At 2 a.m., the first of the 500 tanks crawled forward. By 4 a.m. the lead tanks were in the minefields, where they stirred up so much dust that there was no visibility at all, and traffic jams developed as the tanks got bogged down.
Meanwhile, XIII Corp's 7th Armoured Division (with 1st Free French Brigade under command) made a feinting attack to the south, engaging and pinning the 21st Panzer Division and the Ariete Division and at Ruweisat Ridge Indian 4th Infantry Division similarly occupied the Italian "Bologna" Division.
The morning of Saturday 24 October brought disaster for the German headquarters. The accuracy of the barrage destroyed German communications and Georg Stumme, who commanded the Axis forces while Rommel was in Germany, died of a heart attack. Temporary command was given to General Ritter von Thoma.
Meanwhile, XXX Corps had only dented the first minefields. Not enough of the minefields had been cleared to enable X Corps to pass through, so all day long the Allied Desert Air Force attacked Axis positions, making over 1,000 sorties.
Panzer units attacked the 51st Highland Division just after sunrise, only to be stopped in their tracks. By 4:00 p.m. there was little progress. At dusk, with the sun at their backs, Axis tanks from the 15th Panzer Division and Italian Littorio Division swung out from Kidney Ridge to engage the 1st Armoured Division and the first major tank battle of El Alamein was joined. Over 100 tanks were involved in this battle and by dark, half were destroyed while neither position was altered.
Meanwhile on 1st Armoured Division's right, the Highland Division were engaging in the first tank versus infantry battle at El Alamein. It was to last for two days with many casualties, but when it was over the Allies held Kidney Ridge.
D Plus 2: Sunday, October 25, 1942 The initial thrust had ended by Sunday. Both armies had been fighting non-stop for two days. The Allies had advanced through the minefields in the west to make a six mile wide and five mile deep inroad. They now sat atop Miteriya Ridge in the southeast, but at the same time the Axis forces were firmly entrenched in most of their original battle positions and the battle was at a standstill. Hence, General Montgomery ordered an end to conflict in the south (releasing 7th Armoured Division to move north to join X Corps) and the evacuation of Miteriya Ridge. The battlefield would be concentrated at the Kidney and Tell el Eisa until a breakthrough occurred. It was to be a gruesome seven days.
By early morning, the Axis forces launched a series of attacks using the 15th Panzer and Littorio divisions. The Afrika Korps was probing for a weakness, but they found none. When the sun set, the Allied infantry went on the attack. Around midnight, the 51st Division launched three attacks, but no one knew exactly where they were. Pandemonium and carnage ensued, resulting in the loss of over 500 Allied troops, and leaving only one officer among the attacking forces.
While the 51st was operating around the Kidney, the Australians were attacking Point 29, a 20 foot high Axis artillery observation post southwest of Tell el Eisa, in an attempt to surround an Axis salient on the coast containing the German 164th Light Division and large numbers of Italian infantry.[8] This was the new northern thrust Montgomery had devised earlier in the day, and it was to be the scene of heated battle for days to come. The 26th Australian Brigade attacked at midnight. The air force dropped 115 tons of bombs and the Allies took the position and 240 prisoners. Fighting continued in this area for the next week, as the Axis tried to recover the small hill that was so vital to their defence.
D Plus 3: Monday, October 26, 1942
Rommel returned to North Africa on the evening of the 25th, and immediately assessed the battle. He found that the Italian Trento Division had lost half of its infantry, the 164 Light Division had lost two battalions, most other groups were under strength, all men were on half rations, a large number were sick, and the entire Axis army had only enough fuel for three days.
The offensive was stalled. Churchill railed, "Is it really impossible to find a general who can win a battle?" A counterattack began at 3 p.m. against Point 29 near Tell el Eisa. Rommel was determined to retake the position and moved all the tanks from around Kidney Ridge to the battle site. Air and ground power poured into the area as Rommel moved the 21st Panzer and Ariete Division up from the south along the Rahman Track. That turned out to be a mistake. The British held the position and Rommel's troops could not retire for lack of fuel, and were therefore stuck on open ground at the mercy of air attacks.
However, back at Kidney Ridge, the British failed to take advantage of the missing tanks. Each time they tried to move forward they were stopped by anti-tank guns.
On a brighter note for the British, Beaufort torpedo bombers of No.42/47 Squadron Royal Air Force sank the tanker Proserpina at Tobruk, which was the last hope for resupplying Rommel's army
D Plus 4: Tuesday, October 27, 1942
By now, the main battle was concentrated around Tell el Aqqaqir and Kidney Ridge. The 2nd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, belonging to the 1st Armoured Division, was at a position codenamed Snipe, to the southwest of Kidney Ridge. The stand at Snipe is a legendary episode of the Battle of El Alamein. Phillips, in his Alamein records that:
"The desert was quivering with heat. The gun detachments and the platoons squatted in their pits and trenches, the sweat running in rivers down their dust-caked faces. There was a terrible stench. The flies swarmed in black clouds upon the dead bodies and excreta and tormented the wounded. The place was strewn with burning tanks and carriers, wrecked guns and vehicles, and over all drifted the smoke and the dust from bursting high explosives and from the blasts of guns."
Mortar and shell fire was constant all day long. Around 4 p.m., British tanks accidentally opened fire against their own position, killing many. At 5 p.m., Rommel launched his major attack. German and Italian tanks moved onward. With only four guns in operation, the Rifle Brigade was able to score continual broad-side hits against forty tanks of the 21st Panzer Division, knocking out thirty-seven of them. The remaining three withdrew and a new assault was launched. All but nine tanks in this assault were also destroyed. The Rifle Brigade was down to three guns with three rounds each, but the Germans had given up on this assault.
D Plus 5-6: Wednesday, Thursday, October 28-29, 1942
The Australians were to continue pushing northwest beyond Tell el Eisa to an enemy-held location south of the railway known as "Thompson's Post" and force a breakthrough along the coast road. By the end of the day, the British had 800 tanks still in operation, while the Axis had 148 German and 187 Italian tanks. With the tanker Luisiano sunk outside Tobruk harbor, Rommel told his commanders, "It will be quite impossible for us to disengage from the enemy. There is no gasoline for such a maneuver. We have only one choice and that is to fight to the end at Alamein."
D Plus 7-9: Friday-Sunday, October 30 - November 1, 1942
The night of October 30 saw a continuation of previous plans, with the Australians attacking. This was their third attempt to reach the paved road, which they took on that night. On the 31st, Rommel launched four retaliatory attacks against "Thompson's Post". The fighting was intense and often hand to hand, but no ground was gained by the Axis forces. On Sunday, November 1, Rommel tried to dislodge the Australians once again, but the brutal, desperate fighting resulted in nothing but lost men and equipment. By now, it had become obvious to Rommel that the battle was lost. He began to plan the retreat and anticipated retiring to Fuka, a few miles west. Ironically, 1,200 tons of fuel arrived, but it was too late and had to be blown up.
This phase of the battle began on November 2 at 1 a.m., with the objective of destroying enemy armour, forcing the enemy to fight in the open, reducing the Axis stock of petrol, attacking and occupying enemy supply routes, and causing the disintegration of the enemy army. The intensity and the destruction in Supercharge were greater than anything witnessed so far during this horrific battle. The objective of this operation was Tell el Aqqaqir along the Rahman Track, which was the base of the Axis defence.
This attack started with a seven hour aerial bombardment focused on Tell el Aqqaqir and Sidi Abdel Rahman, followed by a four and a half hour barrage of 360 guns firing 15,000 shells. The initial thrust of Supercharge was to be carried out by the battle-scarred New Zealanders (although the attacking infantry were two brigades attached from British infantry divisions and the armour to follow the infantry were the British 9th Armoured Brigade, attached to the New Zealand division). The New Zealanders' commander, Freyburg, had tried to free his division of this chore, as they were under strength and weary, but that was not to be, so on this cold November night with the moon on the wane, the New Zealanders moved out.
The infantry gained most of their objectives, but as with Operation Lightfoot on the first day of the battle, lanes could not be cleared through the minefields until night was almost over.
9 Armoured Brigade started its approach march at 8pm from El Alamein train station on the 1st November with around 130 tanks; it arrived at its start line with only 94 tanks[9]. The brigade was supposed to have started their attack towards Tell el Aqqaqir at 5.45a.m. behind a barrage; however, the attack was postponed for 30 minutes while the brigade regrouped on Currie's orders[10]. At 6.15 a.m., half an hour before dawn, the three regiments of the brigade charged forward towards the gunline[11].
"We all realise that for armour to attack a wall of guns sounds like another Balaclava, it is properly an infantry job. But there are no more infantry available. So our armour must do it."
– Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyburg[12]
Brigadier Currie had tried to get the brigade out of doing this job stating that he believed the brigade would be attacking on too wide a front with no reserves and that they will most likely take 50 percent losses.[12]
The reply came from Freyburg that Montgomery
"...was aware of the risk and has accepted the possibility of losing 100% casualties in 9 Armoured Brigade to make the break, but in view of the promise of immediate following through of 1 Armoured Division, the risk was not considered as great as all that." [12]
The German and Italian anti tank guns (mostly made up of Pak 38 and Italian 47mm guns[13], along with 24 of the dreaded 88mm flak guns[12]) opened fire upon the charging tanks silhouetted by the steadily rising sun.
The Axis gun screen started to inflict a steady amount of damage upon the charging tanks but was unable to stop them; over the course of the next half an hour around 35 guns were destroyed and several hundred prisoners were taken.
The brigade had started the attack with 94 tanks and was reduced to only 24 runners (although many were recoverable[11]) and had taken between 230–300 casualties.
“If the British armour owed any debt to the infantry, the debt was paid by 9 Armoured in heroism and blood.”
- Bernard Montgomery, referring to the British Armours damning mistakes during the First Battle of El Alamein where they had not been able to support the infantry as well as they should have.
After the Brigade's action, Brigadier Gentry of the 6th New Zealand Brigade went ahead to survey the scene. On seeing Brigadier Currie asleep on a stretcher, he approached him saying, "Sorry to wake you John, but I'd like to know where your tanks are?" Currie waved his hand at a group of tanks around him, replying "There they are". Gentry was puzzled. "I don't mean your headquarters tanks, I mean your armoured regiments. Where are they?" Currie waved his arm and again replied, "There are my armoured regiments, Bill" [14].
The brigade had sacrificed itself upon the gun line and caused great damage but had failed to create the gap for the 1st Armoured Division to pass through; however, the attack as expected[11] brought down the weight of the German and Italian tank reserve which was engaged and destroyed by the 1st Armoured Division and the remains of the 9 Armoured Brigade throughout the rest of the day.
The resulting fighting was later termed, the "Hammering of the Panzers". Although tank losses were approximately equal, this represented only a portion of the total British armour, but most of Rommel's tanks.
Rommel called up Ariete from the south to join the defence around Tell el Aqqaqir in the last stand of the German army. By nightfall, the Axis had only thirty two tanks operating along the entire front. While the Afrika Korps was fighting for its life at Tell el Aqqaqir, Rommel began the withdrawal to Fuka.
Erwin Rommel sent a message to Hitler explaining his untenable position and seeking permission to withdraw, but Rommel was told to stand fast. Von Thoma told him, "I've just been around the battlefield. 15th Panzer's got ten tanks left, 21st Panzer only fourteen and Littorio seventeen." Rommel read him Hitler's message, so he left to take command at the head of the Afrika Korps.
When 150 British tanks came after the remaining members of the nearly vanquished 15th and 21st Panzers, Von Thoma stood with his men. He was in the command tank at the spot where the two panzer units joined, and there he remained until the last tank was destroyed. At the end, when all was lost, Von Thoma stood alone beside his burning tank at the spot that was to become known as the "panzer graveyard".
Despite the desperate situation, Rommel's men stood their ground. Entire units were destroyed, but the remnants continued to fight. A 12 mile wide hole had been cut in the Axis line. "If we stay put here, the army won't last three days... If I do obey the Fuhrer's order, then there's the danger that my own troops won't obey me... My men come first!" Rommel ordered the massive retreat against Hitler's orders.
D Plus 12, November 4, 1942
On November 4, the final assaults were underway. The British 1st , 7th and 10th Armoured Divisions passed through the German lines and were operating in the open desert. The Allies had won the battle. The Axis were in retreat. This day saw the liquidation of the Ariete Division, the Littorio Division and the Trieste Motorised Division. The Ariete Armoured Division under General Francesco Arena performed well at El Alamein effectively thwarting Allied plans to encircle and completely destroy the German forces. Berlin radio claimed that in this sector the "British were made to pay for their penetration with enormous losses in men and material. The Italians fought to the last man."[15]
So far, Rommel had lost nearly 23,000 men and 1,000 tanks, and had only 80 working tanks left. The Allies also suffered heavy losses: 13,500 men were killed, missing or wounded. Major-General Douglas Wimberley swore, "Never again."
"Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat."
– Winston Churchill.
Montgomery had always envisioned the battle as being one of attrition, similar to those fought in the Great War and had correctly predicted both the length of the battle and the number of Allied casualties [16]. Commonwealth artillery was superbly handled but armoured tactics displayed the cavalry mentality that repeatedly cost Allied forces dearly as they attacked in open country in mass formation with insufficient infantry and air support. Commonwealth air support was therefore of limited use, but contrasted with the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica who offered little or no support to ground forces, preferring to engage in air-to-air combat.
In the end the Allies' victory was all but total. El Alamein was the first great offensive against the Germans in which the Allies were victorious. Winston Churchill famously summed up the battle on 10 November 1942 with the words, "Now this is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning." It was Montgomery's greatest triumph; he took the title "Viscount Montgomery of Alamein" when he was raised to the peerage.
Once again, the Axis withdrew to El Agheila. Twice before, in 1940 and 1941, British and Commonwealth forces had advanced to El Agheila but no further. On the first occasion Wavell's offensive in 1940 had failed when with his lines of supply overstretched, political decisions intervened to withdraw troops to fight in Greece and East Africa while his opponents were reinforced with the Afrika Korps. In 1941 Auchinleck and Ritchie's forces once again reached El Agheila with ragged supply lines and exhausted formations and were pushed back. This time, however, it was Rommell's troops which found themselves fought out and with few replacements while prior to the battle Montgomery had focused his planners intensly on the question of how to create supply lines to provide the Eighth Army with the 2,400 tonnes of supply it needed each day.[17]
Huge quantities of engineering materials and equipment had been collected to repair the destroyed transport infrastructure. This was so successful that the railway line between El Alamein and Fort Capuzzo, despite having been blown up in over 200 separate places, was quickly put into commission and in the month after Eighth Army reached Capuzzo carried 133,000 tons of supplies.[18] The port of Benghasi was handling 3,000 tons a day by the end of December when it had been thought that, after two years of almost constant destructive effort, its extreme capacity would be 800 tons.[18]
Rommel's army had lost roughly 75,000 men, a thousand guns and 500 tanks and needed time to re-form. When it became clear to Rommel that the Allies' logistical effort (which by this time was also employing large quantities of aerial transport) would allow Montgomery to mount a major attack on his position at El Agheila in mid-December he decided to husband what remained of his weakened forces and withdraw.[19]
Rommel conducted a text-book retreat, destroying all equipment and infrastructure left behind[20] and peppering the land behind him with mines and booby traps to keep the following Eighth Army at arm's length.[21] Eighth Army reached Sirte on 25 December but west of Sirte they were forced to pause to consolidate their strung out formations in order to deal with the defensive line Rommel had created at Wadi Zemzem.[22]
On 15 January 1943 Montgomery launched 51st (Highland) Division against Rommel's defences while sending 2nd New Zealand and 7th Armoured Divisions around the inland flank of Rommel's line. Once again Rommel was forced to conduct a fighting retreat. Tripoli, some 150 miles (240 km) miles further on, with its major port facilities, was taken on 23 January as Rommel continued to withdraw to the French-built southern defenses of Tunisia at the Mareth Line.
Rommel was by this time in contact with Hans-Jürgen von Arnim's Fifth Panzer Army which had been fighting the Tunisia Campaign against the multi-national British First Army in northern Tunisia since shortly after Operation Torch the previous autumn. Hitler was determined to retain hold of Tunisia and Rommel finally started to receive replacement men and materials. The Axis now faced a war on two fronts with Eighth Army approaching from the east and the British, French and Americans of First Army from the west. Rommel's German-Italian Panzer Army was re-designated Italian First Army under General Giovanni Messe while Rommel assumed command of the new Army Group Africa, responsible for both fronts.
Similarly the two Allied armies were placed under 18th Army Group with Harold Alexander in command. However, the hope of a rapid conclusion to the campaign against the Axis forces was thwarted at the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in the second half of February when Rommel struck a costly blow against the inexperienced U.S. II Corps and destroyed their ability to make an early thrust east to the coast to cut off the Italian First Army's line of supply from Tunis and isolate it from von Arnim's forces in the north.
Rommel did not lose hope in Africa till the end of the Tunisia Campaign. Even so, El Alamein was a significant Allied victory and the most decisive with respect to closing of a war front. After three years the African theatre was cleared of Axis forces and the Allies could look northward to the Mediterranean.
- Barr, Niall [2004] (2005). Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press. ISBN 978-1585677382.
- Bierman, John; Smith, Colin [2002] (2003). War without hate : the desert campaign of 1940-1943, New edition, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0142003947.
- Buffetaut, Yves(1995);Operation Supercharge-La seconde bataille d'El Alamein; Histoire Et Collections
- Carver, Field Marshal Lord [1962] (2000). El Alamein, New edition, Ware, Herts. UK: Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 978-1840222203.
- Clifford, Alexander (1943). Three against Rommel. London: George G. Harrap.
- Latimer, Jon (2002). Alamein. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0719562037.
- Mead, Richard (2007). Churchill's Lions: A biographical guide to the key British generals of World War II. Stroud (UK): Spellmount, 544 pages. ISBN 978-1-86227-431-0.
- Playfair, Major-General I.C.O.; and others [1966] (2004). History Of The Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, volume 4: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa, United Kingdom Military Series. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84574-068-8.
- Rommel, Erwin; with Basil Liddell-Hart [1953] (1982). The Rommel Papers. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0306801570.
- Walker, Ronald (1967). The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945: Alam Halfa and Alamein. Wellington, NZ: Historical Publications Branch.
- The fate of the Italians in the battle as reported by TIME MAGAZINE
- Official History of Australia in the Second World War Volume III - Tobruk and El Alamein Chapters 14 -15
- The 3rd Hussars (9th Armoured Brigade) at El Alamein
- Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and Second World War (Deception and mine clearance at EL Alamein)
- The History of the British 7th Armoured Division
- El Alamein
- ^ a b Buffetaut, Yves(1995)
- ^ a b Carver, Michael (1962)
- ^ a b c d e f g h Playfair, Major General I.S.O., pg. 78
- ^ a b c d e Barr, Niall, pg. 404
- ^ Mead, Richard, p.304
- ^ Barr, Niall, pg. 308
- ^ Clifford, Alexander, p.307
- ^ Clifford, Alexander p.308
- ^ Playfair, Major General I.S.O., pg. 66
- ^ Barr, Niall. pg. 387
- ^ a b c Playfair, Major General I.S.O., pg.67
- ^ a b c d Barr, Niall. pg. 386
- ^ Walker, Ronald pg. 395
- ^ C.E. Lucas-Phillips. “Alamein” pg. 358
- ^ Desert War, Note (11): Statement issued by the German Government on 6 November 1942. spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk. Retrieved on 2007-12-22.
- ^ Hamilton, Nigel (2004). "Montgomery, Bernard Law", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press.
- ^ Clifford, Alexander p.317
- ^ a b Clifford, Alexander p. 318
- ^ Clifford, Alexander p.319
- ^ Clifford, Alexander p.322
- ^ Clifford, Alexander p.320
- ^ Clifford, Alexander pp.325-327