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Title The Guns of August

Author	Barbara Tuchman
Country	United States
Language	English
Genre(s)	Military History, History
Publisher	Random House
Released	1962
Media type	Print (Paperback)
Pages	551
ISBN	ISBN 0-345-38623-X

The Guns of August (1962) (also published as August 1914) is an enormously popular military history book written by Barbara Tuchman. It primarily describes the events of the first month of World War I. The focus of The Guns of August is to provide the history of World War I from the declaration of war through the start of the Franco-British offensive that stopped the German advance through France. In addition, the book provides a brief history of the plans, strategies, world events and international sentiments prior to and during the war.

The book is broken down into four sections—Plans, Outbreak, Battle and afterword.

Contents 1 Plans 2 Outbreak 3 Battle 3.1 Crossing Belgium 3.2 The Front in France 3.3 The Front with Russia 3.4 The Flames of Louvain 4 Critical Analysis 5 Cultural Effects

The first five chapters are devoted to describing the major powers of the war (Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, omitting Austria and Turkey) and the events that led to the conflict. Tuchman describes in detail the societal forces behind the events in The Proud Tower. The opening chapters provide the necessary background for the discussion of the battles and their commanders, although some events (notably the Dreyfus Affair and military engagements prior to 1914, especially the Franco-Prussian War) are assumed to be prior knowledge, and are referenced without explanation.

The book opens with the death of King Edward VII, whose funeral on May 20, 1910 marked "the greatest assemblage of royalty and rank ever gathered and, of its kind, the last."(pp. 15). Following chapters describe

• German obsession with encirclement and military superiority, culminating in the Schlieffen Plan to overrun France in thirty-nine days.
• France's desire to win back her lost territories and in turn focusing exclusively on offensive plans (Plan 17).
• Britain's hesitancy to become involved in a European war.
• Russia's ominous size and unseen military and infrastructural weaknesses.

These chapters discuss from July 28, 1914 (the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife Sophie) through August 3, 1914 and play out the opening days of the war—the commencement of France's offensive Plan 17, the struggle by Russia to ensure her ally (France) would join in the war and France's attempts to win a guarantee from Britain of her involvement; as well as Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.

The remainder of the book is essentially devoted to the battles and tactical planning on the two fronts. Intertwined with this are the effects of leaders' egos and insubordination, as well as the perceptions of the rest of the world, including the events that cemented these views.

Tuchman continues by covering the two major theatres of war, the Western Front and the Russian Eastern Front, but starts the section by covering the search for the German battlecruiser Goeben by Allied forces in the Mediterranean. The Goeben finally took refuge in the Dardanelles while Turkey was still neutral and thus precipitated its entry into the war on the side of Germany, cutting off Russian import/export through the year-round ports of the Black Sea.

Tuchman chronicles the sweep of the Germans through Belgium focusing on the battle at Liège and the efforts of King Albert to mount the best defense possible against overwhelming forces as well as his attempts, in vain, to alert the head of the French forces, General Joseph Joffre, of the massive size of the German force. As with most major events, she describes the effect of the successes in this defense on the world view of the new war.

As they crossed the Belgium frontier into France, the German armies were engaged by 7 French armies and 4 British divisions known as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The Battle of the Borders was brutal, and the Allies were forced to slowly retreat under the German onslaught until finally the Germans were within 40 miles of Paris. The city was preparing for siege and possibly complete destruction, the government had fled south, and when 2 divisions of reserves arrived they were rushed to the front by the city's fleet of 600 taxi cabs.

Tuchman carefully introduces us to all the key players, the Allied commanders (French, Russian and British) and the German commanders. With her characteristic attention to detail we learn of their personalities, strengths and weaknesses. Many of the names are unfamiliar: Joseph Joffre, the French General; Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister; Moltke's, Chief of the General Staff; von Kluck the commander of the German's far right wing. But some of the names are more familiar: Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, President Raymond Poincaré, Lord of the British Admiralty Winston Churchill, and a young soldier named Charles de Gaulle who fought for France (only given honorable mention), among others.

Only two chapters are devoted to the Eastern Front. These chapters center on the Russian invasion of East Prussia and the German reaction to it, culminating in the battle of Tannenberg. Tuchman further completely ignores the front between Austria and Serbia and the front between Austria and Russia in Galicia (Battle of Lemberg).

In these chapters, Tuchman covers the series of errors, faulty plans, poor communications and poor logistics which decidedly helped the French by causing the Germans to transfer two corps (yet another error?) to defend what the book refers to as the 'Russian Steam Roller'. It only hints of the follow-on misery of the eastern front.

Woven into the section on battle, are the threads for the formation of world opinion of Germany as the aggressor nation, with implications that the actions would greatly affect future involvement of the United States. In the chapter The Flames of Louvain, Tuchman uses a variety of sources to convey the desire of the German Empire and what appears to be the majority view of its people. She cites the writing of Thomas Mann [page 348], saying the goal was "the establishment of the German idea in history, the enthronement of Kultur, the fulfillment of Germany's historical mission". Further on she recounts reporter Irvin S. Cobb's account of an interview with a German scientist: "Germany [is] for progress. German Kultur will enlighten the world and after this war there will be no other."

This chapter continues to detail the "German theory of terror" [page 350] inflicted on the citizens of Belgium in a failed attempt to suppress the franc-tireur. The factual account leaves little doubt of the ferocity for which the world would view the reprisals of the German forces.

The book ends on the French mounting an offensive, Order No. 6, September 6, 1914, on von Kluck's exposed right flank, in what is to be the first successful offensive by the Allies. In the subsequent attack, the Germans were forced back north, with both sides suffering terrible losses. While Paris had been saved, the war took on a new cast and both sides settled into a defensive trench system that cut across France and Belgium from the Channel to Switzerland. This became known as the Western Front and was to consume a generation of young men over the next four years.

Throughout the aforementioned narrative, Tuchman constantly brought up the numerous misconceptions, miscalculations, and mistakes that she believed ended with the tragedy of trench warfare. Among these were:

• Economic miscalculation. In Tuchman's view, both European intellectuals and leaders overestimated the power of free trade. These individuals believed that the interconnection of European nations due to this trade would stop a continent-wide war from breaking out, as the economic consequences would be too great. However, this assumption was incorrect. For example, Tuchman noted that Moltke, when warned of such consequences, refused to even consider them in his plans, arguing he was a "soldier," not an "economist."
• Unfounded belief in quick warfare. Except for a very few politicians (who were at the time ridiculed and excluded because of their views), all the leaders of the major combatants believed the war would be concluded in a matter of weeks, and by the end of 1914 at the absolute latest. Tuchman recounted the story of a British statesman who, after he warned others that the war might last two or three years, was branded a "pessimist." This false assumption had disastrous effects, especially on logistics (see below).
• Breakdown in logistics. Because of the false assumption that the war would quickly be over, nations did not plan very far ahead for the supplies and support of their armies. When the war continued longer than expected, this mistake proved disastrous. This was especially true for Russia, which rapidly moved troops and conquered sections of East Prussia, only to be roundly defeated at the Battle of Tannenberg because the Russian supply lines became too long to be sustained.
• Breakdown in tactical communication. Many military leaders - especially German ones - had embraced new means of communication such as the telegraph and telephone, and their war games and tactics were based on the assumption that commanders could quickly and efficiently communicate with their subordinates. However, the unexpected chaos of the war cut off these lines of communications. As a result, commanders rarely had a reliable picture of the strategic situation, and their subordinates were often left with no orders or, even worse, orders based on outdated or false information.
• Over-reliance on morale and the offensive. Tuchman details, in depth, how the leaders of the major powers, before the war, developed a philosophy of warfare based almost entirely on morale, a constant offensive, and retaining the initiative. Joffre, in particular, refused to consider going on the defensive - or even to slow the offensive - even when the realities of the battlefield demonstrated that this approach was not working.
• Failure to consider political backlash. Many war planners did not take into consideration the political and treaty-based consequences of their offensive actions. As Tuchman argues, the German leaders in particular refused to consider the consequences of moving their armies into Belgium, despite that country's neutrality. Despite Moltke's concerns, German generals insisted on moving through Belgium because they needed to maneuver. They failed (or refused) to realize that by invading Belgium, they effectively forced Britain to declare war because of existing treaties and national honor.
• Outdated forms of wartime etiquette. Although the technology, aims, methods, and plans of World War I were drastically different from earlier wars, military leaders continued to insist upon a form of martial etiquette from civilians which increased resentment between the countries. To illustrate, Tuchman regularly quotes from the diaries of German generals who comandeered the homes and supplies of civilians. One recurrent theme within their diary entries was that they simply couldn't understand why the property owners refused to fully cooperate, in line with past wartime courtesy. In a somewhat comical passage, Tuchman even quotes from a general who criticized the master of a Belgian house for failing to sit with him at dinner and observe proper mealtime etiquette, despite the fact that the Germans had violated his country's neutrality, taken over his house, and stolen or destroyed much of his property.

Overall, Tuchman argued that none of the war's major combatants wanted a sustained war, but the above breakdowns caused it nonetheless. Likewise, she argued that even actions that superficially appeared successful, such as the Battle of Tannenberg (German victory) or the First Battle of the Marne (French victory), were in reality accidental victories that were won despite, not because, of military leadership or strategy.

The book was an immediate bestseller. The Pulitzer Prize nomination committee was unable to award it the prize for outstanding history because Joseph Pulitzer's will specifically stated that the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for history must be a book on American history. Instead, Tuchman was given the prize for general non-fiction.

President John F. Kennedy encouraged members of his cabinet to read The Guns of August, see [1]. This impacted on the management of the Cuban Missile Crisis. [2] After the crisis was over, Kennedy gave a copy of the book to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and commented that the Western world had something to learn from the lessons of August 1914.

Graham Allison, a political scientist who covered the Cuban Missile Crisis in Essence of Decision, noted the effect of the Tuchman's book on Kennedy, but also its implications for the proper study of decision-making and warfare. Allison created an entire model of decision-making, which he called the "Organizational Process Model," based on such issues covered by Tuchman, a model which directly countered game theory and other rationalistic means of explaining events.